

# WARS, REVOLUTIONS AND THE FIRST REAL WORLD REVOLUTION

Petri Minkkinen

University of Helsinki, Finland. E-mail: petri.minkinen@helsinki.fi

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**Abstract:** The purpose of this article is to engage in a conceptual discussion for a broader publication on “The Cycles of Imperialism, War and Revolution”. It departs from a presupposition that our common world is experiencing a transition from a broad Eurocentric historical context into a non-Eurocentric broad historical context. It proceeds by a historical discussion on the concepts related to wars, reforms and revolutions and explains why, in the context of the actual phase of global transition and the First Real World War, it is, despite earlier discussions on revolutions and world revolutions, meaningful to suggest that our common world is experiencing a First Real World Revolution.

**Keywords:** Broad Eurocentric historical context, non-Eurocentric broad historical context, the First Real World War, a First Real World Revolution, War, Reform, Revolution.

## INTRODUCTION

This article, the purpose of which is to be a preliminary conceptual and thematic discussion for a broader publication on “The Cycles of Imperialism, War and Revolution”, departs from a presupposition that our common world is experiencing a transition from a broad Eurocentric historical context into a non-Eurocentric broad historical context, which in effective terms means that we are departing from a 500+ years period during which Eurocentric actors, social forces and powers have been in a position to set the defining rules of global political, economic and power-political affairs, among other things. We are thus witnessing a major transition which is about to produce a revolutionary outcome at the global level, in a sense that the non-Eurocentric actors, social forces and powers will replace the

Eurocentric actors as the main protagonists of these global rules and thus global power-relations, especially in an emerging situation in which also material factors support their possibilities and capabilities to set these rules.<sup>1</sup> Another presupposition is that this global transition is an interactive process of world level processes and transformations and revolutionary and power-political transitions at macro-regional, national and local levels. A related presupposition is that, as was the case of Mexico’s revolution of 1910 which had national, macro-regional and global transformative implications, the new long revolutionary process in Mexico has produced, is producing and will produce similar implications but which take place in a different world historical situation. These latter transformations are taking place in the context of the First Real World War (FRWW) and in a situation, in which a genuine global level power-political transition is taking place. Therefore, it is argued in this article that whereas the earlier revolutionary processes and their outcomes during this 500+ broad historical context, including the so-called world revolutions, took place within the parameters of this broad Eurocentric historical context, the actual global transformative process or revolution will be the First Real World Revolution (FRWR), both in terms of its worldwide scope and due to its outcome, that is, a transition to a non-Eurocentric broad historical context.<sup>2</sup>

## 1. THREE EUROCENTRIC CIVIL WARS AND THE FIRST REAL WORLD WAR

I have suggested that the war declared by the first Bush administration should be understood as the First Real World War (FRWW). This claim is based on the view that the great wars of 20<sup>th</sup> century, which have in the Eurocentric view

of history and world been conceived as I and II World Wars and the Cold War, were in fact I, II, and III Eurocentric Civil Wars of 20<sup>th</sup> century (I, II, III ECCW). To begin with, it is useful to remember that many commentators conceived the 1914-1918 war simply as the Great War and thinkers such as John Maynard Keynes understood this war as the European Civil War.<sup>3</sup> As was the case of this war, also in the wars of 1939-1945 and 1947-1991 (or beyond 1991), the main protagonists were European or more broadly Eurocentric countries and social forces. Moreover, all these wars or conflicts were violent struggles between the Eurocentric countries and their representatives whom struggled on behalf of their version of Modern Eurocentric economic growth ideology (MEEGI) against the representatives of competing but in this sense similar Eurocentric economic growth ideologies. This is the case of the US, the Great Britain and France as well as Russia-Soviet Union and Germany in all their variants of politico-economic organization, including the Third Reich, even if the national socialistic ideology of the latter was quite skilfully devised to draw influence from the glorified and mystified past. That was also the case of Japan, the empire of Honorary Whites, which had during the 19<sup>th</sup> century opted for MEEGI for defensive reasons (but which developed into imperialist practices as well), and revolutionary China, which strived for economic growth also after its dissociation from the Eurocentric Soviet and Stalinist model(s) and the chinozation of its national development strategy.<sup>4</sup> Especially in relation to the III ECCW, the strategy of MEEGI had been opted for by Latin American and African countries, even if many of them incorporated indigenous elements into their most often nationally oriented economic growth strategies.

Even if the three ECCW's were struggles mainly between Eurocentric states and their representatives, it is true that all of them were fought to a varying degree outside the territorially delimited geographical Europe. This does not change their fundamental nature as struggles between Eurocentric states and representatives of modern economic growth ideology. Even if as a major challenge to the Western civilization as the US conceived itself representing it and the first great revolution of the 20<sup>th</sup> century was the Mexican revolution of 1910, at least until Russia's Bolshevik revolution replaced it as the principal threat<sup>5</sup>, for example Immanuel Wallerstein thinks that

the wars of 1914-1918 and 1939-1945, which he sees also as "one long 'thirty years war from 1914-1945'", were a culmination of the rivalry between the United States and Germany. The US had become stronger in the world-system since "at least the 1870s" and the US had become increasingly important competitor to the British on the world market, and the principal rival of the US was Germany.<sup>6</sup> After Germany had been defeated and Europe had destroyed itself in the context of the II ECCW, the US emerged as the hegemonic power. At that time the relations between revolutionary Mexico and the United States had reached a relatively stable phase<sup>7</sup> and the Soviet Union, which had been a temporary strategic ally of the US and the Allied forces, and which had been allowed to weaken itself in its war against the Third Reich, became the principal enemy of the western variety of capitalism and the principal competitor in the struggle between competing MEEGI's. Even if China after its 1949 revolution and Cuba after its 1959 revolution, together with the decolonization process, offered at least partially differing competing alternative models, which however remained within the sphere of MEEGI, despite the endogenous elements they contained, the Soviet Union remained the principal competitor as an alternative model of MEEGI. This competition materialized – in various countries of varying level of "development" in different parts of the world – as economic and military aid, military and other coups, support for "our" dictators, repression of peoples and opposition in competing camps (as well as that of internal opposition), proxy wars, open and direct wars, among other things. Most clearly and violently this competition took place in the so-called Third World countries and it took place in the context of the III ECCW which continued at least until the early 1990's.<sup>8</sup>

The United States had emerged as an exceptionally powerful hegemonic state after the II ECCW, in the context of which the principal European states had effectively destroyed their previous power position. After the war the US and its social forces became the main promoter of western version of Modern Eurocentric economic growth ideology and praxis and it was considered to be in their interest, not only to extend and consolidate their own power position, but in the context of emerging III ECCW, to support the reconstruction of Western Europe in order to halt the alleged expansion of the competing MEEGI's and related forms of governance and property control as represented

by the Soviet Union and the “socialist bloc”. As suggested by the world-systems analysis (WSA) and transnational historical materialism (THM), this hegemonic position lasted until early 1970’s. Especially in the context of THM it has been suggested that from the 1970’s the phase of one-state based hegemony eroded and there was an attempt to internationalize or trilateralize the hegemony through the ruling and governing class organizations such as the Trilateral Commission.<sup>9</sup> This informal institution was still a product of especially the US social forces and whereas earlier institutions such as the Bilderberg meetings had deepened the cooperation of the US-Western European ruling and governing classes, the Trilateral Commission incorporated also their Japanese counterparts, elevating the Honorary Whites into the circles coordinating the interests of the trilateral promoters of the western version of MEEGI. Steadily the ruling and governing classes from other parts of the world were incorporated into the Trilateral Commission and other informal and also formal governing institutions, which competed with and tried to replace the international institutions with more equal decision-making practices such as many of the United Nations institutions. This process of incorporation has proceeded along with the promotion of economic globalization or globalization of capitalism based on ideology and praxis of increasingly hardened and more pure “western” or “capitalist” versions of Modern Eurocentric economic growth ideology.

In the context of the world-systems analysis there has been a more consistent tendency to underline the declining tendency of the US hegemony and power position. Within the THM, which builds on Antonio Gramsci’s view of hegemony based not only on coercion but also consent, there has been a stronger tendency to point at the consent which the US and trilateral ruling circles have been able to build around the neo-liberal version of the western variety of MEEGI. It is true that in the context of decline of the inwardly oriented national development strategies of the “developing” countries and the collapse of the Soviet Union and the East-European “socialist” bloc, the triumphalist US and other collaborating ruling and governing classes were in a position to declare a victory for their version of MEEGI. Moreover, even if also the European Union with its slightly and at least apparently more socially oriented growth model strengthened, the US share of the global GNP or

global output increased temporarily during the 1990’s.<sup>10</sup>

This triumphalist attitude of the US ruling and governing classes and shared by many of their especially European equivalents was however based on shallow ground. Even if Zbigniew Brzezinski’s suggestion that the eventually successful US plan to allure the Soviet Union to occupy Afghanistan in 1979, which was based on the assumption that by giving the Soviets their own Vietnam war, they might strengthen the possibilities of the fall of Soviet Union may contain a grain of truth, it also saw seeds for another problem.<sup>11</sup> One part of this project was to support the Mujadeen troops which conceived the atheist-communist Soviets as an enemy and by doing so they built ground for the eventual turn of the Mujadeen and other local forces opposing also the US military and equally occupying presence in the Islamic countries against them as representatives of materialist Western culture. During the Iran-Iraq war the US, which was humiliated by Iran’s Islamic Revolution, supported Iraq’s Saddam Hussein’s secular and dictatorial government and the US and the European corporations provided Iraq material to build chemical weapons which their ally Saddam Hussein used against the Iraqis. Just before the I Iraq war the US diplomatic representative in the area is believed to have replied positively in Hussein’s request to extend its presence in Kuwait, which, while facilitating Hussein’s occupation of Kuwait, may or may not have contradicted the overall US policy in the region. Be it as it may, the I Iraq war strengthened the US military presence in the area and by many such as Osama Bin Laden this military presence in Saudi-Arabia was considered unacceptable. Moreover, the long and continuing Israel-Palestine conflict in which the US has especially from the 1970’s supported the Israeli policies, has been a constant source of mistrust and opposition to the US and more generally “Western” policies in the Islamic world, which has emerged as one key area in which the Eurocentric world order has been challenged.

