

THE BETRAYAL OF DEMOCRACY: TIANANMEN'S SHADOW OVER JAPAN

Jing Zhao*

US-Japan-China Comparative Policy Research Institute, USA. E-mail: jzhao@mail.h-net.msu.edu

*Presidente del US-Japan-China Comparative Policy Research Institute, San Jose, California, EEUU.

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Resumen: The Chinese people's heroic struggle for political freedom in 1989 encouraged East Europe and the USSR to abandon their single-party system. The Cold War ended abruptly under the stimulus of the Tiananmen Square Incident. This article explores the other dark side of the Tiananmen Incident in the international stage: its deep shadow over Japan. Based on the author's personal experience, the article records, reviews and analyzes Japan's failure in its political transformation in the region during this historical period from two aspects: 1) Why and how the Japanese government had to engage China economically?; 2) Why and how the Japanese government betrayed democracy and human rights regarding China? The article concludes that Sino-Japanese relations should be based on principles of human rights and democracy.

Palabras Clave: betrayal, China, democracy, economy, human rights, Japan, Soviet Union, Tiananmen Square.

Following the June 4th Tiananmen Square Incident of 1989, one after another, all Leninist regimes in East Europe collapsed, in an eerie reversal of the so-called 'domino theory'. Then in 1991 the Soviet Union astonishingly dissolved itself. It is not an exaggeration to say that the Chinese people's heroic struggle for political freedom encouraged East European and the USSR people to abandon their single-party system, and Beijing's brutal oppression and the consequent isolation from international society also taught the East European regimes, especially the USSR leadership, to refrain from using military forces to crush their own people's peaceful

demonstration. The Cold War ended abruptly under the stimulus of the Tiananmen Square Incident. Regrettably, however, fifteen years after the incident, the regional political framework in East Asia has not become more secure; instead, it has become more turbulent.

There are several factors to illustrate why the Tiananmen Incident stimulated a worldwide democratic movement, but at the same time cast a deep shadow over the East Asian politics until today. First of all, needless to say, China's political system basically remains the same as before, and those who were responsible for the incident, directly or indirectly, are still staying power in China. Second, Japan's failure in its political transformation in the region during this historical period also deserves serious review and analysis. History provided Japan the rare opportunity to play a role as "global civilian power"² during and especially after the Cold War. There were high expectations, mostly outside of East Asia, for Japan to take initiative in promoting human rights and democracy in East Asia, especially after the incident.

For example, in "the first systematic, comparative, and theoretical exploration of democratization in East Asia"³, American political scientist Edward Friedman concluded:

"Taking Japanese democracy seriously, Sato and Arase describe likely changes in the direction of international human rights activism in Japan that would be inconceivable according to explanations premised solely on cultural continuity and socioeconomic interest. They illuminate the particular political forces that so far have kept Japan from becoming a leader in

human rights diplomacy in Asia. These political forces can be changed or be defeated. There are already tendencies in the direction of change. The democratic potential of Asia looks much larger if one does not find a permanent Japanese cultural obstacle blocking a change to a policy of promoting human rights".

"The authors of the chapters on a future Japanese policy on human rights, as do all the authors in this book, find more that is species-wide in the East Asian experience, including the multiple potential of its complex and rich culture, than is expected by theories premised on an essentialist and monolithic notion of culture and socioeconomic preconditions"⁴.

It is beyond this essay's scope to examine the "theories premised solely on culture and socioeconomic preconditions". However, it is obvious that the Japanese politics after the incident did not change as Professor Friedman (and many others outside of East Asia) expected. We need to explore further and deeper the dialectic of the Japan's role in the context of Sino-Japanese political relations. To do so, people first need to know how the Japanese government responded to the Tiananmen Incident.

This incident was a turning point for contemporary Sino-Japanese relations, especially for the 'friendship' between the two governments. As a comparison, let us consider a typical case just before the incident, indicating the unequal, asymmetric relationship between the two governments. A Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) Deputy Minister suggested that Japan not take Deng Xiaoping's words seriously, because Deng was no longer in charge of Sino-Japanese relations in details. He described Deng "sitting above the clouds." The result was that the Japanese government had to remove him from his MOFA position upon receiving China's diplomatic protest.

This kind of case, that Japanese senior officials being removed because of their 'reckless remarks' toward China, would never happen again after the Tiananmen Incident. The Japanese government fully utilized the opportunity provided from this incident to transform the 'granted friendship' (from Beijing) to a 'normal' (equal, symmetric) relationship with China when the Beijing regime was isolated from the majority of the international world.

