

## THE IMPERIAL CONGRESS AND FRONTIER STABILITY: THE CASE OF IRAQ, 2003

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**Abstract:** This article will examine United States congressional interest, over the course of the Clinton and Bush II administrations, in the associated problems of oil and Saddam Hussein, demonstrating a ruling elite bias in favor of a stable oil market and a stable Persian Gulf imposed by the U.S. government (USG). In the run up to 2003 Congress would show how eager it was to embrace the imperial stabilization policy of Bush II, borrow money, raise troops, declare war, and repel an imagined invasion. Congress reached a consensus over the Clinton and Bush II eras, despite a few dissenters, that Saddam was in the way of American progress and affordable oil. A compliant imperial Congress voted to invade Iraq and replace its entire government and socio-political structure, stabilizing this lucrative new frontier, absorbing it into the U.S. corporatist empire.

**Keywords:** United States of America, Iraq, Persian Gulf, Clinton, Bush, Saddam Hussein, oil.

This article will examine United States congressional interest, over the course of the Clinton and Bush II administrations, in the associated problems of oil and Saddam Hussein, demonstrating a ruling elite bias in favor of a stable oil market and a stable Persian Gulf imposed by the U.S. government (USG). Congress played the role of imperial legislature, hearing testimony and enacting laws to further material interests within the U.S., and specifically the oil industry, in close alignment with the foreign policy goals of the White House. The confluence of interests and imperial policy was most evident in the 16 October 2002 Joint Resolution authorizing president George W. Bush (Bush II) to invade Iraq and stabilize the periphery<sup>1</sup>.

Corporatism provides the best model for understanding the economic motivations of the White House and Congress during the period leading up to the Iraq expedition of 2003<sup>2</sup>. Corporatism is the relationship among big business organizations as they work the law makers and members of the executive branch. Corporatism was the invention of Republican business leaders such as Herbert Hoover in the 1920s, who advocated a greater role for private sector control of the economy via private trade associations and professional societies. The free market and private American-led international business associations would presumably regulate the world economy. During the 20th century, U.S. diplomacy tried to foist this on the entire planet, a collective public-private elite administration of world trade and economic development. It was assumed that global economic integration under corporate/USG tutelage would produce international harmony. U.S. multi-national corporations and the USG shared a common vision of a liberalized world economic order under American domination. Part of this order involved maintaining the U.S. share of world markets, gaining more markets, spreading American economic values, and controlling natural resource flows, especially oil<sup>3</sup>.

Congress has a constitutional and political role in shaping foreign policy, although some have noted a growing reluctance to take responsibility for national security among congressional leaders. Lee Hamilton, for example, thought Congress was reactive rather than proactive, taking action only when forced by the president or media<sup>4</sup>. As a significant component of the domestic politics of American foreign policy, Congress is authorized under Article I, Section 8, U.S. Constitution, to lay and collect taxes, borrow money, declare war, raise troops, and

repel invasions<sup>5</sup>. In the run up to 2003 Congress would show how eager it was to embrace the imperial stabilization policy of Bush II, borrow money, raise troops, declare war, and repel an imagined invasion.

## 1. CONCERN OVER THE OIL MARKET

### 1.1. Foreign Oil

Congress voiced a common refrain over the years: America needed to “reduce our dependence on foreign oil.” On 27 June 2000 Rep. Kevin Brady (R-TX) said “America is addicted to foreign oil and we are falling deeper into addiction every day”<sup>6</sup>. His solution was to drill for more oil on federal lands. At the same hearing Rep. Benjamin A. Gilman (R-NY) said Clinton was remarkably passive in the face of OPEC price fixing and anti-trust laws. Joe Barton (R-TX) echoed these sentiments and declaimed in favor of free markets and more domestic drilling. Red Cavaney, President and CEO, American Petroleum Institute, testified that it would be best to revoke unilateral trade sanctions which narrowed sources of supply. Mark Murphy, speaking for the Independent Petroleum Association of America (IPAA) representing 7,000 independent oil and natural gas producers, thought “We cannot continue a policy of reliance on foreign oil at prices that destroy the domestic producer”<sup>7</sup>.

The Republican drumbeat against foreign oil increased in tempo under Bush II. Speaking on 28 February 2001, Heather Wilson (R-NM) claimed “[...] for the first time in a decade, I think we have the opportunity to craft a national energy policy.” That meant reducing dependence on foreign oil and getting rid of federal oversight on the energy industry from the EPA, Department of Agriculture, and Department of the Interior<sup>8</sup>. In March 2001, Chair. Frank H. Murkowski (R-AK), of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, said reliance on foreign oil threatened national security and could lead to another war for oil, as happened in 1991. Echoing these sentiments was John Paul Pitts, oil editor of the *Midland Reporter Telegram* (a Hearst newspaper serving the Permian Basin of west Texas), and friend of Bush II. He told Murkowski not only that environmental rules were sending Texas fathers home without a paycheck, but that it was wrong to depend on foreign oil: “[...] some of our foreign oil suppliers are openly hostile to America -its

culture and religious heritage. And then there is Iraq. We are their biggest oil customer, but they are so bad we have to bomb them from time to time -taking care not to hit any oil facilities”<sup>9</sup>.

Murkowski welcomed the Bush-Cheney National Energy Policy in May 2001 as a godsend for the oil industry. Bush II offered a plan which “[...] reduces our dangerous dependence on foreign oil”<sup>10</sup>. At this hearing, fellow Alaskan, Jerry Hood, Principal Officer of Local 959, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, vowed that getting rid of foreign oil was possible only by drilling ANWR. Texas oilman Bill Burton suggested bringing back the quota system to keep foreign oil imports lower than 50 percent. Another Texas oilman, Tom Young, spoke in favor of \$10 billion in tax incentives for the oil industry. Ben Nighthorse Campbell (R-CO) said Congress had to address “[...] our dependence on foreign oil. In 1973, the year of the Arab oil embargo, the U.S. bought 35 percent of its oil from foreign sources. Today, we buy 56 percent, by some reports 62 percent, and Iraq is the fastest growing source of U.S. foreign oil”. He felt this was too much, because Americans fought a war in the Persian Gulf where 147 American lives were lost on this problem. He applauded Bush II’s policy to “help us become less dependent on foreign oil”<sup>11</sup>.

Chair. Roscoe G. Bartlett (R-MD), House Subcommittee on Energy: “In 1973, at the time of the Arab Oil Embargo, we imported 34 percent of our oil. Today we import 56 percent of our oil. It is really unconscionable that we should have permitted ourselves to be in this very vulnerable position”<sup>12</sup>. At the same 1 November 2001 hearing R. James Woolsey, former DCIA: “...our dependence on foreign oil, and particularly the world’s dependence on Mid-Eastern oil, is bad and getting worse [...]”<sup>13</sup>.