Decolonization was a process which took place in the context of the decline of the Eurocentric world order in a sense that the Europe, which was weakened after the 1939-1945 war, was also in a situation in which its grip on colonized territories was getting weaker. The new powers the US and the Soviet Union were in principle in favour of decolonization but at the same time

they were eager to impose their versions of MEEGI's on these "liberated" territories and thus to draw them into their respective spheres of influence. The abovementioned emancipation of the Islamic world was a part of this process as was the process of decolonization in Africa. The Mexican revolution of 1910 had, besides its internal consequences also external consequences. Among other causative factors, such as the 1929 crash in the New York stock exchange, it made the US to renounce its earlier new imperialist policies towards the Caribbean and Central America by 1930's. In combination with Mexico's 1917 constitution and Carranza's foreign policy doctrine, Mexico's 1910 revolution promoted new nationally and internally oriented economic growth ideology in Mexico and Latin America, which underlined the right of these countries to exploit their natural resources and to develop their national economies. The II ECCW and the preparation for it fomented the possibilities of these countries to promote such policies. However, as the US and the Soviet Union emerged as new superpowers from this war and the US was in a position to foment its grip on Latin America, the US adopted a policy which tried to check excessive economic nationalism and to prevent advance of communism in Latin America.<sup>12</sup> In the context of this policy line and together with like-minded local ruling and governing classes, the containment of the excesses required often the imposition of a right-wing military dictatorship, for example in Guatemala in 1954 and in Brazil in 1964.

In the early 1970's the post-1945 phase of US hegemony was eroding, especially when conceived as hegemonic position among the rich Northern countries and areas such as the US, Europe and Japan. At that time also the Bretton Woods system was transforming from a system stabilizing post-war economic recovery and expansion of the rich countries of the world economy towards a system promoting the socio-economic transformation of the poorer countries. However, in relation to Latin America the US intensified its subversive policies both in semi-direct and indirect ways. In the case of Chile a military coup and a consequent military dictatorship was organized and realized through the proxies in order to prevent the radical reformist policies of the democratic and socialist government of Salvador Allende. In the case of Mexico, which has been conceived as a perfect dictatorship, as a regime which can contain radical transformations without resorting to

military dictatorship, a more subtle and indirect subversive mode was adopted. In relation to Mexico, the aim was to undermine its internally oriented development policies through promoting a revolt of the local capitalists through e.g. subversive propaganda of the local US embassy.<sup>13</sup>

Though the coup organized against democratically elected Allende government was in principle just another military dictatorship imposed on a Latin American country, it was also a landmark which coincided with the emergence of the renewed anti-democratic mood within the US ruling and governing circles aiming at rolling back the so-called "excess of democracy". Chile became also a precursor of the renewing imperialistic spirit – which resembles the Bush the younger administrations new imperialist policies the seminal example of which is Iraq – in the context of which the earlier leftist radical reformist government was overthrown through a semi-direct proxy military coup and the Chilean society was transformed into a laboratory with an objective to engage in a total social transformation in the context of the policies of "economic imperialism", a derivative of the monetarist approach of the so-called Chicago Boys. In the case of Mexico a more indirect policies were adopted and the aim was to promote a transformation through a rebellion of the local capitalists against the Luis Echeverría government, the aim which materialized later and especially during the 1980's after a series economic crises in Mexico and in the context of world economy. In a situation in which the post-II ECCW hegemony of the United States was eroding, in the context of III ECCW, these two transformative policy lines, neo-conservative or neo-liberal (more indirect and economistic policies) and new right (more direct and militaristic policies) emerged as principal right-wing transformative policy lines of the US ruling and governing classes.<sup>14</sup>

In a sense the imposition of military dictatorship in Chile was a continuation of earlier US policies of anticommunism and supporting the national security dictatorships in order to halt the supposed Soviet communist advance and to promote US economic interests. On the other hand, it coincided with the beginning of the US hegemonic decline, the advance of neo-conservative/neo-liberal and new right policies as well as related reorientation of the Bretton Woods system. Middle East crisis and the consequent oil crisis together with problems of

the nationally oriented development policies and the costs of buying of internal social peace contributed to the emergence of the debt crisis of the 1980's. Also the eventually successful undoing of the Nicaraguan Sandinista-revolution paved way for a situation in which it was possible to allow the "third wave" of democratization, at least partly because the economic problems of the poorer countries and the weakening of the radical left allowed a belief that the limited democracy would not constitute a threat to the US and local economic interests in the area. The ideological triumph of economic orthodoxy which was built into the global, regional and bilateral economic treaties helped to continue with limited democratization which in such a situation was considered relatively harmless until the late 1990's.<sup>15</sup>

Successful taming of the remaining possible nationalist threat of the Mexican Revolution of 1910 by the end of 1980's – which marked also a beginning of a new long Mexican Revolution – was also related to the changes in the Soviet Union and China. Soviet Modern Eurocentric growth model had lost its growth capacity and the "new Cold War" (i.e. the renewed intensification of the III ECCW) together with the successful weakening of the Soviet Union through its induced Afghanistan operation (among other things such as the Chernobyl incident) lead to unsuccessful reform efforts in the Soviet Union in the context of which relative political liberalization preceded economic reforms and eventually lead to the collapse of Soviet Union and its empire. China, on the other hand, after the Cultural Revolution, opted for the primacy of market oriented capitalist economic reforms without political reforms at least at the state level, which, as in the case of well developed and "pure" capitalist democracy, helps to keep the citizens or the people from interfering with the socio-economic policies of respective cadres or ruling sectors<sup>16</sup>, was much more successful in its transition strategy which has made China the foremost emerging capitalist dictatorship, whereas Russia has until recently (despite the pillage of the remaining Soviet national assets and the emergence of local class of robber barons i.e. the oligarchs) had to adapt to expansion of the US, the EU and the NATO.

On the other hand, it can be said that, whereas China has saved its face through thousands years old sense of cultural superiority and patience in defending its national interests, the representatives of triumphalist "western"

MEEGI made a similar mistake in humiliating the Russians in the context of undoing the Soviet Union which was made with the Germans in the form of humiliating economic demands after its defeat in the I ECCW in 1918. The Germans did not forget this humiliation and it is quite probable that the Russians will not forget it either, in a situation which more or less ended the period of Eurocentric civil wars of (1910/1914-1991+).

In the eve of the outbreak of the I ECCW in 1914 the Balkan situation was conceived as a reason for (though in reality it was mainly a trigger of) the Great War. Again in the 1990's there were fears about the repetition of Balkan situation in a sense that it would trigger a new "world war" even if in fact the dissolution of Yugoslavia was related to the final phases of three Eurocentric Civil wars of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, despite the fact that an Islamic element was involved in both cases (dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in the first case and the Bosnian war and the involvement of the non-Bosnian Moslem-fighters in the latter case). Though both belonged to a transition era which involved links to past and to the future, it is important to remember that they both still belonged to the era of intra-European conflicts or Eurocentric Civil Wars. On the other hand, despite the fact that the European Union had emerged as a challenger to US position, the Yugoslav wars while ending the period of ECCW's, constituted also a first "real" war in Europe after the end of II ECCW and it coincided with the US preparation for the next round of wars, as the Wolfowitz-Cheney team prepared a memorandum in 1992 which suggested that in a changing world situation the US must be prepared to prevent the rise of any competing power which might challenge the US global position, which was temporarily improving during the 1990's. This posture was built into the program of the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), the 1997 Statement of Principles of which demanded a radical increase of the US military expenditures in order to defend the US global position,<sup>17</sup> and the government of George W. Bush fulfilled their wish after the atrocities of S-11-2001, which served as a pretext to launch the First Real World War by the end of 2001.

The purpose of this ongoing war, containing the new imperialist wars of conquest, the war on terror and non-white others and the global network of internal civil wars, was to control the

emergence of the EU, Russia, China and India as well as to undo the emerging alternatives movements in Islamic countries. It was also a pretext for an effort to undo the globalizing alternatives movement to neo-liberal political program and potentially dangerous migratory movements thought resorting to hard form integral fascist control and surveillance policies. It was also an effort to tackle with the US and global economic and legitimacy crisis which started in 2001 – a W-shaped (or maybe even M-shaped) – global economic crisis resembling that of 1930's, through military-Keynesian economic policies which (while in reality contributed to the deepening of the US structural and debt-related economic downfall) helped temporarily to alleviate and in a sense postpone the US and increasingly and to a varying degrees also global depression until more or less 2007. Besides the new forms of war in the context of FRWW, due to the US intentions to plant aggressive anti-missile systems into the Eastern Europe, the NATO expansion to countries previously belonging to Soviet/Russian empire, and the continuing new imperialist wars and operations in Eurasia (including the still at least partially mysterious Russian-Georgian war) and consequent re-armament policies of Russia, this may eventually emerge also as a more traditional great power war also in Europe, which may also include a Nuclear Holocaust.<sup>18</sup>