In a recent book referring to the Japanese government's response to the incident, the authors describe how Japan was instrumental in pulling the G7 countries back into engaging China after the Tiananmen Square killings. A reviewer of this book commented: "Their argument that Japan's 'quiet' (i.e. low-key, low-risk) diplomacy has not been adequately recognized is a strong one"⁵. This becomes common sense in the Western world. It argues that Japan "engaged" China differently from other Western countries: to persuade other Western countries to remove economic sanctions against China. However, there is another side of the same 'engagement' coin: Japan traded with the Beijing regime on how to handle the fate of Chinese people who were participated in human rights and democracy activities in Japan.

1. WHY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT HAD TO 'ENGAGE' CHINA ECONOMICALLY

The Japanese government's stance on economic sanctions was nonetheless reasonable, understandable, and, perhaps, rational for its national interest. First of all, it was impossible for the Japanese government to join the 'international' economic sanction against China by suspending or freezing its ODA loan to China⁶. Until 1989, the Japanese government and all Japanese political parties had been headed by senior Japanese who were born during the war. They understood that Japan's ODA loan to China was a kind of substitute of Japan's war reparations to China. The then Japanese Prime Minister Uno stated soon after the incident regarding the massacre: "We do not have the slightest intention of taking punitive sanctions against China"⁷. Uno was only a temporary substitute because the ruling LDP could not decide who would be the Prime Minister in a short time⁸. Ito Masayoshi, an old friend of China" who had just refused to take the Prime Minister position, rushed to China to offer advice. The Chinese government knew Ito's intention to "teach us a lesson". Ito was told that China's Prime Minister Li Peng was visiting a "ten-thousand people pit"⁹ in Northeast China. Ito had to fly to Japan's former puppet regime's territory to meet Li Peng. It was clear who could teach whom a lesson in that place. At the same time, it was also reported that Eishiro Saito, the head of Keidanren (Japan's big-business organization), urged no change in economic relations with China, "As Prime Minister Li

Peng said, China is now trying to see who its real friends are"¹⁰.

As the representative of Chinese students in the Osaka area organizing democratic activities before, during and after the incident, I witnessed, experienced and protested against Japan's handling of this incident. With regard to the economic sanction issue, I wrote a statement of our organization, Kansai Area Chinese Student Association for a Democratic China, at Osaka Press Club requesting the Japanese government to reconsider its ODA policy when the regime in Beijing was obviously oppressing its own people¹¹. From the Chinese people's point of view, a quick response, at least a serious warning, from the outside world to the ongoing mass killings conducted by any regime, is morally necessary. In the long term, however, after the mass killings were over, economic sanctions are neither necessary nor effective. Thus the criticism of Japan's 'low-key' diplomacy did not receive wide response, even though it does not deserve any praise.

In general, Japan's ODA policy has long been criticized by many NPO/NGO groups, inside and outside of Japan, for various reasons. The main problem is that it serves the Japanese overseas business (especially, big infrastructure firms)¹² and the corrupt recipient regimes (such as Marcos' Philippine and Suharto's Indonesia), rather than the people of the recipient countries, especially in Southeast Asia. These criticisms forced the Japanese government to revise its general ODA policy after 1992 and one of the new guidelines is to link human rights and democracy issues to the ODA. Although the Tiananmen Incident image was still strong among the Japanese public, no Japanese official or commentator explicitly referred to China. The much smaller Myanmar was the obvious case to apply for these new guidelines because its military regime's legitimacy per se was under question.

In 1995, backed by Japanese people's attitude change toward China¹³, and reflecting the structural change of the Japanese politics after the Tiananmen Incident, the Japanese government for the first time sent a clear 'No!' signal to China by freezing a small fraction of that year's ODA to China. Unfortunately, instead of human rights or democracy issues, Japan used the irrelevant excuse of protesting China's two nuclear tests, emphasizing its unique experience as the nuclear victim country¹⁴. The following

section further explores why the Japanese government could not use "democracy" or "human rights" card against China.

2. HOW DID THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT 'ENGAGE' CHINA POLITICALLY

While different people have different views on Japan's economic stance, Japan's political stance after the Tiananmen Incident sent an unambiguous signal to people all over the world. The Japanese government's mistreatment of ordinary Chinese people, sometimes in the name of Beijing's request, remains a dark record in contemporary Sino-Japanese history since the 'normalization' of their relationship in 1972.