In June 2002, Alan Larson, Under Secretary for Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs, DOS, insisted that the USG would not let America become dependent on foreign oil to the point of blackmail. However, he told the House Committee on International Relations that with only two percent of the world’s proven oil reserves, the USA was unlikely to ever again be self-sufficient. OPEC might have to be destroyed, but Larson did not say anything about reducing Saudi influence on oil markets<sup>14</sup>. Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., who served Reagan as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security

Policy (1981-89), testified that the USA had excessive dependence on foreign energy suppliers, mostly Arabs, whose coddling of terrorist activities was made possible with American money for Gulf oil<sup>15</sup>.

On the eve of the Iraq expedition, in March 2003, Kyle McSlarrow, Deputy Secretary of Energy, said the USA faced a long-term energy security crisis in the sense that it was increasingly dependent on foreign oil<sup>16</sup>. During the invasion of Iraq in April 2003, Chuck Hagel (R-NE), said "Our dependence on imported crude oil creates potential vulnerabilities to our economy and national security....Our dependence on OPEC oil, including and especially Middle Eastern Gulf crude oil, is more likely to increase than decrease in the foreseeable future"<sup>17</sup>.

## 2. OIL MARKET STABILITY AND ENERGY SECURITY

On 9 March 2000, in Joe Barton's House energy committee, Mark Murphy, representing the IPAA, declared Saddam Hussein a national security threat because he had the power to disrupt OPEC's quota system. Saddam's objective was to dominate the Middle East after ridding himself of U.N. sanctions, controlling Iraq's oil resources, using the greed of France, Russia and China to restore and improve Iraq's oil fields, and using radical Muslims to try to destabilize his neighbors. Murphy believed Saddam would use the oil weapon as soon as it became available, because pulling Iraq's 2mbd production would send the price of oil skyrocketing, damaging the American economy<sup>18</sup>. Why a leader would cut off his only source of revenue just to anger Americans was not discussed.

On 7 March 2001, Chair. James V. Hansen (R-UT) said, "Our current situation is the direct result of the lack of a coherent national energy policy and policies that have restricted the development of our domestic energy resources on public lands, thereby increasing reliance on foreign energy. To keep our economy prosperous and reinforce our national security, we must have reliable energy supplies at a reasonable cost"<sup>19</sup>. Barbara Cubin (R-WO) reinforced this assumption: "[...] national security depends upon energy security"<sup>20</sup>.

The issue of energy affordability seemed to be linked with U.S. policy in the Gulf, paramount

in the senate testimony of Guy F. Caruso (of CSIS). The findings of his *Geopolitics of Energy into the 21st Century* (2001) included recommendations that, 1.) as the world's only superpower the U.S. must accept its special responsibilities for preserving worldwide energy supply, 2.) the U.S. must invest in global fossil fuel supply. Sanctions against oil imports from Iran, Iraq, and Libya did not work, because consumers did not care where oil came from. It was a matter of consumer affordability<sup>21</sup>.

Steve Layton (IPAA) warned that U.N. policies were placing Iraq in a position where it could ultimately control the world price of oil and demand the end to U.N. sanctions. Perhaps the real issue would be whether the world could physically meet its petroleum needs if Saddam closed the spigot. The market price for petroleum would be determined not by the market, but by the politics of "these countries"<sup>22</sup>. Murkowski added that Iraq and OPEC were causing mayhem in the oil market: when Saddam pulled 2 1/2mbd of production off the world market, objecting to the U.N. WMD regime, many people expected OPEC to simply increase its output, but OPEC decided not to do that and held America hostage<sup>23</sup>.

In June 2002 Hyde believed "Fluctuating oil prices and instability in the Middle East once again are prompting calls for energy independence for the United States. The enticing prospect of freedom from the whims of foreign rulers has been held by every President since 1973 and its infamous Arab oil boycott. Our energy security is also directly linked with the voracity of OPEC's demands"<sup>24</sup>. Instability in the Middle East and Iran was a threat to national security. Tom Lantos (D-CA) mirrored the chairman's beliefs with observations that the USA was held hostage to Middle East antidemocratic and anti-American oil interests, namely, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Saudi<sup>25</sup>.

At this hearing, Larson said the Bush administration was trying to stabilize the international oil market with USG energy security policy: 1.) access to energy on terms and conditions that support American economic growth, 2.) ensuring that the USG can never be held hostage by foreign oil suppliers. Earlier in the year Saddam made "[...] yet another futile attempt to damage the world economy through an oil production shut-down, its third embargo in less than two years"<sup>26</sup>. Iraqi embargos could be countered by oil reserves of the International

Energy Agency (IEA) member countries, including the SPR of the USA. “Iraq’s attempts to blackmail the international community did not work”<sup>27</sup>. In corporatist jargon, Larson said that barriers to US investment in the region would have to come down: “American energy firms are world leaders, and their investments and services in energy producing countries enhance market linkages and energy security. Promoting energy investments and trade is a core element of our engagement with major oil-producing countries”<sup>28</sup>. Daniel Yergin concurred that American energy security resided in the stability of the overall petroleum market, but the critical factor would be the stability and reasonableness of the investment framework and its openness to foreign investment<sup>29</sup>.

Gaffney testified that the USG’s ability to wage a global war on terror might be impinged upon “[...] if our enemies are able to disrupt or otherwise interfere with [...] energy flows”. Relying on Saddam Hussein for oil was a mistake, and he was delighted that Bush II was about to remove Saddam from power. American efforts to bring about regime change in Iraq added urgency to the need to reduce the nation’s vulnerability to probable disruptions in energy supplies from the region<sup>30</sup>.

In the days just before the 2003 Iraq stabilization mission, oil enthusiast W.J. “Billy” Tauzin (R-LA) complained that “[...] every time we buy fuel oil, every time we buy any oil derivative product in this country, we are helping to send Saddam Hussein better than \$20 million per day [...]. And to send Mr. Saddam Hussein \$20 million a day to arm his troops to kill our young men and women. There is something insane about that”<sup>31</sup>. He was referring to the USG approved Oil-for-Food program whereby Iraq was allowed to sell oil to the USA in return for revenue placed in an escrow account that was used to purchase food and humanitarian supplies.

On 8 April 2003, during the Iraq expedition, Sen. Chuck Hagel (R-NE) said: “Energy security is a critical component of America’s national security. Reliable energy supplies, particularly oil and natural gas, are crucial to our economic development and growth. Our national energy and national security interests cannot be separated from world developments and global stability. Our dependence on imported crude oil creates potential vulnerabilities to our economy and national

security [...]. Our dependence on OPEC oil, including and especially Middle Eastern Gulf crude oil, is more likely to increase than decrease in the foreseeable future”<sup>32</sup>.

Hagel synthesized material interests into a coherent view. Energy security interests must promote stability and economic growth in oil-producing regions. Long-term energy security would depend on the success of USG efforts to support political and economic reform, along with regional security in the Middle East. The correlation between political instability and oil supply was admittedly not limited only to the Middle East, but the absence of responsible government and democratic institutions tended to undermine security and stability, with dangerous implications for the global economy<sup>33</sup>. Officials in the Bush II administration could not have agreed more with this assessment: Michael Smith, Assistant Secretary for Fossil Energy, DOE, “It is imperative that we have reliable and affordable supplies of energy [...]”<sup>34</sup>.