In the context of three ECCW's, all or at least most participants claimed to fight for and in the interest of their populations and ways of life and also outspokenly on behalf of "the people" whom had been mistreated in the earlier social systems and social struggles. On the other hand, in the context of the First Real World War it is typical that the ruling and governing classes or sectors are fighting not only against external others but also internal others, conceiving their own populations as possible and potential threats. In the context of neo-liberal and new imperialist political programs and related forms of integral fascism and consequent war and control policies, and also more generally, in the context of e.g. control policies included in the environment-related control policies, not only non-white or non-Caucasian others but also the human beings in general have in probably unprecedented ways become threat units that are not only disposable (too many, potentially dangerous and expensive to maintain) but also in need of increased control, surveillance and rehabilitation/re-education (too stupid to

understand the broader picture and the general interest and also selfish and arrogant, in a sense of wanting their share of the pie). At least to a certain degree paradoxically this is related to modernity and modernism (including post- etc. qualifications), which instead of offering material and cultural improvement as well as liberty and freedom, independently of their particular definitions, seems to demand increasing control and surveillance of the human beings. Thus, even if the First Real World Revolution ends up in undoing neo-liberalism and new imperialism as well as signifies a transition to non-Eurocentric broad historical context and the end of FRWW, it does not necessarily mean that the human condition will improve in particular cases or in general.<sup>19</sup>

## 2. NON-EUROCENTRIC BROAD HISTORICAL CONTEXT

What does it mean that we are experiencing a transition to a non-Eurocentric world? Should we be very strict in a sense that a non-Eurocentric world is a place where only people and peoples of non-Caucasian descent rule and set the operative rules of this world? Or, should the requirements for a non-Eurocentric world be more relaxed, in a sense that even if many or most of the rule-makers are non-Caucasian while not all of them, the rules they set or device, are derived from the non-Caucasian ways of organizing their life and historical experiences? Or, should we include a territorial requirement for the concept Eurocentric, that is, that most of the inhabitants of these territorially defined areas and especially their ruling and governing classes are of Caucasian descent? Or, should we relax the requirement even further and conceive as non-Eurocentric all territorial areas outside the recent hegemonic or dominant areas which have promoted and maintained the Eurocentric world order, i.e. especially the territorial Europe proper, the United States and also Canada. Even this relaxed requirement is far from unproblematic, given the fact that the racial-ethnic composition of all these most Eurocentric areas is changing, which, of course, can also be conceived as a symptom and also a promoter of undoing the European or Eurocentric legacy of these territorial areas.

What then is a Caucasian? According to The Free Dictionary, "European physical anthropologists of the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries proposed various systems of racial classifications based on such observable

characteristics as skin colour, hair type, body proportions, and skull measurements, essentially codifying the perceived differences among broad geographic populations of humans.”<sup>20</sup> According to Oxford English Dictionary the term Caucasian was a name given to “the ‘white’ race of human kind” by Blumenbach in 1800 and he derived the term from the region of the Caucasus. Robert T. Hulme suggested in 1861 that there are “three varieties or principal races – Caucasian, Mongolian, and Ethiopian.”<sup>21</sup> Another variety of this classification of populations has been Caucosoid (Caucasian), Mongoloid, Negroid and in some systems Australoid.<sup>22</sup> For the purposes of this preliminary article, the term Caucasian understood as a white European, in all their varieties, with roots or actual existence in the territorial Europe.

In Fernand Braudel’s thinking and in the context of world-systems analysis there is a definition of a world which does not necessarily embrace the whole world in territorial or spatial terms. Braudel defined the Mediterranean which was cultural or civilization based whole which formed a world-economy, a distinctive whole which was not a world-wide. In the context of world-systems analysis developed foremost by Immanuel Wallerstein there are different types of partial worlds and world-systems, such as world-empires, world-economies and mini-systems. Within this intellectual framework we are living in a modern world-system, a capitalist world-economy which emerged 500+ years ago as an European world-economy and which has during different phases developed into a capitalist world-economy which in the actual world comprises practically whole territorial world. A partial world-economy has become a world-system covering whole or almost whole world. Within his intellectual framework, as in various other critical approaches but in different terms, there has been discussion on the possibilities to move beyond the capitalist world-economy and world-system into a different socialist world-economy or world-system. Even if this objective may well emerge as an entry to a better world-system than the actual one, the problem here in definitional terms is that socialism, as it has been developed as a systematic thought system and practice, is evidently an offspring of Eurocentric parts of world and thought, even if many practices to which we may denote with the concept socialism are necessarily not.

In this article it is supposed that now for the first time in human history the world is a territorially divided whole, including the Northern polar regions, and that in the context of the FRWW, it is possible to move beyond MEEGI’s and toward macro-regional and more indigenous and thus non-Eurocentric socio-economic systems. It is also suggested that not only outside the territorial Europe and the US-Canada complex, but also within them the Eurocentrism is decreasing, in terms of demography, the nature of socio-economic system and the capacity to define the “rules of the game”, globally, macro-regionally, nationally and locally.<sup>23</sup>

### 3. REVOLUTION AND REFORM

In his book on European Revolutions between 1492 and 1992 Charles Tilly wrote quite informatively that the European actors such as Great Britain, France and also Russia with her “adjacent regions” have been in a situation of war almost all these 500 years, with only very few intervening years of peace.<sup>24</sup> Moreover, his study on European revolutions implies that during this period there have been variations between different periods in relation to the intensity and number of revolutionary situations. For example, if between 1642-1691, the Low Countries, Iberia, Balkans and Hungary, the British Isles, France and Russia had aggregate number of 121 years during which they had revolutionary situations, between 1692-1741 this was the case only during 52 years and between 1742-1791 only during 33 years. However, during the period between years 1792-1841 this number increased to 98, reduced back to 49 during 1842-1891, increased again to 65 between years 1892-1941 and reduced back to 44 between years 1942-1991.<sup>25</sup>

This statistical analysis of revolutionary situations in Europe suggests two main development paths. First, there was an overall tendency towards internal political consolidation within territorial Europe, i.e. less years of revolutionary situations. Second, there has been a clear cyclical tendency in relation to decrease or increase of years during which there has been revolutionary situations. On the other hand, even if the overall number of revolutionary situations has decreased, the intensity, depth and the extensiveness (i.e. the impact) of these revolutionary situations have increased at least in some cases. There is a parallel situation in relation to the European wars. If one can say that for example from the French revolution of

1779 the impact and the extensiveness of the revolutionary situations has increased, it is also possible to say that the impact and the extensiveness of the European wars has increased, especially during the 20<sup>th</sup> century in the form of three ECCW's. The related hypothesis of this article is that, besides the ongoing global transition or revolution in power-relations, there has been, is and will be an increase of aggregate revolutionary situations globally (possible also years) between years 1992-2041.<sup>26</sup> Moreover, as from the beginning of 21<sup>st</sup> century our common world entered in an era of the First Real World War, it is suggested here that we are at the moment amid a First Real World Revolution, which as it the case of the FRWW with its sub-wars, can be subdivided into interconnected macro-regional, national and local revolutions and revolutionary situations.<sup>27</sup>

How should we conceive the terms revolution and reform? As these words suggest, in the first case the question is related to re-evolution which denotes that it is important to reorient the process of evolution which is taking place in a given social formation and geo-historical context. In the second case the word suggests that there is a need to cause a re-formation within a given social formation and geo-historical context. In other words, revolution means that there is something fundamentally wrong in this particular social order and it is necessary to change its path or form of evolution in a way which departs from this path or form and opts for a very distinctive path or form. It may imply that up to a certain temporal point a social order has evolved but in a problematic way, in which case it may be sufficient to cause a distinctive path or form of evolution without however undoing or negating everything contained by this social order. It may also imply that at that temporal point it is necessary to undo everything contained by it. In the latter case, if we conceive human beings or some of them as inseparable parts of this social order, it may require undoing also all human beings or those of them whom are inseparable parts of this social order. This option has however historically caused unnecessary human suffering and waste of human potential which has effectively harmed the consequent development of this re-evolving social order, both in the cases of revolution and in the cases of coup d'état as well as in the cases of electoral victories, managed or not.<sup>28</sup> On the other hand, re-formation means that its end-result is a social order the path and the form of which is reformed

or reoriented without undoing and negating its fundamental features or properties and thus without causing a re-evolution at this particular temporal point.

There has been some discussion that a sustained long-term re-formation could produce also a re-evolution. This may or may not be a valid suggestion but it is evident that for example the social democratic gradual social-engineering promoting sustained re-formation has not produced a re-evolution as defined above. That this possibility is not altogether denied here is related to a possibility and actual reality that such projects of sustainable re-formations have been pre-empted before it has been possible to obtain real-life evidence whether this is indeed possible during longer periods of time.<sup>29</sup> However, as is the case of the re-evolutions, also the re-formations can be undone to a certain degree. In both cases however some aspects of the changes caused remain and it is also possible that within the processes of re-evolution and re-formation, new re-orienting re-evolutions and re-formations take place. This may be related to the internal frictions or external pressures, or, to other newly perceived needs to re-orient the path selected, with or without internal frictions and external pressures. Thus, as is the case with the re-evolutions or re-formations proper, in a sense that they carry within them features of earlier social formations, also after counter-revolution, counter-reformation or re-orientation the new (or restored) social formation carry with it at least some features of the earlier social formation, though not necessarily toward a progressive and emancipative direction, what ever meaning given to these concepts.

In general terms the revolutions experienced in the course of global history have either been realized by existing or wanna-be ruling and governing sectors or/and the revolutions have been eaten by themselves. A typical outcome has been a somewhat revised or transformed social order in which the new ruling and governing classes or sectors have emerged and replaced the earlier ones. For the part of the masses i.e. the broad majorities of populations, a newly found social order has offered some or none improvements and continuity under the governance system guided by new the ruling and governing classes. This situation is caused either by external pressures on the new revolutionary formation, internal frictions inside the revolutionary cadres or their willingness to impose a new social order which necessarily

causes opposition from the part of those benefiting from earlier social order and in all of these cases some kind of forceful imposition or repression is needed. An often mentioned solution to this problem, especially to the problem of external pressure, has been that a revolution should take place globally or at least among sufficient number of political entities which would allow a situation in which external pressure would be impossible or futile.