It was reported that the Japanese government had a secret agreement with the Chinese government not to grant Chinese political asylum¹⁵. Although it was impossible to verify this report, it was widely believed by Chinese in Japan, from the very fact that no Chinese had been granted such a status, that Chinese laws, not Japanese laws, apply to Chinese people in Japan. And this belief itself worked well to prevent any Chinese from becoming involved any activity in Japan not complying with Chinese government's policy. In 1987 after Professor Fang Lizhi and other liberal intellectuals were expelled from the CCP, while hundreds of Chinese students in the US signed an open petition letter, only one Chinese student (I myself) in Japan sent a similar letter, to the CCP leadership. This is simply because every Chinese student in Japan knew that Chinese in Japan have no human rights protection from the Japanese government.

When I organized a political consciousness survey among Chinese students in the Osaka area and published the result in a Chinese magazine *Yan Min*, for which I was the chief editor. The result was then cited by Hong Kong's *Cheng Min* monthly and Taiwan's *Central Daily* in January 1988. Consequently, *Yan Min* was shut down¹⁶. I was 'reminded' by Chinese consulate officials that Japan didn't accept Chinese political asylum seekers, even I had no intention to seek such a status¹⁷.

Soon after the Tiananmen Incident, a female staff working in the Chinese Tokyo embassy, Ma Qiuyun, had to flee to West Germany after her failed attempt to seek political asylum from the Japanese government. It was widely known

that Yang Zhenya, the PRC Ambassador to Japan, belong to Hu Yaobang's Communist Youth League faction. Ambassador Yang cried openly for Hu's death and permitted his staff to join our demonstration. The chief editor¹⁸ of the official Chinese student magazine in Tokyo area, *Xindalu* (New Continent), asked me to provide our petition letter and signatures¹⁹. He published them in *Xindalu*.

The CCTV broadcast of Deng Xiaoping receiving the PLA generals in Beijing on June 8th sent the final signal to the world that the situation was under his firm control. To everyone inside the Chinese government, this means "the game is over". Yang avoided meeting Chinese students but he appeared in the Japanese media and promised that no Chinese student would be punished for his/her demonstration activity in Japan. Even though this statement was an obvious lie²⁰, the Japanese government needed this pretext. Yang was called back to China later and was forced to retire early. Tang Jiakuan, the PRC Minister-counselor to Japan, was in charge of handling this incident in Japan.

To "calm down" Chinese students' democratic activity in Japan, Tang collaborated with the willing Japanese government. He claimed that the Chinese government would "forgive" any Chinese students for their "naive anti-government" activities, and he has burnt all petitions or any other relevant materials²¹ so every Chinese student could return to China safely. The Japanese government was happy to have this "guarantee" from the Chinese government, because it provided them with the excuse to ruthlessly violate Chinese people's human rights in Japan.

Japan has signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Convention on Refugees. The Japanese citizen Sadako Ogata, an international law professor on US-Japan-China relations, was the UN High Commissioner for Refugee (UNHCR) at that time. Japan also signed the official pledge on June 7th at the 1989 G7 Summit in Paris to protect Chinese students by extending the stays of those Chinese students "who so desire". The Japanese Education Minister also answered in the Japanese Diet that the Japanese government had taken "necessary measures", such as in visa extension and scholarship assistance, to protect Chinese students. This proved to be a lie²². Since Tang Jiakuan had claimed that Chinese students

would be safe to return to China, the Japanese government utilized this pretext to reject every Chinese student's desire to stay in Japan for political reasons²³. The typical answers from the Japanese immigration officials to Chinese students expressing the desire to stay in Japan were: "Just submit a letter of apology for your dissident activities to the Chinese government and you'll be fine. Your government has promised not to persecute you if you do so". "Stop acting like a baby. You will not find any help from our Japanese government"²⁴.

In one case, Rikkyo University received pressure from both the Japanese and Chinese governments not to issue doctorate degree to a Chinese student Yang Zhongmei, who was a Chinese students representative in Tokyo area, even though his dissertation, a book on Mao Zedong's seizing power in the famous CCP Zunyi Meeting during the Long March, had been published in Chinese, Japanese and English. He was the only fortunate Chinese activist in Japan to receive protection from the US government. He obtained a passport from Taiwan and was hired by the Washington Post as its Tokyo "correspondent". When the Japanese and Chinese governments knew that United States President Bush also replied a letter to him, which was published in *Democratic China* monthly (in Chinese), no one could do harm to him.

