

VISION OF MODERNITY IN THE EARLY TURKISH REPUBLIC: AN OVERVIEW

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Recibido: 13 Junio 2007 / Revisado: 20 Julio 2007 / Aceptado: 27 Julio 2007 / Publicación Online: 15 Octubre 2007

Abstract: This article presents the main debates and existing lines of investigation about the foundation of the actual Turkey and which have been the factors of its process of modernization, examining the meaning and the principles of the kemalist political movement and its influence in the conformation of the contemporary Turkish State. Elements such as the political Islamism, the Kurd nationalism and the projects of integration with Europe are analyzed. As result of the combination of these factors, Turkish political history has lived in a state on permanent tension between the secular sectors and the religious/ Islamic /conservative one. In order to solve such dilemma, the presence of soldiers and their intervention to solve many coup d'etats have been constant.

Keywords: Modernity, Turkey, democracy, republic, Ottoman Empire.

History of modernization in the Ottoman Empire, in the sense of adopting Western-origin rational governmental institutions and attitudes under Western military, economic and ideological pressure, is usually considered to begin early in the nineteenth century¹. Several studies take the period of Selim III (1789-1807) as the starting point in dealing with modernization attempts in Turkey². Reforms aiming to restructure mainly the state apparatus were incessantly maintained by the succeeding statesmen throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 is usually argued to be the culmination of such reform process³. Although the continuity between the modernization attempts in the Ottoman Empire and Turkish Republic is underlined, the latter is treated distinctly and as a new beginning. This conventional approach stems from several reasons but the belief or consideration that the

reforms of the early Republican era (also known as, in behalf of the founder and president of the Turkish Republic until his death in 1938, Mustafa Kemal's era) were the marks of 'new Turkey instead of old' and thus a definite rupture from the past is the main drive for the assessment of this period separately. Along with this consideration, this period and the preceding one, the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1922), are presented as the stages of the Turkish 'Revolution', in the first of which independence of the Turks were secured against imperialist powers and in the second, an independent new modern state was founded. Within this approach, Mustafa Kemal [Atatürk] has come to be famed as the 'savior' and revolutionary leader that modernized Turkey.

Reflecting the outlook of the founders of the Turkish Republic, this approach mainly stemmed from both contemporaneous views of foreign authors and diplomats who frequently underlined novelty of Turkey as it turned entirely its face to the West⁴ and studies examining, the so-called Turkish transformation, within the perspective that modernization theory provided at its emergence in 1950s. As a matter of fact, early writings on the Turkish Revolution were enormously influenced from the modernity paradigm as they examined the case of Turkey, a latecomer in modernization, by highlighting development and progress in an underdeveloped country. Critical approaches to modernization theory came in the following decades⁵. In the examination of the Turkish case, challenge to modernization theory came from revisionist scholars who were under the influence of dependency theory. Followers of the dependency school focused on socio-economic basis of the transformation as the fundamental of political change in addition to change and continuity between the Ottoman Empire and the

Turkish Republic⁶. Another revisionist approach came from scholars who analyzed the Turkish Revolution within the cultural-symbolic traits it represented. Comparing it to the French Revolution in order to reveal its peculiarities; for example, Şerif Mardin, an eminent Turkish social scientist, argues that

“The Turkish Revolution was not the instrument of a discontented *bourgeoisie*, it did not ride on a wave of peasant dissatisfaction with the social order, and it did not have as target the sweeping away of feudal privileges, but it *did* take as a target the values of the Ottoman *ancien régime*... For the Turkish Revolutionaries, the symbolic system of society, culture, seems to have had a relatively greater attraction as a target than the social structure itself”⁷.

Among such approaches, the modernist account which describes the Turkish Revolution as national, secular and progressive modernization attempt with strong anti-clerical and anti-traditionalist tendencies⁸ as well as “change from an Islamic Empire to a national Turkish state, from a medieval theocracy to a constitutional republic, from a bureaucratic feudalism to a modern capitalist economy”⁹ seems to dominate studies on the history of the early Turkish Republic.