Larson testified that it was necessary for American energy security policy to support US economic and foreign policy goals. Administration goals included access to energy on terms and conditions that supported American prosperity: “Without abundant, low-cost Gulf supplies, we would expend scarce economic resources to secure the energy we need at higher cost to the world economy, and our citizens.” He made this comment during the invasion of Iraq, an operation designed to ensure that USG foreign policy and national security interests would not be constrained by any more energy concerns (supply disruptions caused by Iraq)<sup>35</sup>. As US troops moved to secure Iraqi oil fields, Larson repeated the Bush position: “The Administration has been clear that our actions in Iraq are not ‘about oil.’ As the President has assured the world, Iraqi oil belongs to the Iraqi people [...]. Iraq’s oil and other natural resources belong to all the Iraqi people -and the United States is and will respect this fact”<sup>36</sup>.

There were dissenting views among Congressional witnesses on hearings about energy policy, but not many. A rare note of rationality was sounded in the testimony of Stuart E. Eizenstat, former Deputy Secretary of the Treasury: “An energy policy that focuses only on supply and does not account for ever-increasing consumption levels will doom us to increased dependence on foreign oil, no matter

what measures we may take to increase domestic sources of energy<sup>37</sup>. Eizenstat called into question whether US oil dependence was a good idea. “Strictly from a national security perspective, this policy does not make sense”. The Gulf War of 1991 had been an oil war, a sign of American dependence on petroleum. Persian Gulf instability had real, tangible effects on the American way of life. A rise in the minimum CAFE standard to 40 miles per gallon would save 125 billion gallons of gasoline by 2012 and reduce the risk of having to send young people to fight oil wars<sup>38</sup>.

The rational question was how to reduce dependence on any oil. Shortly after Bush II assumed office in 2001, David Alberswerth, Director of the Wilderness Society, suggested policy-makers would best serve the national interest “[...] by seeking ways to reduce our dependence, not on foreign oil, but on oil itself<sup>39</sup>. But what can a country do when the people and legislature seem locked into a common belief, as represented by this quote from Tauzin: mandated fuel economy for cars was wrong because it ignored “[...] the fundamental liberty Americans enjoy as a God-given right made manifest by our Constitution. Every United States citizen has the right to choose to consume legal products in commerce without the interference of government<sup>40</sup>”.

### 3. CONGRESS AND SADDAM

Only in the U.S. imperial Congress could there have been a hearing titled “Iraq: Can Saddam Be Overthrown?” On March 2, 1998, Chair. Sam Brownback<sup>41</sup> (R-KS): “If the problem is Saddam, we must see if there are alternatives to him, and God help us all around the world here and in Iraq as we consider these and deliberate on this topic.” Saddam could not be trusted, because “[...] he does not want to give up his weapons of mass destruction and desire for regional domination [...]”<sup>42</sup>.

The first witness was Ahmed Chalabi, president of the CIA-inspired Iraqi National Congress (INC), who made several points. “For too long, U.S.-Iraq policy has been decided by a small group of so-called experts who view the Iraqi people as incapable of self-government, as a people who require a brutal dictatorship to live and work together”. Second, Iraq has the largest oil reserves of any nation on Earth. Third, Iraq will never be free of weapons of mass destruction as long as Saddam is in power.

Fourth, the Iraqi National Congress was committed to a future Iraq without WMD, which renounced aggression, at peace with its neighbors. Fifth, Saddam could not be overthrown by a *coup d'état* launched with CIA help. The US had to invade Iraq, but Saddam’s Republican Guards “will come over to us<sup>43</sup>. These were the ironic comments from a Ph.D. in mathematics from the University of Chicago, whose INC had been established with CIA funding in 1991, outsourced to the Rendon Group (Washington, DC), a PR firm which specialized in disinformation campaigns<sup>44</sup>.

R. James Woolsey, former DCIA (1993 to 1995) agreed with Chalabi that Saddam was a threat to the U.S. because he had WMD and ballistic missiles. He was a threat to his neighbors. Invasion would probably fail to gain popular support in the U.S., and assassination was against U.S. law. Zalmay Khalilzad, Bush II’s future ambassador to occupied Iraq, told the committee that containment was not getting WMD out of Saddam’s hands. The USG had two options: let Saddam have WMD, or invade Iraq and topple Saddam. Then Iraq could be integrated into a regional security arrangement under USG aegis<sup>45</sup>.

On 21 May 1998, Murkowski asked “Have we so weakened U.N. sanctions that Saddam can keep his weapons of mass destruction and threaten his neighbors and the world’s oil supply?”<sup>46</sup>. Since 1994 Saddam had illegally smuggled oil. Iraq sold more oil than before the Gulf War, which meant the U.N. and Clinton had undermined sanctions, removing the incentive for Iraq to comply with arms inspections. He did not want to see “[...] our sons and daughters engaged in another Gulf War because Saddam is stockpiling weapons to attack his neighbors and continue his efforts to control as much oil as he can from the Mideast that we are so dependent on<sup>47</sup>”.

Chair. Jesse Helms (R-NC) objected to the Oil-for-Food program, permitting Iraq to sell two billion dollars worth of oil every six months, intended to repair infrastructure, build hospitals and clinics, repair water sanitation, rehabilitate the agriculture sector, import oil equipment, agricultural equipment, “[...] and spend \$92 million on ‘education’, whatever all that means. Every time Saddam defies the U.N., we punish him by letting him sell more oil”. Helms imagined Iraq was sneaking its oil out through Iranian territorial waters with the complicity of

the Clinton Administration, which had no Iraq policy. Helms preferred that the ends of USG policy in Iraq should be to oust Saddam Hussein from power<sup>48</sup>.

Richard Perle, a wealthy Likud consultant and onetime official in the Reagan administration, asserted before Congress that the sanctions regime was collapsing, and Clinton's approach to Saddam was punctuated by "[...] occasional whining, frequent bluster, political retreat and military paralysis." Saddam was getting stronger and stronger, the CIA incapable of telling the truth about his WMD programs. Saddam had to be removed. "I believe he has weapons of mass destruction now [...]" The INC should be recognized as the official government of Iraq in exile<sup>49</sup>.

David Kay, the future head of Bush II's Iraq Survey Group looking for Saddam's WMD, admitted before the committee that a capability to produce WMD could not be eliminated by simply destroying facilities. The weapons secrets were understood by Iraq's technical elite, and the production capabilities necessary to turn these secrets into weapons were part of the industrial base of Iraq, which would survive any sanctions regimes. This raised the question of means: how to disarm Saddam if his weapons were in the minds of technocrats<sup>50</sup>.