With the collaboration of the Chinese government, the Japanese government also provided a few carrots. For example, Kobe University, a privileged national university directly under Japan's Education Ministry (hence its faculty are all Japanese government officials/employees), provided an associate professorship of Law for a Chinese student in Kyoto University for his role to collect information of, and to control Chinese student democratic movement, even without Ph. D degree. The Japanese media reported this as an example of Japanese government's measure to "protect Chinese students". Did Kobe University dare to hire him if the Chinese government simply did not extend his PRC passport? How could his family come to Japan so rapidly and easily while all Chinese people in China actually were stopped the process to apply for passports and visas soon after the incident? No need to mention that hundreds of Chinese students in Japan could not reunion with their families for years!

My own case provides another example to show how the Japanese government responded to the incident. Osaka University, Japan's State Public Security Committee (*kokka koan iinkai*, the notorious secret police), and local Japanese police approached me to test what kind of position I would accept for exchange to stop my "anti-government" activity²⁵. The Japanese authority soon knew that I had no willing to make a deal with them. When my PRC passport would expire, I expressed my intention to apply for political asylum status, so that I could keep my legal student visa status. The university officials tried to avoid me, and then threaten that if I would apply, "the consequence would be worse". My supervisor professor told me that Osaka University was preparing to expel me with the excuse of "unable to continue normal study" (*shugyo mikomi nashi*) if I could not get my passport extended²⁶. I went to Osaka Immigration Bureau (the notorious *nyukankyoku*) to inquire any possible method to stay "legally" without a passport. The immigration officials refused to accept me; instead, they told me to go Tokyo²⁷.

Finally, I had to sign a statement, in Japanese, prepared by my supervisor professor, expressing my "regret" for participating in activities "not appropriate" for student and my promise to suspend any political activity as long as I stay in the university. Osaka University also promised me scholarship and professorship, but both I and the university knew that this was a convenient lie. What Osaka University needed was to force me to get passport extension for another year, which the PRC Osaka Consulate General did after receiving my signed statement. Upon my graduation, even though I was the first student ever to receive Ph. D in Sociology in the university, I couldn't find a research position in any Japanese institute. The Japanese Education Ministry had promised the PRC government that Japanese institutes would not "ruin" their "friendship" with the Beijing regime by accepting me²⁸.

This was what the Beijing regime did for its own citizens²⁹ in Japan. For his accomplishment to "calm down" the Chinese democratic activity in Japan with the collaboration from the Japanese government, Tang Jiaxuan was promoted to Assistant Minister of PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1991, then to Vice Minister in 1993. He was promoted further to the Minister position in 1998³⁰. A troubled future of Sino-Japanese relations is guaranteed under the two

current regimes' "friendship" on the cost of sacrificing Chinese people's human rights.

Eventually, the Japanese government issued "designated activities" (*tokutei katsudo*) visas to 34 Chinese activists³¹. Most of them were language school students and members of Front for a Democratic China (FDC, or Minzhen, headquarters in Paris). This visa status needed renewing every three months³². To renew this status, these Chinese had to prove that they were engaged in "designated activity." Typically, they had to show demonstration against important Chinese government VIPs (such as the PRC President Jiang Zemin, Prime Minister Li Peng, Beijing's CCP Secretary Chen Xitong) who were visiting Japan. This visa was used as a dirty card by the Japanese government to control these Chinese activists to push them against the Chinese government: "Dear PRC President, before you teach us about history, how about first listening to your citizens' protest?" It is not difficult to image how the Chinese government would persecute these Chinese citizens (and their families in China) who dare to humiliate its own leaders in the international public³³. These Chinese activists became hostages of the Japanese government to serve Japan's "national interest".

Twelve years after the incident, the Japanese government finally granted the first and only Chinese political asylum application case. Zhao Nan was a language school student in Osaka when I went to his school to collect petition signatures and donation. He lost his language student visa soon after the incident and thus it became 'illegal' for him to stay in Japan. Based on his democratic movement experience with Wei Jingsheng in 1978-79 and the subsequent two-year sentence in labor camp, we judged that he had the biggest chance to obtain the political asylum status and supported him in the decade-long court struggle. FDC was publicly declared by the Chinese government as a 'reactionary organization' and its members in China were sentenced to twenty-year or life-long terms in prison. How could the Japanese government continue to claim that FDC's Japan branch head is safe to return to China?