In the case of the global solution, there however remains a possibility that in order to impose a new social order, equally forceful and repressive modes of imposition are needed. It is also quite conceivable that the internal frictions of the cadres over the course of revolution would also in this case require repression or violent purification of the ranks. The more limited variety of solution, that of sufficient number of political entities, could mean for example that the political entities of a certain region are within the sphere of a newly found revolutionary social order. This could correspond for example to the macro-regions of our common world and in this case it might be possible to respect better the particularities of a given area<sup>30</sup>. Also in this case, there remains the very real possibility that in order to impose a new social order, violent forms of imposition and repression are needed. It could be suggested here that, in the context of the FRWW, the revolutionary/reformist transformations in different world regions constitute a variety of global network of alternatives, the cumulative consequences of which are difficult or impossible to reverse by the previous Eurocentric ruling and governing countries and classes.

Though there are significant similarities between the great transformations of 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries and those of 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries, there are also important contextual differences. The Mexico's 1910 revolution and the other great revolutions of the first part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century coincided with the crisis of the previous intensive phase of liberal economic and imperialist globalization, the Eurocentric Civil Wars, the dissolution and regionalization of world economy and the ascendancy of the US into a hegemonic position. The actual on-going long Mexican revolution as well as the dissolution-revolution of the Soviet empire and most of the so-called real socialist bloc and the emergence of the co-called global civil society, the recent and actual phase of intensive liberal economic and new imperialist globalization, the

First Real World War, the global economic crisis which began in 2001 and has intensified recently, and the possible dissolution as well as the on-going regionalization of world economy and economic governance system are taking place in the context of the US and also European decline as well as the transition to non-Eurocentric broad historical context and the First Real World Revolution.

As was also the case of the French Revolution of 1789 and the Napoleonic wars, there was and has been a conservative counter-reaction in both cases. In the first case this was represented by the Congress of Vienna and Holy Alliance. In the second case a partial US reaction against Mexico's 1910 revolution, the combined US-British-German reaction against the Russian Bolshevik revolution and its ramifications in Germany, in the context of US-German competition and the rise of aggressive, expansive, militaristic and globalistic nationalism in form of populist and right-wing National Socialism in Germany<sup>31</sup>. In the third case, there has been a rise of aggressive, militaristic global nationalism in the US, which adopted the policies of new imperialism and hard form integral fascism in order to prevent the US decline and the ascendancy of alternatives movement of the global civil society and in order to establish a new kind of world(-)empire, with special focus on promoting its geo-strategic interests in the "soft underbelly" of the Eurasian landmass, in order to control the emergence of the European Union, Russia, China and India as well as curbing down Islamic alternatives movements which their anti-Soviet policies had strengthened. However, it is evident that the First Real World Revolution is beyond the US (and somewhat allied) counter-revolutionary policies, even if their repressive and population control policies have been adopted (or their earlier policies have been synchronized) by many governments with the hard form integral fascist policies of the Bush administrations, and around which a construction of new consent (in Gramscian sense) has had certain success, especially among the ruling and governing classes.

There is general tendency to believe that all revolutions are more or less progressive or emancipative. It is true that in all revolutionary situations there is a conceived necessity to change the existing social order and power relations and most often also material factors supporting this social order. There are however

many examples of regressive revolutions and counter-revolutions which, as the so-called progressive revolutions, aim at changing or restoring the existing or emerging social order and power relations. Moreover, there can be counter-revolutions within revolutionary processes which are often related to the internal division within revolutionary cadres and also to the external efforts to interfere with the revolutionary process in order to halt it, or in order to change its course. It is also relatively typical that in the preparatory phases of revolutions external states and social forces support certain sectors of the revolutionary cadres in order to promote the particular interests they may gain from the revolutionary process. This was the case for example when the US oil sector supported Francisco Madero (himself connected through family ties to Mexico's northern sector of private capital, still influential Monterrey Group)<sup>32</sup>, one key initiator of the "democratic phase" of Mexico's 1910 revolution, even if in the later phases of the revolutionary process the US oil sector was one of the most hawkish and militarist force that wanted US military intervention to promote their interests. For their part, the Germans supported Vladimir Iljitiš Uljanovs (also known as Lenin) revolutionary intentions with the hope that he would keep his promise – as he did – to stop Russia's participation to the inter-imperialist war, i.e. the I ECCW, even if Germany under the National Socialists became the most ardent anti-communist and anti-Soviet power, which suited well to the overall policy line of e.g. the US and Great Britain.

One example was Mexico's 1910 revolution, which was a the first great revolution of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and a long revolutionary process into which various US actors tried to influence at different stages<sup>33</sup>. It was conceived as a principal threat to the Western capitalist civilization as represented by the US – before the Russian revolutions – and throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century there were attempts to undermine its objectives and/or achievements one way or the other. Especially the US oil industry supported military intervention in order to undo the nationalization Mexico's oil assets – this battle is still under way. On the other hand, the experiences from direct military and other indirect intervening in Mexico's revolutionary process were crucial in the process in which the US regional and global policies transformed from imperialistic and militaristic policies towards adoption of the policies of non-

intervention, national self-determination and national economic development. This became evident in Woodrow Wilson's policies and especially in Franklin D. Roosevelt's policies, which were during 1930's and early 1940's compatible with the policies of e.g. land reform and oil asset nationalization of Mexico's president Lázaro Cárdenas as well as his more conservative successor. There were also considerable policy similarities between the opponents of policies of Cárdenas in Mexico and the opponents of those of F.D. Roosevelt in the US and there are similarities to the actual revolutionary situation, in which policies of Cárdenas have been adopted in e.g. Venezuela and Bolivia and in which the next US president may adopt at least to a certain degree similar post-Bush policies, which may or may not allow more cooperative policies between different parts of the Americas. During the 1920's there was a purification of ranks of the revolutionary Caudillos and there were more leftist and rightist periods of the post-1910 (revolutionary) governments until the electoral defeat of 2000. Repression of the internal opposition (both rightist and leftist) became commonplace and the revolutionary governments became revolutionary and democratic only in name and the internally oriented growth model lost its previous growth dynamism by the 1970's. By the 1980's the "revolutionary" governments had adopted neo-liberal and anti-social socio-economic policies, in combination with undemocratic rule and the repression of especially the leftist opposition. The end of PRI-revolutionary governments in 2000 aroused certain euphoria but soon the post-PRI governments (latter of which is illegitimate) adopted repressive and anti-democratic policies.

Another example is the November or Bolshevik revolution of Russia, which was from the point of view of its promoters conceived as a progressive and necessary revolution in order to undo the existing ossified social order, which was an hindrance to social development and reflected material and power relations that were hopelessly outdated in order to achieve this progressive social development. Even before the new revolutionary regime had consolidated its position, the counter-revolutionary activity had begun. However, by the 1970's the Soviet regime was conceived (in "West") as an ossified regime incapable to adapt to the technological development achieved in the context of the Western form of economic growth ideology and by the 1980's many if not most within the

Soviet sphere of influence conceived their regimes as ossified hindrances not only to the political liberties but also to the progressive social development achieved at least in some countries within the Western form of MEEGI. As was the case of November revolution of 1917, many of those benefiting from the existing order lamented the social revolutions that changed the social order of the countries within the Soviet sphere by 1991. As was the case after the November revolution of 1917, the “springs of peoples” and “velvet revolutions” of late 1980’s and early 1990’s opened up an euphoric phase for many or most in these countries, and, again as after 1917, after the euphoric phase a new phase of social inequality, confrontation and control began.<sup>34</sup>

Both of these great revolutions caused a re-evolution and not only re-formation and both had global implications: Mexican revolution in itself as well as through the emerging hegemonic power the United States and the Russian November revolution in itself and especially through the eventually declining hegemonic area Europe. Both also had implications to the later anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist revolutions such as the Chinese revolution of 1949 and the Cuban revolution of 1959<sup>35</sup>. The duration of both was more or less the period of the Eurocentric civil wars (1910/1914-1991+) and both took place in the expansive though revolutionary phase of the Eurocentric world-system and did not, as was hoped, turn into revolutions leading to an alternative world-system (though this term had not been coined at the time of the beginning of these revolutions). Because the Mexican revolution involved more indigenous elements (though often more discursive than real, especially in its post-Cárdenas phase), it was more non-Eurocentric than the Russian revolution, which was basically a radical catch-up strategy based on twisted and very Eurocentric Marxist thought, both in its “third worldist” Leninist versions and its nationalist-dictatorial (and more anti-Semitic and imperialist) Stalinist versions.

#### **4. WORLD REVOLUTIONS AND THE FIRST REAL WORLD REVOLUTION**

The earlier discussion on world revolutions took place in the context of the revolutionary phase of the emergence of Braudelian world-economy or Wallersteinian capitalist world-economy. Especially the latter involves a suggestion that

the modern world-system contains a tendency to expand and that from the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century there began a revolutionary phase in the world-system. One should remember that this analysis has tackled with revolutionary tendencies within the capitalist world-system, though containing the idea that once this particular world-system reaches the limits of its sustainability, there opens up a possibility for an alternative and possibly socialist world-system from within this existing world-system, though the transformative potential may emerge especially from the semiperipheral areas of this world-system. It is, for example, from this perspective, possible to conceive e.g. the actual long Mexican revolution as a revolution emerging from a semiperipheral country. It is also possible to conceive the actual transformations taking place in Latin America and China and why not also those in Russia and Islamic world as transformative tendencies emerging from semiperiphery.