On 9 September 1998, Brownback damned Clinton's approach to Iraq: "U.S. foreign policy at the moment is weak and seems oriented more toward appeasement than leadership." To which Martin Indyk, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, replied: "Iraq remains within the strategic box that Saddam Hussein's folly created for it 7 years ago"<sup>51</sup>. The USG would keep him in the box.

On 31 October 1998, the Republican Congress passed the *Iraq Liberation Act of 1998* (P.L. 105-338 (H.R. 4655), a declaration that it should be the policy of the United States to "support efforts" to remove Saddam from power in Iraq and replace him with a democratic government. It authorized the president to give the Iraqi opposition assistance for radio and television broadcasting, weapons, military training, and humanitarian assistance. Apparently this was not good enough for Brownback, who complained on 9 March 1999 that maintaining troops in the Gulf to contain Saddam had cost the USG over \$6 billion since 1993, and because policies had not been followed to address the real threat,

there was little prospect that the 20,000 troops would return home soon<sup>52</sup>.

Late in 1999, the humanitarian Helms quipped that "Food and medicine are rotting in Iraqi warehouses undistributed while little children suffer and die"<sup>53</sup>. The powerful chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations asked why sanctions were not working. Richard Butler, former chairman of UNSCOM thought Saddam lied, concealed WMD, unilaterally destroyed WMD, and simply failed to comply with U.N. resolutions. The basic problem was Iraqi failure to comply with the disarmament law, leading to the continuation of sanctions<sup>54</sup>.

On 2 February 2000, the Select Committee on Intelligence held its annual review of security threats to the USA. J. Stapleton Roy, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, noted that Usama bin Ladin's al-Qaida group was the most dangerous threat among non-state actors. The UBL network was analogous to a large MNC with bin Ladin as the CEO who provides guidance, while distant minions carried out policy. Saddam wanted WMD, but it was hard to say if he had any<sup>55</sup>. For George J. Tenet, DCIA, the WMD problem was paramount. Saddam could develop an ICBM in ten years time, but his country was on a downward path, its economic infrastructure continuing to deteriorate badly. He agreed with Roy that Usama Bin Ladin was the foremost terror threat, actively seeking WMD<sup>56</sup>.

Vice Admiral Thomas R. Wilson, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, said individuals, groups, and states that feared the global expansion and perceived dominance of American values, ideals, culture, and institutions might try to resist, halt, or undo this trend with asymmetric warfare, i.e., terrorism. Iran sought to dominate the Gulf with WMD, which it would have in ten years. Iraq "[...] has probably been able to retain a residual level of WMD and missile capabilities"<sup>57</sup>.

In a 28 June 2000 Senate hearing titled "Liberation of Iraq: Progress Report," Richard Perle and his asset Ahmed Chalabi denounced Clinton policy on Saddam. The former derided Clinton for being in a box, not Saddam. Perle boasted that the INC would lead Iraq to democracy, and Chalabi said the Iraqi people were in "latent" rebellion against tyranny, while Russia and France worked to undermine sanctions. Chalabi was on message, hitting all

the key themes, terrorism, WMD, freedom, Gulf hegemony. The USG would save lots of money if it helped overthrow Saddam, etc<sup>58</sup>.

On 1 March 2001, Brownback announced that the Republican platform in 2000 called for the full implementation of the Iraq Liberation Act, meaning support for the INC. Perle supported the INC again, calling them the equals of the men of 1776 who had declared independence from British rule. Everyone knew Saddam possessed WMD<sup>59</sup>.

After 9-11 the rhetoric against Saddam acquired new associations. On 4 October 2001, Chair. Benjamin A. Gilman (R-NY) told his committee that Saddam was a dictator who sought WMD to possibly give away to bin Ladin. Gilman had long advocated the overthrow of Saddam. Gary L. Ackerman (D-NY), said Saddam was just as dangerous as in 1991. Lantos thought Bush I had failed to make it all the way to Baghdad, and hoped the next Bush would finish the job. Eric Cantor (R-VA) demanded the USG do something about Saddam, who gave aid and comfort to Palestinian terrorists. Geoffrey Kemp, of the Nixon Center, testified that the goal of regime replacement should remain a fundamental tenet of USG policy, and would be welcomed by Arabs and Israeli alike. The best approach was to invade and occupy Iraq. Charles Duelfer, U.N. weapons inspector, said Saddam was intent on dominating the Persian Gulf with WMD. He would be surprised if there was not a relationship between Iraqi intelligence services and al Qaida<sup>60</sup>. Jesse Helms thought "Saddam Hussein must go. All of our half measures have failed [his italics] and our efforts to give Saddam room to improve were used by him to consolidate his power and build up more weapons"<sup>61</sup>.

At the same hearing William Kristol, speaking on behalf of PNAC, praised the new Bush Doctrine for its war on terrorism and its rejection of the international status quo. Kristol dismissed international consensus or cooperation, because American self-defense was a unilateral proposition. Spreading the blessings of liberty to all peoples of the world meant a challenge to tyranny in general through the restoration of American military power. President Bush wished to promote the principles of liberty and justice in the Islamic world, but Iran and Iraq stood in the way<sup>62</sup>. Americans would be welcomed in Baghdad as liberators. Kristol, summoning his best Macauleyesque

delivery said, "The political, strategic and moral rewards would also be even greater. A friendly, free, and oil-producing Iraq would leave Iran isolated and Syria cowed; the Palestinians more willing to negotiate seriously with Israel; and Saudi Arabia with less leverage over policymakers here and in Europe"<sup>63</sup>.

In the spring of 2002 the CIA informed the Senate of Saddam's growing danger. "Baghdad is expanding its civilian chemical industry in ways that could be diverted quickly to manufacturing CW agents, and retains a significant amount of dual-use infrastructure that could support a rejuvenated nuclear weapons program [...]. Baghdad also has a history of supporting terrorism". Iraq might have an ICBM by 2020<sup>64</sup>.

By the summer of 2002 Andy Card's White House Iraq Group (WHIG) public dissimulation campaign was getting underway and Congress increased the tempo of anti-Saddam hearings<sup>65</sup>. Dissent was rare as members of both parties declaimed in favor of overthrowing Saddam. Joe Biden (D-MD) said "We must confront clear danger with a new sense of urgency and resolve [...]. Saddam Hussein's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, in my view, is one of those clear dangers [...]. In my judgment, President Bush is right to be concerned about Saddam Hussein's relentless pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and the possibility that he may use them or share them with terrorists"<sup>66</sup>. Chuck Hagel went a bit further when he stated that American security and interests would never be assured with Saddam Hussein in power. He was a ruthless tyrant who brutally oppressed his own people, and who possessed WMD that had the potential to threaten the USA, Iraq's neighbors and especially Israel<sup>67</sup>.