The above-mentioned cases have a common condition: these Chinese people were originally "legal" students in Japan when the Tiananmen Incident happened. This condition greatly troubled the Japanese government. In other cases, there were some Chinese people who

arrived in Japan "illegally", i.e., without valid passport or visa. The Japanese government and media simply labeled them "criminals" or "false refugees" and denied their human rights from the beginning.

Let's think of the case of Zhang Zhenhai, who with his wife and child, hijacked a Chinese domestic airplane and forced the plane to land in a Japanese airport in December 1989. The Japanese government immediately stated to send the Zhang family back to China. Although a hijack is a criminal action, the hijacker still has the rights to receive a fair judgment. Zhang actually didn't bring anything dangerous to the plane. He just threatened the plane in word. His wife and child were with him in the same plane. It is apparent that he just wanted to use this unusual method to flee from China without the real intention to harm the plane. He should have been given the right to be tried in Japan. Some people further argued that at least Zhang's wife and child should be given the right to apply for political asylum. An American attorney was ready to come to help the Zhang family voluntarily, but the Japanese government sent the wounded Zhang back to China before the American attorney came to Japan. Zhang received 8-year sentence upon being sent back to China. It was reported that the Japanese government requested China not to execute Zhang. In this regard, where is Japan's judiciary independence? What is China's judiciary independence when it try its citizen under a foreign request?

The case of boat people further revealed the ridiculousness of the Japanese judiciary independence. A Chinese girl Lin Guizhen arrived the Japanese coast with other fellow Chinese by boat in September 1989. As other "false refugees", she was locked up in an immigration facility, waiting to be sent back to China. But a Japanese journalist successfully interviewed her and the video clearly showed that she came to Japan to seek political asylum. A Japanese attorney appealed the local Japanese court on behalf of her requesting the Japanese government to release her. However, the Japanese government forcibly repatriated her to China on August 14, 1991³⁴. Unlike other fellow Chinese, she received two-year term in labor camp, obviously for her courage to requesting her human rights outside of China's territory. That was a time when the very action of a Chinese citizen applying for political asylum

became another fact that he/she would receive persecution from the Chinese government.

In another case, a Chinese government delegation translator left his team during their visit to Tokyo. He went to the Tokyo Immigration Bureau to seek political asylum but was locked up in the immigration facility. Knowing that his leaving the delegation without permit had become an action of defection, the Japanese immigration officials were 'kind' enough to make up a sick certificate and bought the ticket for him. The Immigration officials then forcibly drove him to the airport. Fortunately, he was strong enough to push away the two Japanese immigration officials at the airport and found FDC's Tokyo office. He was also able to obtain a certificate from UNHCR's Japan Office. Since his major is Japanese, Japan should be the right country for him to seek refugee and live in. However, the Japanese government still refused to recognize his refugee status. People wonder for what reason Japan signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Convention on Refugees. How could Professor Ogata provide protection to international refugees as the UNHCR commissioner even the government, which sent her to the UN, does not respect human rights in its own territory?

It became obvious to the Chinese activists in Japan that we had to leave Japan, even though other western countries had closed their doors to us. Some in the early years went to East Europe when these countries didn't require visa for PRC passport holders³⁵. Others bought air tickets from Japan to Mexico. Since the airplane stops at Los Angeles, they could seek political asylum from the US at Los Angeles airport. When this kind of method became impossible (the airline companies refused Chinese people boarding without valid visa), some used Japanese friend's passport, some went Seoul airport and from there boarded a plane for the US. Some had to buy other third country's passport or visa. Families were split without the hope of a reunion in the near future. It is no wonder that NHK (Japan's state broadcasting association) received a couple of letters from Chinese students threatening to kill Japanese in China.

This is the darkest time of Sino-Japanese relations after the war. This is a grand betrayal of democracy. In the short term, the Japanese government gained from its mistreatment of Chinese ordinary people. However, in the long

term, it became a precedent record of sacrificing Japan's sovereignty; it missed the historical opportunity offered to it to establish its international reputation as a democratic global civilian power; it also educates every Chinese people that a Chinese has no human rights protected from Japan³⁶.