Debates on the Turkish Revolution since the end of 1980s has actually any relevance with both the modernization theory and its critics. The Revolution has been under close examination due to the process that Turkey has undergone, particularly of political climate that has dominated domestic and international affairs. Three main factors, which also surround the debates on the Turkish Revolution and have brought it into questioning, can be counted for this development. First is the resurgence of Kurdish nationalism which, after the suppression of 1925, had not developed an efficient program and organization until 1980s¹⁰. Second, the rise of political Islam with a viable mass support and well-established political organization(s) backed with a fairly good amount of capital. Finally, there is the process that Turkey entered in integration with the European Union. All of these, together or separately, led the questioning of the aspects, understanding, structure and vision that the Turkish Revolution comprised. If Kurdish issue can be resolved without abandoning Kemalist notion of ‘nation’, if the perpetual tension between secular/laicist and conservative/Islamist

sections of the society can come to halt without redefining the Kemalist understanding of secularism/laicism and if the democratic regime in Turkey can be solidified and integration to the European Union can be eased without revising the Kemalist principles are the most frequently asked, polemicized and debated questions today.

Questioning of the Turkish Revolution in this way has well-founded reasoning since socio-political, socio-cultural and even economic vision of the order that was established in 1920-30s is still efficient together with the figure of Mustafa Kemal [Atatürk] whose “images and ideals adorn the landscape of social life; multiple portraits and posters of him hang in nearly every public meeting place; his epigrams appear on frontal pieces of school buildings and state offices from postal services to the army barracks throughout the country”¹¹. In the political culture of contemporary Turkey, reforms of the early Republican era and figure of Mustafa Kemal have been considered as the foundational stones of the Turkish state that a challenge, threat or claim to change these is usually perceived by the establishment as attempt to overthrow the regime, to partite the country or to destroy the secular and democratic national order. This order took its name from its founder and it is widely known as Kemalism which, in some studies, have been treated as a peculiar ideology and a third way between socialist and liberal ideologies¹². Peculiarity of the Kemalist thought or ideology is debatable, but it is not exaggeration to say that it has dominated political landscape of contemporary Turkey as it has been consolidated and reproduced through all periods since the establishment of the Turkish Republic. This essay will simply describe the principles of Kemalism and attempt to uncover the vision of state and society laying in these principles.

1. KEMALISM

What is Kemalism? Together with if Kemalism is an ideology or not, this question is frequently asked one and actually has not definitely been answered. As widely accepted, however, Kemalism “never became a coherent, all-embracing ideology, but can be described as a set of opinions which were never defined in any detail”¹³. The ‘set of opinions’ that are considered to form Kemalism has been fixed in six principles or arrows, each signifying a target and characteristic of the reforms and was claimed to complement each other. The six

arrows have become the emblem of the Republican People's Party which was founded in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal [Atatürk] and now the main opposition party. These are republicanism, secularism/laicism, nationalism, populism, etatism/statism and reformism/transformationism.

Except for republicanism, all these had actually firm Ottoman roots, not in form of doctrine or principle but as characteristics of the modernization process, and as a part of the Ottoman polity¹⁴. Secularization/laicization was one of the essential characteristics of the Ottoman modernization since, roughly to say, the second half of the nineteenth century; early writings on the history of the Turks began at the same time and by the end of the century, Turkism, then denoting Turkish nationalism, became one of the cornerstones of political thought among intellectuals. Populism was one of the components of the ideology of the Committee of Union and Progress, which was the party in power in between 1908-18. Etatism emerged as practical and pragmatic economic policy during the First World War¹⁵. That is to say, Mustafa Kemal was not the creator of these principles¹⁶; instead, he was the political leader that systemized them as a political program to be implemented for the transformation of Turkey into a modern state. Nevertheless, he and the bureaucratic elite surrounding him presented them as novelty through which the state and nation would catch up the contemporary and civilized world. As a matter of fact, they were the ideological instruments providing the republican-bureaucratic elite to disconnect themselves from the Ottoman past and legitimate their position as well as the reforms held for eradication of religious institutions¹⁷.