According to the representatives of the world-systems analysis there have so far been two world revolutions (WR), i.e. 1848 and 1968, which both were historical failures. Both were also [progressive] counter-revolutions to [traditionalist-“rightist”] counter-revolutions in relation to the French Revolution of 1789 and the Russian Revolution of 1917, the purpose of which was to fulfil the goals of the revolutions of 1789 and 1917. The WR of 1848 was a revolution for popular sovereignty (within and between the nations) and it institutionalized the “old left” and it fomented the political goal of obtaining state power as an intermediary step to social transformation. On the other hand, the WR of 1968 was a counter-revolution to the counter-revolution of 1917, which according to the authors, was a victory of the proponents of the state-power strategy, and it institutionalized the so-called new social movements. The 1968 WR had four main legacies. First, the capabilities of “West” and “East” to police the South become increasingly limited. Second, it changed the power relations between status-groups (such as age-groups, genders and ethnicities) especially in the rich countries. Third, the pre-1968 power relations between capital and labour have never been restored and “the functionaries of capital” have been on the run [i.e. the recent phase of intensive capitalist globalization]. Fourth, the civil society became less responsive to state-power and the power of states over civil society diminished, especially in

the semiperiphery as reflected by the crisis of different kinds of dictatorships.<sup>36</sup>

There are however various substantive issues which separate the First Real World Revolution from earlier “world revolutions”. First of all, the earlier WR’s took place in the expansive phase of the Eurocentric world-system whereas the FRWR takes place and in fact incorporates the transition to the non-Eurocentric broad historical context. Second, for the first time in human history, the whole world is interconnected in various ways and all world areas and territories are either under someone’s sovereign rule or claims to sovereignty have been made (including the northern polar regions), even if some relatively minor “lost tribes” are still occasionally found. Third, whereas for example the WR of 1968 took place mainly by the representatives of unsatisfied middle classes (though it helped to wreck cultural/intellectual hegemonies around the world), the contemporary FRWR reflects the dissatisfaction of broad social sectors around the world (despite the discussion of the elite lead nature of some major alternative social institutions) and will reflect true power transition from the Eurocentric areas to the non-Eurocentric areas. Fourth, the WR of 1968, despite its countercultural elements and later dogmatic turn, had certain similarity with anarchist-individualist neo-liberal economic anarchism, which, for its part, shared many interesting themes of Maoism and also China’s Cultural Revolution. Fifth, despite the dogmatization of 1968 revolution ideologies, there was a broad-based belief in the progressive and emancipative nature of this revolution, whereas in the context of the contemporary FRWR (despite some change-related emancipative hopes and beliefs, without which no revolution is possible), there are no whatsoever guarantees that this real world level transformation will be progressive or emancipative at least as a whole, from the point of view of global majorities, or even various though different minorities around the world.

Would then, however, the FRWR be an example of a counter-revolution to counter-revolution on 1968 WR, which materialized as a roll-back of popular democracy in the rich countries and undoing of the national and socialist socio-economic strategies and the progressive adoption of the leftist 1968 cultural revolution goals (sexual liberation, minority rights, and anarchism) by the rightist neo-liberal and also to a certain degree new right counter-revolution?<sup>37</sup>

An optimist would answer yes, at least in the context of the continuity of Eurocentric broad historical context, and with considerable reservations in relation to post-Eurocentric broad historical context, the eventual end result of the FRWR. However, the themes such as of sexual liberalization, anarchism and also minority rights<sup>38</sup> have been banalized and commercialized up to a point that they have in real world terms become smoke-screens for the real exploitative processes and undoing of real freedoms and social consciousness. If this is the case in the rich countries which tend to claim to be liberal and freedom-loving, are there reasons to believe that the possible freedom enhancing tendencies involved in the legacy of 1968 would prosper in more conservative and traditionalist areas of the world, keeping in mind that various conservative anti-liberal and anti-freedom tendencies have recently strengthened also in the rich “liberal” countries, in which illusory freedom of all has actually meant freedom of few and even these supposedly free few are themselves objects of the anti-liberal and anti-freedom surveillance and control tendencies involved in modernity discussed above? Moreover, even if from the 1990’s there has been a spectacular growth of alternative movements and tendencies promoting various aspects of freedom for all (counter-revolution to conservative counter-revolution), the institutionalized consequences of the new imperialism and the hard form integral fascism are still very much present, not only in the US and Europe, but in some form of control in almost all countries of the world (new conservative counter-revolution, in the form of gaining new consent (in Gramscian sense) in relation to necessity to increase control of the human beings) also in the most progressive countries belonging to avant-garde of the FRWR. Someone always wants to control someone and some social groups.

However, from the point of view of temporal duration (1789 → 1848, 1917 → 1968), it might be possible to conceive the FRWR as derivative of 1968, even if in the actual transition the main implication is a transition from one broad historical context to another. Moreover, the nature of the FRWR as a freedom increasing and emancipative derivative of 1968 would increase considerably in the case that all countries which have adapted integral fascist control technologies and constructed institutions undermining human rights and individual liberties and freedoms would renounce and roll-

back these freedom decreasing tendencies. Possible signs of this possibility are the intention to Barack Obama to restore *habeas corpus* in the US and also Obama's and also John McCain's promise to undo the concentration camp of Guantánamo. Whether these promises are actually kept and similar roll-back policies are adopted elsewhere remains to be seen. However, even in this case there are serious doubts in relation to general freedom enhancing capabilities of either of these candidates, given the fact that both intend to increase military expenditures of the US, continue the US new imperialist wars (even if in refocused form in the case of Obama due to his intention to increase war efforts in Afghanistan while reducing those in Iraq) in Eurasia and also to increase border-control in the Mexico-US border, and indeed more generally inside North America.

Moreover, whereas the general tendency towards the general increase of surveillance and control is related to modernity and recent trends in the development of control and surveillance technology, it is to be seriously doubted whether these candidates or in fact most of the people around the world would be willing to sacrifice even this part of technological development in exchange to increased liberty and freedom (other parts of modernity, at least partially), even if *control fatigue* related reaction also in relation to technology is certainly a possibility. Be it as it may, the increased utilization of control and surveillance technology is one indication of the especially recently deepened lack of trust, not only between the ruling and governing classes and the governed classes but also more generally between the human beings in general. This is one aspect of the dissolution of the actual Eurocentric order and it remains to be seen whether this technology and control related dissolutive factor is about to be removed in the context of the FRWR and in the eventual non-Eurocentric broad historical context.

There are also other tendencies of dissolution in the actual world which undermine the existing order and promote the FRWR, i.e. the transition to a broad non-Eurocentric historical context. At the global level there have been repetitive and ever deepening economic crises which have undermined the existing territorial Eurocentric order. In this context it is particularly interesting that whereas from 1970's the economic crises of poorer countries made it cheap for the rich country actors to purchase productive and

financial assets of these poorer countries and the then emerging economic orthodoxy prohibited protective measures by these countries – while rich countries themselves adopted various open and hidden protectionist measures. On the other hand, especially during the 2000's when the rich countries themselves are in economic troubles, now the non-Eurocentric actors have a possibility to reverse this tendency and buy cheaply productive and financial assets of the rich countries<sup>39</sup>. At the same time the US and the EU – traditionally highly protectionist entities – have began to adopt legal and other protective measures to prevent their assets to be bought by these non-Eurocentric actors, thus reinforcing the overall tendency towards macro-area specific and also national protectionism<sup>40</sup>. Moreover, one should remember that the possible and potential non-US and non-European purchasers tend to come from big countries with liquid assets (such as China, India and also Russia) or from the oil rich countries and thus this possibility is not open to everyone and all countries. At the same time, especially the declining US has resorted to illegal new imperialist measures and in fact open robbery in order to promote its (or at least of some of its economic classes') economic interests for example in Iraq, while, however, these actions are in fact undermining its overall economic position. Moreover, while these non-Eurocentric purchasing countries have had this possibility, their purchasing activity and simultaneous foreign investments to these countries have increasingly tied these countries to interdependencies of capitalist world-economy, this tendency, while possibly benefiting these non-Eurocentric countries in general, casts necessarily doubts on the progressive and emancipative possibilities of this aspect of the FRWR.

Another dissolutive tendency is the macro-regionalization of world economy and international economic organizations. This in fact, while undermining the actual order, also contributes to the FRWR, due to the fact that it strengthens the material possibilities of the non-Eurocentric or only partially Eurocentric world areas and opens up possibilities for macro-regional economic coordination based more on macro-regionally specific and indigenous socio-economic ideas and liberates them from the universalistic Eurocentric orthodoxies. At the same time there have been in recent decades separatist and autonomist tendencies both within countries and from existing countries and

defunct empires, some of which are more of internal origin (e.g. Zapatistas, Lakota's, Orange County, Quebec, Kurds, Basques and Catalans) whereas some are more clearly related to global power struggles (e.g. Kosovo, Kashmir, Chechnya, Georgia) or anti-colonialism (e.g. Tibet). Even if there would not be clear separatist tendencies there are tendencies to towards indigenization of socio-economic policies within countries (e.g. Bolivia), which is one clear example of the policies attempting to replace MEEGI with endogenous socio-economic development as well as decolonization from within and from below (as is the also case of the Zapatistas and Lakota's). To what extent it is possible to indigenize the socio-economic policies at macro-regional level is an interesting question but it is evident that the general tendency towards the macro-regionalization of world economy and its institutions foment these possibilities.