A few legislators remained skeptical of Bush II claims. Paul Wellstone (D-MN): "I do not believe the administration has yet made a case for taking military action against Iraq [...]. What is the precedent for the U.S. to launch a major military operation in the absence of direct provocation by the target country? [...]. What would the death toll be among ordinary, innocent Iraqi civilians?"<sup>68</sup>. Cynthia B. McKinney (D-GA), thought Bush II had been planning an invasion of Iraq for years (true enough), but congresspeople were afraid to speak out for fear of being called unpatriotic. The USG had no compelling interest in launching humanitarian invasions of

Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Sudan, East Timor, Uganda, Rwanda, and the Congo when millions perished, but Bush II was spending \$200 million in the Office of Global Communications to pump up support for an expedition to Iraq. “Before we send our young men and women off to war we really need to make sure that we are not sacrificing them so rich and powerful men can prosecute a war for oil”<sup>69</sup>. In concurring written testimony, J. Daryl Byler of the Mennonite Central Committee did not believe Bush II had made a case for a just war, citing elements such as the likelihood of success, proportionality, all alternatives exhausted, and no significant collateral damage. Bush had established no credible link between Iraq and 9-11<sup>70</sup>.

Yet, among congressional witnesses the consensus on the Saddam threat persisted. Richard Butler, chairman of UNSCOM from 1997 to 1999, said “It is essential to recognize that the claim made by Saddam’s representatives, that Iraq has no WMD, is false. Everyone concerned, from Iraq’s neighbors to the U.N. Security Council and the Secretary-General of the U.N., with whom Iraq is currently negotiating on the issue, is being lied to [...] Iraq has been hard at work, across the board, to increase its WMD capability”<sup>71</sup>. Khidhir Hamza, an exiled Iraqi nuclear physicist, told the committee that Saddam had enough uranium for a bomb, and had the capability to produce chem/bio weapons. Saddam had to be overthrown for two reasons: 1.) U.N. inspection would never find the nuclear program, because it was cleverly hidden in dual-use facilities, 2.) Saddam preserved a large team of scientists and engineers who knew how to build a bomb, and inspection could not eliminate them. Saddam needed WMD to make up for a seriously weakened military after the Gulf War, and now had no more than a quarter of the firepower it possessed in 1990<sup>72</sup>.

Anti-Saddam exiles testified on the merits of an Iraqi expedition. Rend Rahim Francke, U.S. citizen and head of the Iraq Foundation, supported INC efforts and called for the overthrow of Saddam, because the Iraqi people yearned for democracy and territorial integrity, to set an example for the Middle East, all the keywords in vogue at the time. Sinan Al-Shabibi, in Iraq’s oil ministry from 1975 to 1977, was already dreaming of reconstruction and rehabilitation of power and water plants, sanitation, sewage facilities and

telecommunications; human development and technological rehabilitation, all made possible with USG intervention<sup>73</sup>.

Caspar Weinberger, Reagan’s SecDef in the 1980s, claimed Saddam had a significant relationship with Palestinian terrorist groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (General Command), Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Abu Nidal. “I have been told he is cultivating operational ties with each of these groups, doing much more than simply providing cash to the families of suicide bombers [...]. We cannot risk the possibility that Saddam will share weapons of mass destruction with terrorists”. Saddam was not contained, and could not be contained. He violated all of his promises. He could not be believed, and he was an “implacable foe of the United States. That is why he must be removed”<sup>74</sup>.

On 19 September 2002, Lantos lauded the action of Israel in bombing the Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981, because without that attack, Saddam “[...] would have a stranglehold on the jugular of the civilized world through his control of energy.” Lantos was also under the impression that Iraq was wealthy, so they should be hit up with the bill for regime change after the invasion<sup>75</sup>. Richard Perle testified that U.N. inspections were useless. “If he eludes us and continues to refine, perfect and expand his arsenal of chemical and biological weapons, the danger to us, already great, will only grow. If he achieves his holy grail and acquires one or more nuclear weapons there is no way of knowing what predatory policies he will pursue”<sup>76</sup>.

Powell testified in the House that same day, warning the U.N. that it was a question of weeks, not months, before action would have to be taken. He insisted no decision had been made to invade Iraq, but the Bush II government had been intensifying the level of discussion with the INC. In response to a query from Peter King (R-NY) as to how the USG would respond if Israel was attacked during regime change, Powell answered, “With respect to Israel, this is also something that we are thinking about, and you can be sure we will be in the closest consultation with our Israeli friends and colleagues”<sup>77</sup>. He insisted Bush II was acting multilaterally through the U.N., working for a UNSC resolution that would not explicitly call for regime change, but would also not prohibit regime change. It was Saddam who acted

unilaterally. Powell reminded them that Bush II had engaged the congressional leadership at the beginning of September and asked them to be ready to support a joint resolution<sup>78</sup>. In response to a criticism from Jim Davis (D-FL) that the Bush II regime had been giving Congress the bum's rush, Powell said Bush II had been speaking about the Saddam problem from the very beginning of his administration, but 9-11 made it imperative to do something now. Bush II had intended to remove Saddam at some point during his period in office<sup>79</sup>.

On the same day, Rumsfeld made the administration case before the Senate Armed Services Committee. The Secretary of Defense painted a frightening picture: "As we meet, state sponsors of terror across the world are working to develop and acquire weapons of mass destruction. As we speak, chemists, biologists, and nuclear scientists are toiling in weapons labs and underground bunkers, working to give the world's most dangerous dictators weapons of unprecedented power and lethality"<sup>80</sup>.

There were a number of terrorist states such as Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Syria, but Iraq was the most dangerous. Saddam was an immediate threat to the security and stability of the world, and especially the Persian Gulf region. Rumsfeld could not say exactly when, but he was certain that in the future Saddam would attack the USA with WMD. He raised the specter of Munich and Pearl Harbor. It was important to the administration that Congress signal the world (via a joint resolution) where the USG stood, before the U.N. Security Council vote took place<sup>81</sup>.

Approaching the critical October joint resolution vote, on 25 and 26 September Sen. Biden of the Foreign Relations Committee said policy could not be sustained without the informed consent of the American people<sup>82</sup>.

This seems in retrospect like an absurdity, in light of the dissimulation campaign designed and implemented by the WHIG at this time to use false WMD intelligence and anxiety over terrorism as a scare tactic to induce war hysteria in Congress.

In a letter to Bush II from Biden and Lugar dated 10 September 2002, they assured the president that they shared his conviction that Saddam and WMD posed a significant threat to the region and to the world.

Either the weapons must be dislodged from Iraq, or Saddam must be dislodged from power. They asked Bush II if attacking Iraq would precipitate Saddam's use of WMD against Israel, and warned that a massive rebuilding effort would be required after invasion of Iraq<sup>83</sup>.

Powell told this committee that Saddam could empower a few terrorists to threaten millions of innocent people with WMD. 9-11 proved that terrorism was no longer isolated to non-state actors; there was a potential connection between terrorists and WMD. Therefore, the president set forth certain conditions under which Saddam had to comply or be replaced: 1.) he must immediately disclose, remove or destroy all WMD, 2.) he must end all support for terrorism and act to suppress it, 3.) he must cease persecution of civilians, 4.) he must return Kuwaiti POWs, 5.) he must end oil smuggling. Bush II challenged the Security Council to live up to its responsibilities, and if they could not, then the USG would act alone or with a coalition of the willing to depose Saddam.