2. PRINCIPLES OF KEMALISM

Cutting all relations with the Ottoman past and arguing that 'the new Turkey has any relation with old [Ottoman] Turkey', that 'the Ottoman government has passed into history' and 'now a new Turkey has been born'¹⁸, a very characteristic of the Kemalist discourse, found its expression in transformationism. This principle, defined as 'a commitment to ongoing change and support for the Kemalist programme'¹⁹, was the spirit lying behind the reforms held in the early Turkish Republic and displayed Mustafa Kemal and his colleagues'²⁰ determination to create a new Turkish state and society independently of the past. Yet it has also

political connotations regarding the power struggle ongoing among Mustafa Kemal's faction and their opponents. It is because it provided legitimacy for the reforms while it was used as a mean to devalue what belonged to the Ottoman past so as to discredit every kind of opposition, whether conservative/Islamic or Kurdish or political, against the political power held by Mustafa Kemal's party.

Along with the transformationist vision, reforms aiming nationalization and secularization of the state and society were held on a vast scale beginning in 1922. In the first place, the Sultanate and Caliphate, the temporal and spiritual symbols of power in the Ottoman Empire were abolished and replaced by the Republican regime. Republicanism was to be one of the arrows demonstrating anti-monarchic nature of the new regime and its popular base. Resting the new regime on popular base or national sovereignty found its expression in populist arrow. In the Turkish case, populism denoted national solidarity and was defined by the Republican elite as 'interests of nation came before interests of any group or class'. In that, populism, as Parla and Davison aptly state, depicts of relations between social groups and individuals. Claiming that 'interests of all members of society are not and should not be considered to be in conflict', this elite rejected the notion of class in society. According their understanding, there were no classes but only occupational groups in Turkey. Turkish people were 'farmers, herdsman, landowners, artisans, workers, free professionals', etc.²¹ As there were no classes in Turkey, there would be no political activity based on class interests. As society in Turkey was harmonious and not made up of competitive/rival economic groups, political competition would not be allowed. In the context of 1920s and 1930s, following brief experiences in multi-party politics, this came to mean that the party in power; namely, Republican People's Party was the sole legitimate party to rule. In other words, authoritarian mono-party rule was consolidated and any group of opposition or autonomous organization was allowed to exist. In the long run, this understanding targeted socialist or communist organizations, which would not be allowed for open legal political activity until recent time²².

Establishment of the Republican regime based on popular sovereignty was followed by other fundamental reforms. In 1924, together with the

abolishment of the Caliphate, religious schools were closed; a unified national and secular system of education was introduced. At the same time, religious office and the Ministry of Religious Affairs were replaced by the Religious Directorate. Interpretation and execution of an enlightened version of Islamic religion was the main drive behind the establishment of this Directorate²³. A year later, in 1925, the religious shrines and dervish contents, which had vital importance in the daily life of the Muslims, were closed down²⁴. In addition, traditional headgear of the Ottomans, fez, was prohibited; instead, a symbol of being western, hat, was promoted. Adoption of the European calendar, the Swiss civil code, Italy's penal code and Latin alphabet followed these. All these were the requirement for being civilized, particularly secular/laic. As still one of the most complicated and debated Kemalist principles, secularization/laicization thus targeted mainly three areas. First target was fields of state, education and law. These areas had been the traditional strongholds of the institutionalized Islam of the *ulema* (higher religious class) in the Ottoman Empire. Secondly, religious symbols; and finally, social life and popular Islam were subjected to fundamental change²⁵.