Yet another dissolving and at the same time reconstructing tendency are the migratory movements. Whereas the European (and others before them) colonists and imperialists changed the cultures and societies of the colonized areas, contemporary migratory movements to the US (especially Mexicans, Latinos in general and Asians) and to the EU (especially Moslems, Sub-Saharan Africans and Latin Americans<sup>41</sup>) are lessening the Eurocentrism of these areas both in demographic and cultural sense, especially to the degree they do not assimilate and adapt to the respective white-Caucasian and Christian (though secular) cultures. The US case is at least partially different due to the fact that the still dominant culture was imposed by the European colonists (as is the case in Latin America as well), with the specific features offered by the imported black slaves and the indigenous peoples. However, this process of de-Eurocentrifcation from within has caused and is about to cause frictions within these societies, and one vary lamentable aspect of this process is its tendency to deepen the control and surveillance within these societies, whereas the de-Eurocentrifcation of various world areas (while one key reason for the new imperialism) is about to decrease in time as the changed power relations caused by the FRWR is about to force US-Europe to retreat militarily and possibly also economically – through indigenization of foreign transnational corporations, among other things, the large scale possibility of which has until recently been

considered minimal due to the “necessities” of capitalist globalization.

The First Real World Revolution and the transition to non-Eurocentric broad historical context will probably also wreck the existing institutional-organizational world structure, not only that of international financial and economic institutions but also the United Nations structure. It is essential to remember that the existing institutional-organizational structure was erected to consolidate the territorial, demographic and material expansion and benefits of the conquering European populations during the past 500+ years. Even if China was included e.g. in UN's Security Council it does not change this basic equation. This will probably also put into question the Holy Cow of existing state-borders, which, besides consolidating these achieved gains, has been considered essential for the maintenance of world peace (which, evidently, in the context of FRWW, does not exist).<sup>42</sup> Throughout human history, peoples have migrated for various reasons and borders and areas of “sovereignty” and domination have been changed and it would be utterly naïve to believe that this would not be the case in the context and aftermath of FRWR. This will evidently cause increased confrontation within and between countries. Another very important question in relation to the FRWR and at least partially related to the possibility of continuing control and surveillance practices is that of more or less permanent features related to human nature. As the profound social transformations inevitably involves various kinds of power struggles, it may yet result as an illusory revolution with many good intentions, but, which may result as a continuity in a new dressing. Though the question of human nature is highly contested issue and it is also evident that cultural differences impact some human features, one should not underestimate the possibility that all declarations on improving the lot of human beings and related compassion may result as another forms and modalities of predatory and selfish practices.

It is also interesting to see how the contemporary phase of global economic crisis will affect the inevitable transition process. One curious thing is the surprisingly rapid fall on oil prices, which seems to be too rapid in relation to the level how much monetary-financial crisis has so far affected the real productive economy and consumption – even if also the rise to the

highest price level was probably at least partially unrelated to real economy. It is however clear that if the lowering of the oil price level continues and achieves some temporal duration, it will evidently affect the economic possibilities of oil producing countries, including Middle Eastern Islamic countries, Russia, Mexico and Venezuela, all of which are among countries and areas promoting local and regional revolutions and also contributing to the FRWR. Another oil price related issue is its implication to the US war propensity. In principle lower oil price would make military invasion to Iran less hazardous in relation to its implications to oil price and consequent impact on the US and world economic situation. On the other hand, the costs of earlier military Keynesianism and the recent public financial institutions bailout, among other things, have dramatically increased the public indebtedness and the nature of overall depression situation would most likely make renewed attempts to improve economic situation through military Keynesianism futile and even highly counterproductive.

## 5. SPECIFIC FEATURES OF DIFFERENT MACRO-REGIONS

Mexico will also in the future develop in the larger context of territorial North America, and the new long Mexican revolution has already impacted the development in the Americas as well as globally. Despite the internal and external operations supporting the fraud aiming at stopping the transformative-revolutionary process through electoral polls in 2006 (as happened also in the US in 2000 and 2004), this process continues through the combination of both violent and peaceful civil society organizations, parliamentary means and international cooperation, headed by the peaceful movement of the legitimate president Andrés Manuel López Obrador. North America in itself has a possibility to develop as an entity of democratic regionalism, even though at the moment the neo-liberal NAFTA and the new imperialist SPP (Security and Prosperity Partnership for North America) have set the path of regional development. If Barack Obama becomes the next US president, there are possibilities for the renegotiation of NAFTA towards more social economic community. On the other hand, he supports the deepening of border control within North America and has supported the continuation of the militarist Colombia Plan as well as the Merida Initiative (extended Mexico Plan), which are compatible

with the militaristic aspects of SPP and in general, his reform plans seem to be more internally oriented (that is, inside the US) than globally emancipative. In the case of John McCain victory, positive and emancipative development possibilities should not be expected (besides closing of the Guantánamo). In general terms Mexico will rise economically within the North American political economy (despite the negative effects of the US and world depression) whereas the relative position of North America as a whole will decrease. It is probable that Central America will increasingly become a part of the North American compact. Migratory movements and internal decolonization will make the US and North America as a whole less Eurocentric.

South America has emancipated from the US tutelage, even if there have been US interference in the affairs of Venezuela, Bolivia, Colombia and Ecuador. New macro-regional institutions such as Banco del Sur, Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR) and Conselho Sul-Americano de Defesa carry further the South American macro-regional institutional development. From the western point of view the South American transformations are more progressive, that is, they represent varieties new forms of socialist and also nationalist tendencies (though nationalism is often conceived as non-progressive). If conceived from the point of view of Braudel's "extended Europe", that is, that Latin America is partly European or Eurocentric area, it is possible to suggest that to an extent that Latin American transformations embody imported Eurocentric ideas and ideologies, they remain within the Eurocentric sphere and to the extent they embody endogenous i.e. non-Eurocentric ideas, they depart from the Eurocentric sphere. Thus, seen from a strict criterion of non-Eurocentric, Latin America represents only partially non-Eurocentric transformations, but seen from the more relaxed criterion, as a challenge to the recent Eurocentric power areas and also as one macro-regional locus, which, in the context of macro-regionalization or even dissolution of global economy, has a possibility to depart from the universalistic and one-dimensional Eurocentric socio-economic dogmatism and to promote more or less non-Eurocentric socio-economic practices and institutions embodying them.

In the case of Africa considerable advances were made during the decolonization and in the case

of Apartheid regime of South Africa. Egypt of Gamal Abdel Nasser was the leader of Arab nationalism/socialism. Muammar Gaddafi's green socialism has been until recently been relatively successful in resisting external pressure though now it has at least seemingly given up this resistance. South Africa has suffered on the problems related to power transfer as well as leadership problems after Nelson Mandela. Besides the Republic of Congo in which the murder of Patrice Lumumba was realized in order to pre-empt a social revolution, the recent case of Zimbabwe is the most obvious case of sustainable external pressure which together with internal problems have ruined the country. In the context of the FRWR Africa and especially sub-Saharan Africa can be conceived as a relatively black spot due to the fact that no real and credible endogenous transformative movement, force or country is in sight. The possible transformative energies are wasted in internal civil wars (race-related or not) and quite often the "development strategies" are foreign aid dependent and externally imposed. In the context of the policies of new imperialism, Africa has been a target area of the US, the EU and recently also China. The latter may or may not represent alternative possibilities for African development (e.g. alternative markets, technology, financing and also capable though cheap work force), but given the fact that China can nowadays be conceived as a capitalist dictatorship, there are no real guarantees that China would be a new developmental guardian angel for Africa, and it may well represent just another round of external imperialism and colonialism.

Seen from the point of view of Eurocentrism/non-Eurocentrism angle, Africa as a whole can be seen as less Eurocentric from the racial-ethnic point of view even if there are many internal racial-ethnic conflicts. Even if the Chinese expansion in Africa would involve exportation of Chinese people to Africa, this would mean decreasing racial-ethnic Eurocentrism of Africa. If the Chinese (imperialist) expansion in Africa succeeds in replacing Euro-US imperialist interests and socio-economic practices in Africa, or, its (benevolent) expansion supports the emergence and strengthening of the endogenous socio-economic practices and the replacement of the Euro-US ones in Africa, the possibilities for endogenous development may increase despite the fact that from the point of view of the FRWR especially the sub-Saharan Africa can be

seen as a black spot. It is, on the other hand possible that Africa is, in a sense, experiencing a temporal delay. If Latin America was socio-economically destroyed through the neo-liberal political programs of 1980's and 1990's, which supported the emergence of recently actualized transformative socio-political forces, the increased interest of the Eurocentric new imperialist forces to "develop" Africa during the 2000's may imply similar destruction-transformation cycle in Africa, even a more rapid one, though one must keep in mind that the material-economic possibilities – though not natural resources – are more limited in Africa.

Various key areas of Eurasia have been targets of the US and NATO new imperialist policies and occupation. This has overshadowed the potential for endogenous non-Eurocentric development in Eurasia, which is actually one reason for the Eurocentric occupation of these areas. One of the possible institutional expressions of this is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (CSO). As it includes Russia and China as well as a few ex-Soviet Union republics, and Mongolia, India, Pakistan and Iran are its observers, it includes one way or another many powerful non-Eurocentric and emerging countries. While Eurasia in general is a great landmass of very different countries, the eventual US-European military retreat from the area may allow deeper political, economic and security cooperation of these countries, the interests of which may however be often contradictory. As for example China has emerged as a competitor to the Western monetary institutions, there may open up new possibilities for a new version of Asian or Eurasian Monetary fund which would probably represent more endogenous and independent monetary policies and thus contribute to the de-Eurocentrication of world economy. Even if Russia is only partly non-Eurocentric both demographically and culturally, as a whole the SCO-members and observers form an emerging economic powerhouse contributing to macro-regionalization of the world-economy, despite the economic ties discussed above. An interesting and important question is how Japan will integrate into the emerging Eurasian-Asian complex. From the Western point of view these Eurasian and Asian countries are to a varying degree progressive, while many of them are considered to be traditional-conservative and lacking freedom.