Powell assured members of Congress that the administration would provide all necessary evidence to support their claims, and denied that Bush II was asking for a war resolution even before the president had made a decision to invade<sup>84</sup>.

The joint resolution *To Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq*, became law on 16 October 2002. Also styled "Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002," it was a blank check given to Bush II, the first president to receive such a *carte blanche* privilege. First, the bill of indictment or attainder against Saddam recalled the tyrant's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the U.N. sanctions, the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 requiring the overthrow of Saddam, and his alleged WMD<sup>85</sup>. Iraq posed a "continuing threat to the national security of the United States and international peace and security in the Persian Gulf" by possession of significant WMD capability, and by supporting and harboring al Qaida. The president and congress were determined to take all appropriate actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 9-11. It was in the national security interest of the U.S. to restore peace and security in the Persian Gulf<sup>86</sup>.

#### 4. OIL AND THE OCTOBER 2002 JOINT RESOLUTION

Money from the oil industry given to senators over the period 1997-2002 might give an idea of the scope of its influence on voting in the Senate on the 16 October 2002 Joint Resolution authorizing Bush II to invade Iraq<sup>87</sup>. One must note that there was no majority party in the upper chamber at the time. The Senate roster included 50 Republicans and 49 Democrats, with one independent, former Republican James Jeffords (VT) who tended to vote with Democrats. On the war resolution, 1 Republican, 21 Democrats, and Jeffords voted No. Voting Yes were 29 Democrats and 48 Republicans. Let us begin with the Democrats who voted No. Of these 21 Democratic senators who voted against the resolution, only three (14%) had oil and gas contributions in either the overall period of 1997-2002, or in the senator's most recent election campaign cycle. As for the 29 Democrats who sided with Bush II and voted Yes, ten had oil and gas contributions, or 34%. The most anomalous and inexplicable vote was that of Jeff Bingaman (NM), who received oil and gas money in an amount second only to law firms, and whose pro-Israel money should have tipped the scale in favor of Bush II policy, but he voted No. In the Yes column the most bizarre votes came from Maria Cantwell (WA), Thomas Carper (DE), and John Kerry (MA) who had neither oil and gas nor pro-Israel contributions of any significance. The yes votes of Hillary Clinton (NY), Charles Schumer (NY), and Joseph Lieberman (CT) are consistent with a heavily pro-Israel constituency. The senators from New York represented electors most traumatized by 9-11. As for Kerry, he was planning a run for the presidency and had to calculate a warlike stance<sup>88</sup>.

Now for the Republicans, for whose party Bush II was *de facto* leader. Of the 48 Republican senators who voted Yes, 47 (97.9%) had significant oil and gas contributions in either the overall period of 1997-2002, or in the senator's most recent election campaign cycle. There was only one Republican senator who voted No, and that was Lincoln Chaffee (RI)<sup>89</sup>.

And yet, there are those who insist the Iraq war had nothing to do with oil<sup>90</sup>. It is fair to conclude that the preponderant money influence among Republicans was from the oil and gas interest group, filling the coffers of all but one of those who voted for the 16 October resolution.

Quantitative methods and regression analysis are pointless in this regard. If the Republicans were as divided as the Democrats then a case might be made for more intricate analysis of statistics and the formulation of an appropriate model. What the data cannot explain is why so many senators stifled their intuition and accepted the Bush II rationale for war, based on falsehoods. The data provide a tantalizing suggestion that the cause of war, though based on a series of irrational premises, long disproved in post-game intelligence analyses on WMD and al Qaida, had a material basis. The material interests of the oil and gas lobby could not and cannot be ignored as a probable motivator in USG corporatist policy on Iraq and the Persian Gulf, evidenced in the several years of congressional consensus before 2003 that Saddam must be ejected and stability established for both the oil market and for this most vital region on the U.S. periphery.

#### CONCLUSIÓN

Readers will note a contradiction in the ruling elite over the place of imported oil in the U.S. economy: annoyance with dependence on "foreign oil," but a determination to secure it nonetheless in the form of affordable and reliable supply from a stabilized Persian Gulf. The dependence problem was an ideological one, but the requirement for cheap and stable oil supplies was a material problem, voiced as a material interest. Congress reached a consensus over the Clinton and Bush II eras, despite a few dissenters, that Saddam was in the way of American progress and affordable oil. A compliant imperial Congress voted—in remarkable accord with their financial support from the oil and gas interest—to invade the distant country of Iraq and replace its entire government and socio-political structure, in alignment with the policy of the Bush II administration, stabilizing this lucrative new frontier, absorbing it into the U.S. corporatist empire. Iraqis in collaboration with the USG must manage their own submission to U.S. public and private interests, including the oil fields. There was much public diplomacy on WMD and terrorism, but what did Saddam have to do with either of these dangers?

#### NOTAS

<sup>1</sup> I assume the existence of a U.S. empire, in line with both the right, Bacevich, Andrew J., *American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy*. Cambridge, MA, 2002; Ferguson, Niall,

*Colossus: The Price of America's Empire*. New York, 2004; Odom, William E.; Dujarric, Robert, *America's Inadvertent Empire*. New Haven, 2004; Hadar, Leon, *Sandstorm: Policy Failure in the Middle East*. New York, 2005; and the left, Harvey, David, *The New Imperialism*. Oxford, 2003; Hoffmann, Stanley, *Gulliver Unbound: America's Imperial Temptation and the War in Iraq*. Lanham, MD, 2004; Johnson, Chalmers, *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic*. New York, 2004).

Core/periphery relations are examined in Lundestad, Geir, *The American "Empire" and Other Studies of U.S. Foreign Policy in a Comparative Perspective*. Oxford, 1990, 37; Doyle, Michael W., *Empires*. Ithaca, 1986, 12; Snyder, Jack, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambitions*. Ithaca, 1991, 2-6; Kupchan, Charles A., *The Vulnerability of Empire*. Ithaca, 1994, 3. My views coincide with Williams, William A., *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*. New York, 1972, *The Roots of Modern American Empire*. New York, 1969; and LaFeber, Walter, *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion*. Ithaca, 1963. Mommsen, Wolfgang J., *Theories of Imperialism*. Chicago, 1982, remains a good introduction. Space does not allow a more extensive bibliography.

<sup>2</sup> I do not discount completely other motives, Israel, WMD, anti-terrorism, but my concern is with Congress and probabilities in light of available evidence.

<sup>3</sup> Hogan, Michael J., "Corporatism," in Michael J. Hogan; Thomas G. Paterson (eds.), *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*. Cambridge, 2004, 138; *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952*. Cambridge, 1987, 2-3; Painter, David S., *Oil and the American Century: The Political Economy of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1941-1954*. Baltimore, 1986, 2; Rosenberg, Emily S., *Financial Missionaries to the World: the Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900-1930*. Cambridge, MA, 1999, 2.