In the Kemalist secularization/laicization reforms, it is possible to decipher the positivist mentality of the reformers. As a matter of fact, positivist ideology was the intellectual basis of the Turkish Revolution²⁶. The belief that a modern nation thinks in terms of positive sciences was not a newcomer in Turkey. Positivism had began to influence deeply Mustafa Kemal's generation, widely known as the Young Turks or *Jeunes Turcs* and later to form the Republican elite, from the beginning of the twentieth century onwards²⁷. Positive sciences had particular emphasis in the Kemalist thought and discourse. Science, according to Mustafa Kemal, was the 'truest guide to life'. For this reason, Turks had to learn to think in scientific manner. This was the requirement for the nation's success in contemporary progress since 'science was the gateway to progress in contemporary civilization'²⁸. As this was the belief, sphere of religion, Islam, should be limited and religious belief should be an individual matter. Thus Kemalist reforms that were held with a well-rooted positivist understanding essentially targeted religious institutions and symbols. Separation of religion and state was rhetorically the purpose; however, a firm state control was established on religion

through the Directorate of Religious Affairs. In other words, the aim of secularization/laicization became removal of religion from certain spheres of governance without separating its institutions and personnel from the state²⁹. In that, the early Republican government did not separate the temporal and spiritual domains; instead, it strictly put the spiritual under the control of temporal³⁰.

The vacuum that secularizing/laicizing reforms created at the expense of the domain that had previously been occupied by religion was attempted to be filled with Turkish nationalism. The efforts of the Republican elite for nation-building and to give a sense of Turkishness to its citizens through linguistic and historical studies led the adoption of an overtly ethnicist and secular Turkish nationalism emphasizing the Turkish ethnicity as master of the country and dismissing Islam from being a component of the Turkish identity. These two characteristics of the Turkish identity can be seen in efforts to find a Turkish civilization in history and for language reform aiming, particularly following the adoption of Latin alphabet in 1928, purification of the Turkish language from the Arabic and Persian words, which had actually made up the Ottoman language together with Turkish³¹. These efforts were culminated in the formulation of Turkish Historical Thesis and Sun-Language Theory respectively. While the former claimed that 'the Turks had originally lived in Central Asia, but had been forced by drought and hunger to migrate to other areas, such as China, Europe and the Near East' where 'they had created the world's great civilizations', the latter argued that 'all languages derived originally from one primeval language, spoken in Central Asia, that Turkish was the closest of all languages to this origin and that all languages had developed from the primeval language through Turkish'³². Simply the claim comes to be that all civilizations were born from the Turkish civilization and mother of all tongues over the world was Turkish.

Turkish nationalism that was officially adopted through such historical and linguistic studies was civilizationist and universal as it attempted to demonstrate that Turks were a significant part of world history and belonged to civilized world by separating them from the East and cutting their relations with Islam. Domestically, however, this nationalist vision excluded 'others'; those who had non-Turkish background ethnically, linguistically and culturally. With the

adoption of the Turkish Historical Thesis, it was accepted that Turkishness was made up of race, ethnicity and glorious past of the Turks and their language³³. Accordingly, ethnically non-Turkish elements were subjected to assimilative policy.

Nationalism of the new regime is also discernible in the principle of étatism/statism. Étatism was adopted as an economic policy following the Great Depression of 1929 and has generally been considered to mean as state intervention for economic progress and the creation of a national economy. However, étatist understanding can not be confined to economic sphere. As vision of economic progress laid in railway building, banking and state-led industrial investments which were given the name of ancient civilizations that were claimed to be Turkish in the Historical Thesis such as *Sümerbank* (Sümer means Sumerian) and *Etibank* (Eti means Hittite), this principle came to represent economic aspect of the nationalist ideology. This vision also entailed the creation of a national bourgeoisie and thus targeted refinement of economic enterprises and commerce from non-Turkish elements, specifically the non-Muslim minorities. In the context of 1930s, étatist principle actually signified state domination in political, economic, social and cultural spheres as well as an instrument of national mobilization effort together with populism³⁴.

3. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Over viewing all these principles together, it is convenient to state that they were parts of the effort to replace the Ottoman Empire with the Turkish nation-state. As they were announced in their complete form in the program of Republican People's Party in 1931 and incorporated into the constitution in 1937, these principles were considered to form the official ideology of the Turkish nation-state. Secular and nationalist citizens committed to the Republican regime and accommodated to the modern, contemporary world were to be created by inculcating these principles. Education was the primary mean of inculcation³⁵. Kemalist reforms, principles and thought have become particular and compulsory subjects of education from the primary to university level. Beginning from 1930s till the present, some institutes within and outside university bodies were founded until the title of 'Institute for Atatürk's Principles and History of the Turkish Revolution' or 'Atatürk Research Center' with

the purpose of studying, reproducing and disseminating vision of state and society of the early Turkish Republic. Curriculum of schools arranged to this end and history textbooks propagating this vision were written to publicize ideals of Kemalist understanding. The Republican People's Party also established People's Houses and People's Rooms in order to transform the Turks into a modern 'enlightened' people within the Kemalist ideology. As they were also a part of national mobilization, the number of such organizations reached to approximately 4,500 in 1950³⁶.

Although it was envisioned as the 'sole and most determinative, all-encompassing public philosophy embedded and enforced in governing and socializing institutions of the Turkish Republic'³⁷, the Kemalist thought was transformed as a result of the social, economic and political change that Turkey underwent in the following decades. The vision that the Republican elite had in transforming Turkey was questioned and challenged by political movements developed in subsequent periods. In the aftermath of the World War II, when there was hot debate and effort for transition into multi-party politics, these principles, particularly étatism and laicism were reinterpreted³⁸. In 1950s, Kemalist understanding of laicism/secularism was crucially challenged by the political representatives of those who were discontented with the harsh laicist/secularist policy of 1930s and objected to eradication of Islamic symbols and institutions from social life. Organized in the Democratic Party, they overthrow Mustafa Kemal's People's Party in elections and held the power in 1950 for a decade. During their period of rule, an Islamic revival was generally observed³⁹.

In 1960s and 70s, leftist movement which, for the first time in the history of modern Turkey, acquired a popular base by the growing of labour class, was viewed as the main challenge to Kemalist vision of state and society although it adopted and was deeply influenced from some aspects of Kemalist principles. Growing of socialist organizations was actually the dead letter of 'harmonious society' having no classes but occupational groups⁴⁰. In the next two decades, in 1980s and 90s, challenge to Kemalist principles came from the Kurds. Objecting to the vision of one state, one people, one official language in an organically unified society under the hegemony of ethnic Turkish nationalism, the Kurds overwhelmingly

supported the Kurdish rebellion that broke out in 1980s. Another challenge to Kemalist principles began to accompany the Kurdish movement in mid-1990s. Political Islam which was still questioning the secular/laic character of the Republican regime gained considerable popular support and the representative party became the first party in elections in 1995⁴¹.

All such challenges became a pretext of intervention by military in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997 respectively; sometimes in form of *coup d'état* and sometimes through check and balances of the political system. As a matter of fact, the military emerged as the guard of the Kemalist principles since 1960; a role that legitimating and reproducing its position in politics up to date. For this reason, Kemalist principles still the main points of reference for not being excluded and segregated in the political system and actually the only legitimate vision in dealing with current issues of Turkey, especially those related to identity issue. Therefore, examining the Kemalist principles and vision provide one with abound clues on political struggles ongoing in Turkey today, particularly around the issue of integration into the European Union between liberals and nationalists.

NOTES

¹ Military defeats of the Ottoman forces in wars with the 'Westerners' became the primary cause for the need of reformation as perceived by the Ottoman rulers. Thus Treaty of Karlowitz (1699) has a symbolic significance as marked the first lose of territory to 'enemy' and the beginning of delimitation of Ottoman territories which would continue until its end as political entity. Rustow, Dankwart A., "The Modernization of Turkey in Historical and Comparative Perspective," in Kemal H. Karpat (ed.), *Social Change and Politics in Turkey*. Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1973, 93-120; Lewis, Bernard, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*. New York & Oxford, Oxford University Pres, 2002. Structural changes emanated from the disintegration of the Ottoman land system are treated as the internal dynamics of the Ottoman modernization in Karpat, Kemal H., "The Land regime, Social Structure, and Modernization in the Ottoman Empire," in William R. Polk; Richard L. Chambers (eds.), *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century*. Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press, 1968, 69-90.