The heroic, repressed and betrayed 1989 democratic movement provided us with a historical lesson: Treating every Chinese people based on his/her human rights, regardless of his/her relations with the Chinese government, is the first step for Japan to take for a true Sino-Japanese friendship; Sino-Japanese relations should be based on principles of human rights and democracy. A new revolutionary democratization in Asia is needed to provide a solid base for the permanent peace between China and Japan, for people's security in East Asia.

NOTAS

¹ By Leninist regimes, here I mean those countries ruled by a single communist or socialist party without opposition.

² The recent case is Indonesian people's uprising to overthrow the dictator Suharto in 1998 spring.

³ This is the core concept in a book regarding Japan's international role. Vid. Gurtov, Mel, *Pacific Asia? Prospects for Security and Cooperation in East Asia* (Asia in World Politics Series). Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002. Jing Zhao reviewed the book for H-US-Japan, July 2002, [on-line document]. Available from internet at: <http://www2.h-net.msu.edu/reviews/showrev.cgi?path=196671029215885>.

⁴ Friedman, Edward, "Introduction", in id. (ed.), *The Politics of Democratization: Generalizing East Asian Experiences* (Transitions: Asia and Asian America Series). Boulder and Oxford, Westview Press, 1994. The book is from a 1990 summer conference, soon after the Tiananmen Incident. Eric Dowling wrote a review for this book in H-Japan, April 1998, [on-line document]. Available from internet at: <http://www2.h-net.msu.edu/reviews/showrev.cgi?path=21903895003931>.

⁵ Ibid., 8-9.

⁶ Hook, Glenn et al., *Japan's International Relations: Politics, Economics, and Security*. London and New York, Routledge, 2001. The citation is from George Ehrhardt's book review, published in H-US-Japan, April 2002, [on-line document]. Available from internet at: <http://www2.h-net.msu.edu/reviews/showrev.cgi?path=288251019666331>.

⁷ The original Japanese words of ODA are Government/Official Development Aids (seifu kaihatsu enjo). Since Deng Xiaoping disliked the

word *enjo*, so toward China, Japan uses the word 'cooperation' (*kyoryoku*). The newest official Japanese record shows that in 20 years from 1979 to 1998, Japan transferred to China a total of \$13.184 billion in ODA. It includes \$9.900 billion in interest-bearing loans that required repayment; \$2.528 billion in "mutually beneficial technical cooperation" funding with strings attached to buy from Japan; and \$0.756 billion without strings attached or repayment requirements. Check the web site of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan at http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/seisaku/seisaku_3/sei_3f.html and select "China".

⁸ *Asahi Daily*. June 6 1989 (evening edition).

⁹ He only stayed two weeks. A Geisha unexpectedly (against her usual professional requirement) showed up in the public to reveal her affairs with Uno, so Uno had to leave the Prime Minister position.

¹⁰ These kinds of pits were used by the Japanese Army to bury (sometimes alive) Chinese during the war.

¹¹ *Wall Street Journal*. June 26 1989, A5.

¹² This was perhaps the main reason for the Chinese government to suspend my scholarship and later denied my PRC passport extension. One PRC Osaka counselor condemned me: "Will you further bring the Japanese Army to China?"

¹³ When international firms were competing for the Bosphorus Bridge project, the Japanese government announced to add additional ODA loan to Turkey. Today the bridge is also called "Japan Bridge". This is just only one example how Japan used its ODA to drive other country's (especially British) companies away.

¹⁴ *Yomiuri Daily* conducted a series of survey of Japanese people's attitude toward China. In 1988, the first time survey showed that 76% answered to trust China, while 14.2% answered not to trust China. In 2002 (August 24th and 25th), only 37% answered to trust China, while 55% answered not to trust China. (*Yomiuri*. September 11 2002.) Notice that the rightist *Yomiuri* does not have a good relationship with China, so the above numbers may not be the accurate data of the general Japanese public. Nonetheless, the sharp change of Japanese people's attitude toward China after the Tiananmen Incident is clear.

¹⁵ China was annoyed. The PRC Ambassador to Japan rebuked: "Japan should first leave the nuclear umbrella under the world's solo superpower before criticizing China for developing its moderate nuclear capacity". The Chinese media naturally asked: "If Japan can use the small amount of ODA as a diplomatic tool against China, why our government cannot remind Japan of the huge amount of reparations?"

¹⁶ *Cheng Min*. April 1989. Until the Tiananmen Incident, this Hong Kong-based Chinese monthly was the most authoritative and informative media on China's high-level political information.