<sup>4</sup> On the declining prestige of Congress, see Silverstein, Gordon, *Imbalance of Powers: Constitutional Interpretation and the Making of American Foreign Policy*. New York, 1997; Lindsay, James M., *Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy*. Baltimore, 1994; Hinckley, Barbara, *Less Than Meets the Eye: Foreign Policy Making and the Myth of the Assertive Congress*. Chicago, 1994. Hamilton, Lee, *A Creative Tension: The Foreign Policy Roles of the President and Congress*. Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2003, 69.

<sup>5</sup> My view is of a compliant imperial legislature, not an activist one, in line with Lindsay, James M., *Congress...*, op. cit., 160. For an opposite view, see Rodman, Peter W., "The Imperial Congress". *National Interest*, 1 (1985), 26-35.

<sup>6</sup> US. Congress. House of Representatives, "Hearing before the Committee on International Relations. 106th Congress. Second Session. OPEC's Policies: A Threat to the U.S. Economy". 27 June 2000, 9.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 2; US. Congress. House of Representatives, "Hearing before the Committee on International Relations. 106th Congress. Second Session. Price Fluctuations in Oil Markets". 9 March 2000, 2, 80, 88.

<sup>8</sup> US. Congress. House of Representatives, "Hearing before the Committee on International Relations. 107th Congress. First Session. National Energy Policy". 28 February 2001, 17.

<sup>9</sup> US. Congress. Senate, "Hearing before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. 107th Congress. First Session. Energy Trends". 21 March 2001, 2; US. Congress. House of Representatives, "Hearing before the Committee on International Relations. 107th Congress. First Session. National Energy Policy: Crude Oil and Refined Petroleum Products". 30 March 2001, 60.

<sup>10</sup> US. Congress. Senate, "Hearing before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. 107th Congress. First Session. National Energy Issues Part 1". 24 May 2001, 2.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 119-22, 144, 3.

<sup>12</sup> US. Congress. House of Representatives, "Hearing before the Committee on Science, Sub-committee on Energy. 107th Congress. First Session. U.S. Energy Security. Options to Decreasing Petroleum Use in the Transportation Sector". 1 November 2001, 15.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 25.

<sup>14</sup> US. Congress. House of Representatives, "Hearing before the Committee on International Relations. 107th Congress. 2nd Session. Oil Diplomacy: Facts and Myths Behind Foreign Oil Dependency". 20 June 2002, 18.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 56-57.

<sup>16</sup> US. Congress. House of Representatives, "Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality of the Committee on Energy and Commerce. 107th Congress. 2nd Session. Comprehensive National Energy Policy". 5, 12 and 13 March 2003, 25, 28.

<sup>17</sup> "Overview of Global Energy Security Issues". 8 April 2003, 1.

<sup>18</sup> "Price Fluctuations in Oil Markets". 9 March 2000, 82-85.

<sup>19</sup> US. Congress. House of Representatives, Committee on Resources, "Hearings on the Role of Public Lands in the Development of a Self-Reliant Energy Policy 107th Congress. 1st Session". 7 March 2001, 1.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 18. Clinton did have an energy policy: *Sustainable Energy Strategy* (July 1995) and *The Comprehensive National Energy Strategy* (CNES, April 1998). Energy Sec. Bill Richardson said it was based on: 1.) market forces, 2.) diversity of supply and strong diplomatic relations with energy producing countries, 3.) diversity of sources, 4.) increasing efficiency. For the period 1996-2001, the Republicans voted to block energy supply R&D at the DOE, and the Republican cumulative cut below Clinton's budget requests was \$1 billion. See "OPEC's Policies...", op. cit., 3, 6, 15, 18.

<sup>21</sup> "Energy Trends...", op. cit., 18.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 13, 14.

<sup>23</sup> “National Energy Issues. Part 1...”, op. cit., 80.  
<sup>24</sup> “Oil Diplomacy...”, op. cit., 1.  
<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 3.  
<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 20. Larson was neglecting to mention the March 1999 OPEC-engineered 2mbd withdrawal in an effort to raise oil prices. See the testimony of Matthew Simmons, US. Congress. Senate, “Hearings before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. 108th Congress. First Session. Oil Supply and Prices”. 13 February 2003, 10-11.  
<sup>27</sup> “Oil Diplomacy...”, op. cit., 23.  
<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 24.  
<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 50-51.  
<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 56-57.  
<sup>31</sup> “Comprehensive National Energy Policy...”, op. cit., 6.  
<sup>32</sup> “Overview of Global Energy Security Issues...”, op. cit., 1.  
<sup>33</sup> Ibid., 2.  
<sup>34</sup> US. Congress, House of Representatives, “Oversight Hearing before the Committee on Resources. 108th Congress. First Session. Enhancing America’s Energy Security”. 19 March 2003, 43.  
<sup>35</sup> “Overview of Global Energy Security Issues...”, op. cit., 13-14.  
<sup>36</sup> Ibid., 17.  
<sup>37</sup> “Oil Diplomacy...”, op. cit., 62. From 1977 to 1981 he served as President Jimmy Carter’s Chief Domestic Policy Adviser and Executive Director of the White House Domestic Policy Staff.  
<sup>38</sup> Ibid., 65.  
<sup>39</sup> “Hearings on the Role of Public Lands...”, op. cit., 64.  
<sup>40</sup> “Oil Diplomacy...”, op. cit., 80-81.  
<sup>41</sup> “Voted against banning chemical weapons”. April 1997. “Voted to abolish CAFE fuel efficiency standards”. September 1999. Available from Internet at: <<http://www.activoteamerica.com/KSGO/3/3.html>>.  
<sup>42</sup> US. Senate, “Hearing before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations. 105th Congress. Second Session. Iraq: Can Saddam Be Overthrown?”. 2 March 1998, 1.  
<sup>43</sup> Ibid., 3-9.  
<sup>44</sup> Mayer, Jane, “The Manipulator”. *The New Yorker*, 7 June 2004. Hersh, Seymour M., “The Debate Within”. *The New Yorker*, 11 March 2002; Dao, James, “Pentagon Readies Efforts to Sway Sentiment Abroad”. *The New York Times*, 19 February 2002; Thomas, Evan, “He Has Saddam in His Sights”. *MSNBC.com*, 4 March 2002. For the Rendon Group, see <<http://www.rendon.com>>.  
<sup>45</sup> “Can Saddam Be Overthrown?”. 2 March 1998, 23, 28.  
<sup>46</sup> US. Senate, “Joint Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. 105th Congress. Second Session. Iraq: Are Sanctions Collapsing?”. 21 May 21, 1998, 1.  
<sup>47</sup> Ibid., 3.  
<sup>48</sup> Ibid., 4, 6.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., 34, 53.  
<sup>50</sup> Ibid., 58.  
<sup>51</sup> US. Senate, “Hearing before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations. 105th Congress. Second Session. United States Policy in Iraq: Public Diplomacy and Private Policy”. 9 September 1998, 1, 7.  
<sup>52</sup> US. Senate, “Hearing before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations. 105th Congress. Second Session. United States Policy in Iraq: Public Diplomacy and Private Policy”. 9 March 1999, 1, 3.  
<sup>53</sup> US. Senate, “Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations. 106th Congress. First Session. Facing Saddam’s Iraq: Disarray in the International Community”. 28 September 1999, 1.  
<sup>54</sup> Ibid., 8-9.  
<sup>55</sup> US. Congress. Senate, “Hearing before the Select Committee on Intelligence. 106th Congress. Second Session. Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States”. 2 February 2000, 5-7.  
<sup>56</sup> Ibid., 12-13.  
<sup>57</sup> Ibid., 22, 28, 29.  
<sup>58</sup> US. Senate, “Hearing before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations. 106th Congress. Second Session. The Liberation of Iraq: Progress Report”. 28 June 2000, 4, 12.  
<sup>59</sup> US. Senate, “Hearing before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations. 107th Congress. First Session. United States Policy Toward Iraq”. 1 March 2001, 29-31.  
<sup>60</sup> US. Congress. House of Representatives, “Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia of the Committee on International Relations. 107th Congress. First Session. U.S. Policy Toward Iraq”. 4 October 2001, 1-11, 43. Kemp had been the author of *Energy Superbowl: Strategic Politics and the Persian Gulf and Caspian Basin*. Washington, DC, 1997.  
<sup>61</sup> US. Senate. “Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations. 107th Congress. Second Session. What’s Next in the War on Terrorism?”. 7 February 2002, 7.  
<sup>62</sup> Ibid., 25. PNAC, Project for the New American Century, based in the same offices as the right-wing Weekly Standard in Washington, DC, long advocated US imperial sway in the Middle East. See Kalidi, Rashid, *Resurrecting Empire*. Boston, 2004, 3, 52-53, 55; PNAC, *Rebuilding America’s Defenses*. Washington, DC, 2000, v, 1.  
<sup>63</sup> “What’s Next...”, op. cit., 26.  
<sup>64</sup> Stanley K. Moskowitz, Director of Congressional Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency, to Bob Graham, Chairman, “Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate”. 8 April 2002. Available from Internet at: <[http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002\\_hr/020602cia.html](http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002_hr/020602cia.html)>.