² For example, Zürcher, Erik J., *Turkey: A Modern History*. London & New York, I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd Publishers, 1993.

³ "With the establishment of the [Turkish] Republic in 1923, modernization reached a climax-and, in a

sense, came full circle." Rustow, Dankwart A., "The Modernization of Turkey...", op. cit., 96.

⁴ 'New Turkey', 'La nouvelle Turquie' and 'Die neue Türkei' were the most popular titles of books written on Turkey in different languages in 1920s and 30s. Zürcher, Erik J., "Modern Türkiye'ye Ne Oldu? Kırk Yıl Sonra Bernard Lewis'in *Modern Türkiye'nin Doğuşu* Kitabı [What Happened to Modern Turkey? Bernard Lewis' *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* after Forty Years]", in *Savaş, Devrim ve Uluslaşma: Türkiye Tarihinde Geçiş Dönemi (1908-1928)* [War, revolution and Nationalization: Period of Transition in the History of Turkey]. İstanbul, Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2005, 83.

⁵ For example, Tipps, Dean C., "Modernization Theory and Comparative Study of Societies: A Critical Perspective". *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, XV-2 (March 1973), 199-226.

⁶ See, for example, Keyder, Çağlar, *State and Class: A Study in Capitalist Development*. London, Verso, 1987.

⁷ Mardin, Şerif, "Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution". *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, II-3 (July 1971), 202.

⁸ Berkes, Niyazi, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma* [Modernization in Turkey] [Ahmet Kuyaş (ed.)]. İstanbul, Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2005.

⁹ Lewis, Bernard, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey...*, op. cit., 481.

¹⁰ For the emergence, rise and development of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey see van Bruinessen, Martin, *Agha, Shaikh and State: the Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan*. London, Zed Boks, 1992; Olson, Robert, *The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880-1925*. Austin, University of Texas Press, 1989; McDowall, David, *A Modern History of the Kurds*. London, I. B. Tauris, 1996; Mango, Andrew, "Atatürk and the Kurds". *Middle Eastern Studies*, XXXV-4 (October 1999), 3-25.

¹¹ Parla, Taha; Davison, Andrew, *Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey: Progress or Order?*. New York, Syracuse University Press, 2004, 37.

¹² In 1930s some ideologues of the Republican regime attempted to explain principles of the Turkish 'Revolution' by stressing its difference from socialism and liberalism and underlining its peculiarities. For example, Peker, Recep, *İnkılap Dersleri* [Courses on the Revolution]. İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 1984. Recep Peker (1880-1950) was one of the ideologues who also served as secretary-general of the Republican People's Party and minister of Finance, Interior, Transport and finally Prime Minister until his death. A complete attempt at systemizing principles of the Turkish 'Revolution' as a third-way ideology came from a group of intellectuals who gathered around a journal entitled *Kadro* (Cadre). It was published in between 1932-35. Besides elaborating the Turkish 'Revolution' as to form a peculiar ideology and in that a model and example for all colonized, underdeveloped countries, these intellectuals sought for an

alternative development strategy to socialism and capitalism. Türkeş, Mustafa, "A Patriotic Leftist Development-Strategy Proposal in Turkey in the 1930s: The Case of the *Kadro* [Cadre] Movement". *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, XXXIII-1 (February 2001), 91-114.

¹³ Zürcher, Erik J., *Turkey...*, op. cit., 189. For objections to this claim and a systematic elaboration of Kemalism as a corporatist ideology see Parla and Davison. Nevertheless, it is still not convenient to define Kemalism as monolithic ideology. From its birth till the present, dependent to the historical context, it has been interpreted diversely by different political groups, organizations and parties. In 1930s, when Kemalism was at its formation phase, it is argued that it had three variants competing each other 'for political and intellectual supremacy within the regime'. For a close examination of the issue see Aydın, Ertan, "Peculiarities of Turkish Revolutionary Ideology in the 1930s: The *Ülkü* Version of Kemalism, 1933-1936". *Middle Eastern Studies*, XL-5 (September 2004), 55-82.