¹⁷ A Chinese official in Osaka Consulate General claimed that the Chinese government considered the

Yan Min Incident was the "most serious political mistake since the 1972 normalization of Sino-Japanese relations". "Your case has been discussed in the Politburo". I had to cancel my Europe trip because I was ordered to hand over my PRC passport. They were afraid that I would flee from Japan.

¹⁸ He was studying at Tokyo University at that time, but he moved from Osaka University. He told me that Yang encouraged him doing so.

¹⁹ I wrote the petition. I also organized a demonstration in downtown Osaka and collected Chinese student signatures to support the democratic movement in China on April 17th soon after Hu Yaobang's death on April 15th. This is the first time in Japan that Chinese students openly demonstrated against their government's reactionary policy.

²⁰ After his statement, my scholarship was suspended. (I was sent to Japan to study Sociology by the PRC Education Ministry since 1986).

²¹ These petitions were not to him. But no one dared (from below), no one cared (from above) to question him.

²² Osaka University's Foreign Student Department officials kindly told me: "Are you so stupid not knowing that our politicians, especially those in the Diet, are all liars?".

²³ This fact was also reported in English and French media, such as *Asia Watch*. Amnesty International Japan Branch published a booklet concerning of Chinese students' human rights situation in Japan with a special subtitle: "An Advice to the Japanese Government". The Japanese government replied that they needed no advice.

²⁴ These Japanese official responses were also reported in Japan Civil Liberties Union. Cit. Sato, Yasunobu, "New Directions in Japanese Foreign Policy", in Friedman, Edward (ed.), *The Politics of Democratization...*, op. cit., 102-121.

²⁵ Every time I moved within Japan, I expected the State secret police or local police knocking my door. I felt much safer after they showed up. They also met my landlords.

²⁶ After I left Osaka University, I revealed this to the public. See *Asahi's* interview with me, October 20 1992, 14.

²⁷ Osaka is hundreds miles away from Tokyo, and Tokyo Immigration Bureau would not accept me either. They used this trick to handle Korean people (with relations to North Korea) in Japan for decades.

²⁸ My supervisor professor told me not to send application to educational institutes, "in vain". A Chinese student at Osaka University was a translator for a Chinese Education Ministry delegation visiting Osaka University. He told me that the two Education Ministries' officials talked about me but he knew no details.

²⁹ For those PRC citizens who could not extend their expired passports, the Chinese government simply denies their PRC citizenship.

³⁰ Jiang Zeming's failure visit to Japan in 1998 provides another explanation why Jiang selected Tang Jiaxuan as PRC Foreign Minister. To prepare Jiang's visit, the whole negotiation process went far off normal diplomatic practice. The Japanese side soon found that, not the Japan expert and Foreign Minister Tang, but Zeng Qinghong (Jiang's former secretary in Shanghai, then CCP Central Committee Office director) was making the decision. Without even the right to handle Jiang's visit to Japan, Tang Jiaxuan certainly is not allowed to intervene the more important affairs such as Sino-American relations, the Taiwan problem, or Hong Kong affairs. What kind of job can he do as a Minister? The only important diplomatic task to show that he was in charge was to send a defected North Korean official to South Korea. Jiang Zeming selected Tang Jiaxuan because Jiang wanted to show that he himself is in charge of PRC's foreign policy. Since Tang Jiaxuan is not an American expert, he has to show that he knows the US, so he frequently uses English expressions for some core concepts of PRC's foreign policy.

³¹ *Human Rights Watch, 1993 World Report: Japan*, [on-line document]. Available from internet at: <<http://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/WR93/Asw-08.htm>>.

³² Later, it was extended to six months.

³³ When Dalai Lama's delegation met the PRC officials in Beijing in September 2002. One condition from Beijing is to request Dalai asking his followers not to protest PRC leaders in international situations. Dalai did so. (*Voice of America*. October 1 2002).

³⁴ *Human Rights Watch, 1993 World Report: Japan*, [on-line document]. Available from internet at: <<http://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/WR92/ASW-09.htm>>; *1993 World Report: Japan*, [on-line document]. Available from internet at: <<http://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/WR93/Asw-08.htm>>.

³⁵ The above-mentioned translator entered Hungary and was granted political asylum status with his UNHCR refugee certificate.

³⁶ This also explains why so many Chinese students with study experience in Japan dislike/hate Japan. Under such a circumstance, even these Chinese who did receive benefit from Japan, cannot speak out on behalf of Japan.