<sup>65</sup> Karl Rove, Condoleezza Rice, Stephen Hadley, Karen Hughes, Mary Matalin, J.R. Wilkinson, and Nicholas Calio met as a public relations unit for chief of staff Andrew Card's rollout of the Iraq invasion in September: 1.) Douglas Feith's Office of Special Plans furnished the appropriate "intelligence" about Saddam's WMD capabilities, 2.) WHIG leaked it to select members of the press, 3.) Bush II officials appeared before the news media to go on record parroting these anonymous sources, especially Dick Cheney, making claims about nuclear threats, 4.) Lawmakers reacted by pressing the administration for an official National Intelligence Estimate to confirm these allegations. The most aggressive manipulators in the Bush II regime set up Congress and the American people to accept that war was inevitable. See Bamford, James, *A Pretext for War: 9/11, Iraq, and the Abuse of America's Intelligence Agencies*. New York, 2004, 318, 324, 325, 328, 377; Woodward, Bob, *Plan of Attack*. New York, 2004, 168-72; Western, Jon, *Selling Intervention and War*. Baltimore, 2005, 201.

<sup>66</sup> US. Senate, "Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations. 107th Congress. Second Session. Hearings to Examine Threats, Responses, and Regional Considerations Surrounding Iraq". 31 July and 1 August 2002, 1-2.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, 161-62.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>69</sup> "U.S. Policy Toward Iraq". 19 September 2002, 58-59; "U.S. Policy Toward Iraq: Administration Views". 19 September 2002, 30.

<sup>70</sup> "Hearings to Examine Threats". 31 July and 1 August 2002, 270-71.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, 14-15.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, 21-23.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, 178, 195.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, 236.

<sup>75</sup> US. House of Representatives, "Hearing before the Committee on International Relations. 107th Congress. 2nd Session. U.S. Policy Toward Iraq". 19 September 2002, 3, 20.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>77</sup> US. House of Representatives, "Hearing before the Committee on International Relations. 107th Congress. 2nd Session. U.S. Policy Toward Iraq: Administration Views". 19 September 2002, 24-26.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, 32, 35.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, 36, 37, 40.

<sup>80</sup> US. Senate, "Hearing Before the Armed Services Committee. 107th Congress. 2nd Session. Hearings on Iraq". 19 September 2002, 1.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, 1-6, 13, 16, 19, 23.

<sup>82</sup> US. Senate, "Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations. 107th Congress. Second Session. Next Steps in Iraq". 25 and 26 September 2002, 1.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, 16.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, 119-22, 124.

<sup>85</sup> "Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq". 16 October 2002, P.L. 107-243 (H.J.Res. 114), 2-6.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.* For reasons of space the House of Representatives will not be discussed. Although the Senate voted on 11 October 2002, Bush II did not sign it until 16 October 2002. See "Senate Roll Call: Iraq Resolution". 11 October 2002. Available from Internet at: <[http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/onpolitics/transcripts/senaterollcall\\_iraq101002.htm](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/onpolitics/transcripts/senaterollcall_iraq101002.htm)>. Data on monetary contributions to senators are from the Federal Election Commission, and have been compiled and organized on the OpenSecrets.org statistical website, <http://www.crp.org/politicians/index.asp>, cited hereafter as FEC. Data are from the FEC on oil and gas contributions to senators from 1997 to 2002, and during each senator's most recent election campaign (1998, 2000, or 2002). For some senators who did not seek re-election the data for 1996 were used.

<sup>88</sup> FEC.

<sup>89</sup> FEC; in 2004 Chaffee visited the CIA for a briefing on Saddam's WMD and concluded, "[...] we're not going to find any weapons of mass destruction [...]" US. Congress. Senate, "Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations. 108th Congress. 2nd Session. The Iraq Transition-Obstacles and Opportunities [Part III]". 22 April 2004, 69.

<sup>90</sup> For example, Hoffmann, Stanley, Gulliver..., op. cit., 49; Frum, "Myth 2: America Wants War with Saddam because of Oil". *Daily Telegraph*, 22 October, 2002; Marcel, Valerie; Mitchell, John V., "Iraq's Oil Tomorrow". London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, April 2003, 2. Available from Internet at: <<http://www.riia.org/sustainabledevelopment>>; Hepburn, Donald F., "Is it a War for Oil?". *Middle East Policy*, 10 (Spring 2002):1; Todd, Emmanuel, *After the Empire: The Breakdown of the American Order*. London, 2004, 140-42.