Islamic world which ranges from Atlantic to Pacific Ocean, partly in Eurasia, in Asian island states and in Africa, is one of the foremost areas of alternatives to Eurocentrism, despite its internal religious, economic and political divisions. The radical Islamism, to a considerable degree a result of the US and other Western aggression, forms the most visible sectors but only a part of whole Islamic world, and especially this part is considered from the western point of view more conservative, traditional and regressive. While to a considerable degree true, it should be remembered that the Western Christian fundamentalism as well as orthodox economic fundamentalism can be considered as equally non-progressive and regressive. Radical Islamic militants as well as many more moderate Moslems have in different historical periods thought about the possibility of reconstruction of the Umma or the Caliphate. Whether this is or even could be possible as one modality of non-Eurocentric and endogenous socio-economic order remains to be seen. One interesting possibility could be more socially oriented, tolerant and freedom supporting Islamic Umma, which could possibly to a certain degree adopt some modern and non-Eurocentric forms of the earlier anti-colonial Arab socialism. Be it as it may, the fact remains that the oil-rich Islamic countries have economic muscle to promote endogenous and non-Eurocentric forms of socio-economic order, fomented e.g. by the already existing OPEC and Arab Monetary Fund.

In the case of Europe, even if during the 1990's the EU developed into a challenger of the US and Europe as a whole is at the moment world's largest economic unit, prospects look generally relatively grim. The main reason for this is the decision to promote at the same time Eastern enlargement and the constitutional process of the EU, both of which have created considerable problems. The East-European enlargement made the EU vulnerable to the US expansion, both in terms of NATO (dangerously undermining the development of EU's own defence institutions)<sup>43</sup> and the US missile shield plans, which together may lead to renewed great power wars in Europe. The undemocratic constitutional process undermined EU's credibility as a democratic unit and has in fact paralysed the development of the Union. The adoption and institutionalization of the US hard form integral fascist control and surveillance methods e.g. in the Eurojust-system as well as the conservative influence of East-European countries such as

Poland have together deteriorated the human rights situation within the EU, and the roll-back of these deteriorations would be essential both to human rights in Europe as well as to the credibility of EU as a promoter of human rights around the world. In economic terms the relative weight of the EU will decrease even if at the moment it is difficult to see the overall short term implications of the actual phase of global economic crisis in different world areas. Moreover, it is possible that the notorious international financial institutions such as IMF will lose their global position and return to their original position as Euro-US institutions, as for example its recent action in relation to Iceland and Hungary seems to suggest. It is also possible that the IMF will be eliminated completely as the European financial-monetary institutions improve their possibilities to operate in such situations. Extra-European immigration will decrease the level of Eurocentrism also in Europe itself.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> One way to define revolutionary situations and outcomes has been presented by Tilly, Charles, *European Revolutions, 1492-1992*. Oxford/Cambridge, 1995.

<sup>2</sup> Besides FRWW and FRWR this article contains abbreviations ECCW (Eurocentric Civil War) and MEEGI (Modern Eurocentric economic growth ideology).

<sup>3</sup> Keynes, John Maynard, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*. London, MacMillan and Co., 1920, 3.

<sup>4</sup> On the similarities and differences of Soviet and Chinese models after their respective revolutions (especially 1917 and 1949) see e.g. Skocpol, Theda, *States and Social Revolutions. A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press (First published in 1979), 1984, especially Chapter 7.

<sup>5</sup> See Minkkinen, Petri, "The First Real World War and the Emerging Nuclear Holocaust". *Historia Actual Online*, 13 (Primavera, 2007), 19-41.

<sup>6</sup> Wallerstein, Immanuel, "The Global Picture, 1945-1990", in Terrence K. Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein (coordinators), *The Age of Transition. Trajectory of the World-System 1945-2025*. London/New Jersey, Zed Books; Leichhardt: Pluto Press, 1996, 215. As I have suggested in Minkkinen, Petri, "The First Real...", op. cit., during the times of war and disagreement between the Eurocentric powers, the capability of negotiation and room for manoeuvre of more peripheral states and actors has increased. This has been the case during the Eurocentric Civil Wars of 20<sup>th</sup> century as well as during the First Real World War declared by the first Bush administration. Wallerstein (*The Modern*

*World-System III. The Second Era of Great Expansion of the Capitalist World-Economy, 1730-1840.* San Diego/London, Academic Press, 1989, 250-251) has pointed out in his discussion on the Spanish American independence and the Mexican revolutionary independence struggle which began in 1810, that “Three elements now entered to set the stage for the final phase of the Spanish American settler independences: the War of 1812 (actually 1812-1814) between the United States and Great Britain, the restoration of Ferdinand VII to the throne of Spain in 1813, and the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Besides being “more or less the last act of the settler decolonization of the United States”, as Wallerstein suggests, the War of 1812 between the US and Great Britain and the Napoleonic Wars created also a war situation between Eurocentric states both in North America and Europe, which also in this case opened possibilities for more peripheral actors. As Wallerstein (“The Global Picture...”, op. cit., 215) suggested the struggle of 1914-1945 can also be seen as a thirty years war. In this case the principal competitor to the US was Germany but if we include revolutionary Mexico and Russia as principal threats, it is possible to suggest that a long war of the 20<sup>th</sup> century lasted either from 1910 to 1991 (or beyond) or 1917 to 1991 (or beyond). If we conceive Germany, especially after the European Unions inclusion of (or expansion to) various Eastern European states, the strongest member-state of the EU, we may also think that the disagreements between the US and the EU over the Iraq war of 2003-, which is taking place in the context of the First Real World War, we may see yet another round of the US-Germany competition, despite the shadowy deals and agreements between Germany and the US behind the scenes.

<sup>7</sup> Which does not mean that the US social forces which had been considering revolutionary Mexico as a threat to the Western capitalist civilization as represented by the US and which opposed also the reformist policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt, would have given up their task to undo the revolutionary and reformist progressive policies of Mexico’s revolution of 1910 as represented for example by Mexico’s 1917 Constitution and the foreign policy doctrine of Venustiano Carranza (see Minkkinen, Petri, *Meksikon 1900-luku. Vallankumouksellisen maan politiikka, talous ja ulkopoliittikka.* Helsinki, KAKTUS (forthcoming). Even if the concept development had been coined by President Truman, the US which favoured gradual recreation of liberal world economy, did not abandon its criticism of the excessive nationalism of the national development programs of the peripheral and semiperipheral countries.

<sup>8</sup> There are differing views whether the Third Eurocentric Civil War ended, say, in 1991, or whether it continued beyond this date. It is evident that in the sense of “super-power” struggle between the US and the Soviet Union this war did end as a struggle between competing Modern Eurocentric

economic growth ideologies. On the other hand, Xabier Gorostiaga SJ (*El sistema mundial: situación y alternativas. La experiencia, la visión y las propuestas desde las víctimas.* Colección Mundo Actual: Situación y Alternativas, México, CIIH-UNAM, 1995, especially 11 & 17), who considers that the Third Eurocentric Civil War (what he calls “Cold War”) did end, thinks that – at that time – “the actual civilization is antagonistic, confronting the North against the South [...]”, among other things, and in this unbalanced global situation, together with the [attempted] creation of global market, with the tendencies toward homogenization and uniformity, “under the umbrella of exclusive global military monopoly.” (translated from Spanish by PM) Pablo González Casanova (“Globalidad, neoliberalismo y democracia”, in Pablo González Casanova y John Saxe-Fernández (coordinadores), *El Mundo Actual: Situación y Alternativas.* México/Madrid, CIIH-UNAM-Siglo XXI, 1996, 50) interprets this that Gorostiaga means that the 21<sup>st</sup> century and the war of North against the South had already begun. This can be conceived as an economic war of the North against the South and González Casanova suggest that this can be seen in terms of global war as an “internal war”, a concept which emerged from the experiences of the 1960’s and from earlier “colonial domination through credit”, which England practiced “with great success” from 19<sup>th</sup> century. They both appreciate the importance of military power, but in the context of their analysis, this war of the North against the South or global internal war, is foremost an economic war, which takes place within the practices of neo-liberal/neo-conservative program. Of the Cold War as a “civil war of Europe”, see Minkkinen, Petri, “La democratización de México en el contexto mundial”. *Relaciones Internacionales*, 72 (Octubre-Diciembre de 1996), 37.

<sup>9</sup> See e.g. Gill, Stephen, *American Hegemony and Trilateral Commission.* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990.

<sup>10</sup> See and compare Minkkinen, Petri, “New Imperialism and Beyond. Why the New Imperialism Will Fail and Unseat the Bush Administration?”. *Historia Actual Online*, 4 (Primavera, 2004); Minkkinen, Petri, *KAKTUS, Bush ja Pohjois-Amerikan tulevaisuus. Kriittinen avointen historiallisten kontekstien tutkimus ja muutoksellinen politiikka.* Helsinki, SRTY/Like. Another attempt to create a hegemonic consent took place in the context of the FRWW, this time around hard form integral fascist control and surveillance ideology and practices.

<sup>11</sup> On Brzezinski’s revelations, see “Les révélations d’un ancien conseiller de Carter, “Oui, la CIA est entrée en Afghanistan avant les Russes...”. *Nouvel Observateur Hebdo*, 1731 (Janvier 15-21 1998).

<sup>12</sup> Here one should remember that from the US point of view communism was a foreign ideology to the Americas and the standard custom was to interpret all or at least most attempts to improve the lot of the

poor social sectors as indicators of Soviet advance in Latin America.

<sup>13</sup> See e.g. Minkkinen, Petri, *Meksikon 1900-luku*, op. cit.

<sup>14</sup> See e.g. Minkkinen, Petri, *Meksikon 1900-luku*, op. cit.

<sup>15</sup> After the triumph of left in various countries of Latin America, influential journals such as *The Economist* began to discuss about the problems of democracy, in a sense echoing the 1970's discussion on the crisis of democracy by the Trilateral Commission.