¹⁴ This does not mean that Republicanism or its Ottoman equivalent *Cumhuriyet* was entirely absent from the political dictionary of the Ottoman Empire. Its usage by some intellectuals was in support of a constitutional monarchy based on the sovereignty of people. Dumont, Paul, "The Origins of Kemalist Ideology", in Jacob M. Landau (ed.), *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey*. Colorado, Westview Press, 1984, 26-28.

¹⁵ For a brief and general view presenting Ottoman background of these principles see Zürcher, Erik J., "Kemalist Düşüncenin Osmanlı Kaynakları [Ottoman Sources of Kemalist Thought]", in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Kemalizm* [Political Thought in Modern Turkey: Kemalism]. Vol. II. İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 2001, 44-55; its English version can be found at <<http://www.let.leidenuniv.nl/tcimo/tulp/Research/MUNCHEN2.htm>>. Also Dumont, Paul, "The Origins...", op. cit., 25-44. For the development of Turkism and Turkish nationalism see Kushner, David, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism 1876-1908*. London, Frank Cass, 1977; for populism Tekeli, İlhan; Saylan, Gencay, "Türkiye'de Halkçılık İdeolojisinin Evrimi [The Evolution of Populist Ideology in Turkey]". *Toplum ve Bilim*, 6-7 (Summer-Fall 1978), 44-110; Toprak, Zafer, "II. Meşrutiyet'te Solidarist Düşünce: Halkçılık [Solidarist Thought in the Second Constitutional Period: Populism]". *Toplum ve Bilim*, 1 (Spring 1977), 92-139; for etatism id., *İttihat ve Terakki ve Devletçilik* [The Committee of Union and Progress and Etatism]. İstanbul, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1995.

¹⁶ Prior to the establishment of the Turkish Republic; namely, in the Second Constitutional Period (1908-1918), there was an efficient Westernist movement, which had developed a Westernization program in order to transform Ottoman society into a 'modern-scientific' society. Reflections of this program can

easily be traced in the republican reforms. Hanioglu, Şükrü, "Garbcılar [Westerners]: Their Attitudes Toward Religion and Their Impact on the Official Ideology of the Turkish Republic". *Studia Islamica*, 1997/2 (Août 1986), 133-158.

¹⁷ The emergence of these bureaucratic elite, with no doubt, owed much to the Ottoman westernizing tradition. Inheriting this tradition, they held the power in 1908 and limited jurisdiction of the Sultan. In 1923, political power was entirely in their hands. This was the moment to create a modern society through socio-cultural change by the civilian-military bureaucracy that was organized in the Republican People's Party. For a comprehensive evaluation see Turan, İlter, "Continuity and Change in Turkish Bureaucracy: The Kemalist Period and After", in *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey*, 99-121.

¹⁸ Mustafa Kemal's statement, quoted in Timur, Taner, *Türk Devrimi ve Sonrası* [The Turkish Revolution and Its Aftermath]. Ankara, İmge Kitabevi, 1993, 104.

¹⁹ Zürcher, Erik J., *Turkey...*, op. cit., 190.

²⁰ The reforms held in the early Turkish Republic with the purpose of creating a modern nation-state and a secular republic resembling European ones were "a generation of men, born in the 1880s in Muslim families in an urban environment in Southeastern Europe and in the coastal areas of the Marmara and the Aegean; people, formed in the colleges, which the Ottoman Empire had established after European models in the nineteenth century, who knew at least one European language and who went on professional careers in the service of the state". Zürcher, Erik J., "How Europeans adopted Anatolia and created Turkey". *European Review*, XIII-3 (2005), 385.

²¹ Parla, Taha; Davison, Andrew, *Corporatist Ideology...*, op. cit., 80-81.

²² Zürcher, Erik J., *Turkey...*, op. cit., 181. Except for a period of twenty years (1960-1980), socialist and communist organizations could not operate legally until the fall of the so-called 'Real Socialism'. Legal restrictions began to be abolished in 1990s.

²³ Cizre Sakallıoğlu, Ümit, "Parameters and Strategies of Islam-State Interaction in Republican Turkey". *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, XXVIII-2 (May 1996), 234.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid., 194-95.

²⁶ Timur, Taner, *Türk Devrimi...*, op. cit., 99.

²⁷ Şükrü Hanioglu, M., *The Young Turks in Opposition*. New York & Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, 203-205.

²⁸ Parla, Taha; Davison, Andrew, *Corporatist...*, op. cit., 102.

²⁹ Ibid., 104. For an evaluation of the State-Islam relationship in the early Turkish Republic see Davison, Andrew, "Turkey, a 'Secular' State? The Challenge of Description". *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, CII-2/3 (Spring, Summer 2003), 333-350.

³⁰ Cizre Sakallıoğlu, Ümit, "Parameters and Strategies...", op. cit., 234.

³¹ History and language were the main components of nationalization of culture and society in Turkey as the requirement of Kemalist modernization project. Adoption of the Latin script was followed by the purification of language, change of names of places, i.e., towns, cities, geographical names. By the adoption of Law of Surnames in 1934, it extended into family surnames which had to be pure Turkish. For an evaluation of the language policy in the early Turkish Republic see Çolak, Yılmaz, "Language Policy and Official Ideology in Early Republican Turkey". *Middle Eastern Studies*, XL-6 (November 2004), 67-91.

³² Zürcher, Erik J., *Turkey...*, op. cit., 198-199.

³³ Cagaptay, Soner, *Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who is a Turk?*. London and New York, Routledge, 2006, 52.

³⁴ For an evaluation of étatism as economic policy and its socio-political connotations see Birtek, Faruk, "The Rise and Fall of Etatism in Turkey, 1932-1950: The Uncertain Road in the Restructuring of Semiperipheral Economy". *Review*, VIII-3 (Winter 1985), 407-438.

³⁵ The following article enables a good account of the relation between ideology and education as a transformative mean in the case of early Turkish Republic. Salmoni, Barak A., "Turkish Knowledge for a Modern Life: Innovative Pedagogy and Nationalist Substance in Primary Schooling, 1927-50". *Turkish Studies*, IV-3 (Autumn 2003), 103-144.

³⁶ Birtek, Faruk, "The Rise...", op. cit., 420.

³⁷ Parla, Taha; Davison, Andrew, *Corporatist...*, op. cit., 35.

³⁸ Karpert, Kemal H., *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to A Multy-Party System*. Princeton and New Jersey, Princeton University Pres, 1959, 245-348.

³⁹ Lewis, Bernard, "Islamic Revival in Turkey". *International Affairs*, XXVIII-1 (January 1952), 38-48; Reed, Howard A., "Revival of Islam in Secular Turkey". *The Middle East Journal*, 8 (1954), 267-282; Ahmad, Feroz, "Politics and Islam in Modern Turkey". *Middle Eastern Studies*, XXVII-1 (January 1991), 10-12.

⁴⁰ It should be pointed out that corporatist understanding of society was bankrupt as early as 1950 when the Democratic Party came to power as the representative of the Turkish bourgeoisie. Foundation of this party in 1946 actually signified the end of a coalition among the civilian-military bureaucracy, bourgeoisie and big landowners. Emergence of a popular socialist movement in 1960s was important in terms of highlighting class politics in a socio-economically differentiated structure as it had ever done in Turkey. For reading history of Contemporary Turkey as the development of capitalist state and class struggles the following may give significant clues: Öncü, Ahmet, "Dictatorship Plus Hegemony: A Gramscian Analysis of the Turkish State". *Science and Society*, LXVII-3 (Fall 2003), 303-328.

⁴¹ For analysis of the development and radicalization of political Islam in Turkey in a historical perspective see Cizre Sakalhoğlu, Ümit, "Parameters and Strategies...", op. cit., 231-251.