<sup>16</sup> Relatively similar economic reform before political reform choice was made in Mexico. However, in the case of Mexico the transition was very humiliating due to the necessity to cede considerable part of its sovereignty and autonomy to its traditional enemy the US. On the other hand, despite the terrible suffering faced by the Mexicans, their country will in time evidently improve greatly its position in North American political economy, which, however, in the context of global transformation, is becoming increasingly less central.

<sup>17</sup> See <http://www.newamericancentury.org>, "Statement of Principles" and "Rebuilding America's Defences".

<sup>18</sup> See e.g. Minkkinen, Petri, "The First Real...", op. cit.

<sup>19</sup> One can note that similar and quite justified concerns emerged in the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, after the beginning of the I ECCW.

<sup>20</sup> <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/race>.

<sup>21</sup> See <http://www.oed.com/>, and there term Caucasian. According to Encyclopædia Britannica, the peoples living in the Caucasus are subdivided into two northern branches and a southern branch. Of the southerners Mingrelians and Laz, and the Svan form the Republic of Georgia and partly in Turkey. Among the northern group are the Chechens, the Kabardians, the Abkhaz, the Ingush, the Lezgi and a number of less populous groups. Besides them, in the Caucasus and Transcaucasia area live various groups of Indo-European, Turkic and also Semitic peoples (<http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9021862/Caucasian-peoples>).

<sup>22</sup> See <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/race>.

<sup>23</sup> To what extent, if any, it is possible to discuss about emerging macro-regional cultures or civilizations, will be discussed in broader versions arising from the basis of this article.

<sup>24</sup> Tilly, Charles, *European Revolutions,...*, op. cit., 1995, especially Tables 4.1, 5.1 and 6.1. British states (including England, Wales, Scotland and Ireland) and France have been most constantly in the state of war. Due to its formative process as a state and empire, Russia's case is more complicated and includes also wars involving regions which have been parts of Russian empire or which have been within its sphere of influence. Also other European actors such as the Dutch and the Iberian states (Spain and Portugal) have been often involved in external and internal wars but the British states (especially

England) and France have been the most constant warriors.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 243, Table 7.1.

<sup>26</sup> This hypothesis implies that there has been, is, and will be a general increase of revolutionary situations globally during this period but admits that it is possible to verify this hypothesis empirically only to the point of time in which this article is submitted for publication.

<sup>27</sup> Given the preliminary nature of this article, it is not possible to discuss all the revolutionary situations globally during the past 500+ years. This evidently requires more research work and will be discussed in an eventual book emerging from this research process.

<sup>28</sup> One might suggest that a revolution requires a re-evolution caused by the so-called people or peoples which have not been in a position to benefit from the earlier or existing social order. A coup d'état is a change in power-relations within existing social order in the context of which one ruling or governing class, group or section undoes the power position of another ruling or governing class, group or section and takes this power position. This requires further thinking for example in the case of revolution, whether a re-evolution can strictly be caused only by the so-called people or peoples or whether there can be some actor or actors who somehow inspire or even lead this re-evolution. In the case of electoral victory, managed or not, a question arises whether a revolution on the polls, or the so-called democratic revolution is possible? If the answer is yes, this requires that a revolution on the polls causes a re-evolution as defined above. Moreover, it is important to remember that a system of representative democracy as it was organized for example in England, was devised as a system which would prevent a radical social transformation, especially in relation to property-relations.

<sup>29</sup> This is related, among other things, to the discussion whether the capitalist and social democratic Sweden is (or at least was) or even the New Deal but archetypically capitalist US was more socialistic than any of the so-called real-socialistic or real-communistic countries ever were or are or can ever be (this discussion is well beyond the limits of this article).

<sup>30</sup> The most obvious contemporary example is Latin America. In this case one should remember that the new governments represent different versions and levels of deepness of social transformation and that even if there has been considerable advance in relation to new macro-regional institutions, these differences have not yet so far been surpassed. As a historical example (or warning) one can remember the failure of Latin American countries to unite their powers after the independence during early 19<sup>th</sup> century. Moreover, in the context of the FRWW the US has been mostly marginalized from these developments, which has given Latin America more room to manoeuvre.

<sup>31</sup> To be sure, anti-Bolshevik sentiment and action was prevalent also among the broad sectors of ruling, governing and in general propertied classes of many other countries. As in the case of Mexico's revolution, the undoing of Bolshevik revolutions objectives and achievements became a permanent objective of the US, Great Britain and Germany. Adolph Hitler's National Socialistic Germany, which, among other things, adopted a policy of protecting German workers against both international Jewish finance and international Jewish communists and within this framework preserved private ownership in non-Jewish and preferably German hands, emerged as a bulwark and primary force against the nationalized but potentially expansive Stalinist version of Bolshevism. This was also useful in undoing Germany's ascendancy in relation to Great Britain and the US, which, after Nazi-Germany's defeat, could proceed with undoing of the Soviet challenge, the success of which, however, was by no means certain at that time. Hitler's policies had supporters also in the US and it is probable that the US forms of anti-Semitism resonated also with the Communist-Jew image given to Bolshevik revolution.

<sup>32</sup> Here it might be useful to remember that the wealthy industrialist Friedrich Engels supported Karl Marx's (he himself a descendant of a long line of Jewish rabbi-intelligentsia) investigation and political activity. Also Mexico's anarchists promoted their revolutionary propaganda from the US side of the border.

<sup>33</sup> It was the second long Mexican revolution 1910-1929 (1940). First one was the anti-colonialist revolution of 1810-1821 which led to national independence and the third one is the actual ongoing one which began in 1988. (See, Minkkinen, Petri, *Meksikon 1900-luku...*, op. cit.).

<sup>34</sup> It is evident that there are differences within the countries of ex-Soviet sphere. In Russia a majority thought at least during 1990's that their life was better during the Soviet regime. Moreover, as a personality cult and a need for a strong leader emerged after 1917, similar development has taken place especially during the Putin era. Also, as was the case of Stalin era, Russian nationalism has re-emerged during the Putin era and in both cases this tendency is related – notwithstanding the national particularities – to a more general world-wide tendency. On the other hand, many Eastern European countries, especially those which are now EU-member states, have to a certain degree improved their and their citizen's situation. However, given the fact that the EU itself has, in the context of the First Real World War, adapted to the corresponding forms of population control, and the entry of new Eastern European countries to the EU has in fact contributed to the increased conservatism within the EU, the overall situation of the citizens of the Eastern European countries (as well as those in other EU member-states), has not improved as much as is often believed.

<sup>35</sup> Which have effectively outlived their Mexican and Russian predecessors even if in both cases it has been necessary to make accommodations with the Western versions of Modern Eurocentric economic growth ideology.

<sup>36</sup> See Arrighi, Giovanni, Terence K. Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein, *Antisystemic Movements*. London/New York, Verso, 1989, especially chapter 5.

<sup>37</sup> Here one could refer to the belief in an emancipative upward spiral of capitalism and socialism as suggested by Terry Boswell and Christopher Chase-Dunn (*The Spiral of Capitalism and Socialism. Toward Global Democracy*. Boulder/London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), which seems to reflect the belief in almost perpetual upward spiral of capitalist and socialist revolutions and adaptations (not basically an unsound belief because the capitalist "learnt" also from the radical theses of Marx (see e.g. Minkkinen, Petri, *KAKTUS, Bush ja...*, op. cit) leading to ever more emancipated global society.

<sup>38</sup> At least in the rich countries the issue of minority rights has developed up to a point in which the demand of equal rights for each separate minority group has led to increasing dissolution of society and to ever increasing demand for equal rights for increasingly small and increasingly curious minority groups, whereas the goal should be equal rights to everyone, each single human being.

<sup>39</sup> In the pro-economic globalization camp there has been a tendency to point at the redistributive beneficial tendencies of capitalist globalization by suggesting that the recent phase of globalization has opened up these possibilities to poorer countries. While there is a grain of truth in this these views tend to forget the state and public nature which is often behind facilitating these operations. Moreover, while it is not possible here to engage in deeper discussion on this topic on the benefits or defects of capitalist globalisation, it is necessary to remember that especially the neo-liberal and new imperialist versions of capitalist globalization have tended to concentrate ownership and polarize and dissolve societies and thus even if at the country level there may be some redistributive tendencies this is not the case at the level of human beings.

<sup>40</sup> The discussion whether this is morally and ethically right thing to do is beyond the limits of this article. It seems however that rich man's (or country's) protectionism is and has been more acceptable than poor man's (or country's) protectionism. Moreover, it was not considered as problematic when the asset purchaser came from other white Eurocentric country, whereas protectionism is required when the non-white asset purchasers have emerged. For example in Finland, the Eurocentric asset purchasers have so far done much more damage to national ownership than the non-white asset purchasers.

<sup>41</sup> Here it is possible to say that besides the US policies lead problems in European-Moslem

relations, the traditional religion-based legacy of confrontation may still cause problems. In relation to Sub-Saharan Africans, there are reasons to believe that there is considerable resentment and potential conflict in Europe in relation to their immigration *en masse*. In relation to immigrants from Latin America no such resentment exist (due to their partial Eurocentrism and historical fascination in relation to indigenous populations and civilizations of the Americas), especially in Spain and Portugal, but also elsewhere.

<sup>42</sup> It is true that the capitalist globalization (in its all forms) and the macro-regional and world institutions have (until recently) in a sense made state borders more porous and invisible though especially in the context of new imperialism and hard form integral fascism they have again become very much visible. This tendency – as well as all more or less utopian views of borderless world, be they capitalist or emancipative – should however be conceived at least partially different from the probable institutional and border changes related to the FRWR.

<sup>43</sup> This has been the case despite the fact that the NATO belongs to past era, and should be dissolved, because in contemporary world it has become a new imperialist institution, the existence and the expansion of which is causing exactly what it was supposed to deter (besides the Soviet expansion), i.e. war, and possibly also a traditional great power war in Europe.