

MEXICO'S LONG REVOLUTIONS

Petri Minkkinen

University of Helsinki, Finland. E-mail: petri.minkkinen@netsonic.fi

Recibido: 29 Enero 2011 / Revisado: 21 Febrero 2011 / Aceptado: 1 Marzo 2011 / Publicación Online: 15 Junio 2011

Abstract: Mexico celebrated in 2010 the Bicentenary of the beginning of its struggles of independence and the Centenary of the Mexican Revolution of 1910. What is not celebrated officially is the contemporary revolutionary process though some of its phases have included enthusiasm for the part of different social actors. In this article I offer you a historical analysis of these revolutionary processes as Mexico's three long revolutions. Besides that I will explain them within the broader historical context of the transition from the broad Eurocentric historical context towards a non-Eurocentric broad historical context, which can also be understood as the First Real World Revolution (FRWR). I begin by explaining this broad historical context. I continue with the analysis of the independence process from 1810 as well as the Mexican Revolution from 1910. I proceed with the explanation of the third long Mexican revolution, for which I have selected 1988 and its presidential elections as a year of beginning. Other possible years of beginning could be the repression of the student movement in 1968 or the rebellion of the Neozapatists from 1994. By means of concluding it is analysed how Mexico's long revolutions are connected to the transitions in the sphere of the broad historical context.

Keywords: Mexico, revolution, long revolutions, First Real World Revolution (FRWR) .

INTRODUCTION

Mexico celebrated in 2010 the Bicentenary of the beginning of its struggles of independence and the Centenary of the Mexican Revolution of 1910. What is not celebrated officially is the contemporary revolutionary process though some of its phases have included enthusiasm for

the part of different social actors. In this article I offer you an historical analysis of these revolutionary processes as Mexico's three long revolutions. Besides that I will explain them within the broader historical context of the transition from the broad Eurocentric historical context towards a non-Eurocentric broad historical context, which can also be understood as the First Real World Revolution (FRWR). I begin by explaining this broad historical context. I continue with the analysis of the independence process from 1810 as well as the Mexican Revolution from 1910. I proceed with the explanation of the third long Mexican revolution, for which I have selected 1988 and its presidential elections as the main year of beginning. Other possible years of beginning could be the repression of the student movement in 1968 or the rebellion of the Neozapatists from 1994. By means of concluding it is analysed how Mexico's long revolutions are connected to the transitions in the sphere of the broad historical context.

1. TRANSITION TO A NON-EUROCENTRIC BROAD HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Though the Europeans of various parts of this westernmost corner of the Eurasian landmass had had different kinds of contacts with their non-European counterparts during many past millennia, the European ascendance to world domination began with the Portuguese exploration of the route to Calicut through a circumnavigation of Africa and especially through the accidental discovery of until then unknown lands – from the part of the Europeans – beyond the Atlantic Ocean in the West by Christopher Columbus. This man from Genoa had sought funds for his travels from many parts of Europe and was granted travel funds by the

Catholic Kings of Castile and Aragón Isabel and Fernando. The first large scale invasion to the American continent proper was realized by Hernán Cortés and his troops, later to be continued towards South and North by other *conquistadores* such as Francisco Pizarro, Alvar Nuñez Cabeza de Vaca and Hernado de Soto. These hostile raids which led to the occupation of indigenous lands in the Americas and undid the Aztec and Inca empires, among other “less civilized” entities, caused long-lasting transformations in the target areas though the imposition of a new alien system of domination, a new belief system, new forcefully exported modes of wealth creation, new exotic illnesses, as well as the bases for a new ethnic-racial compositions and a consequent system of class and domination. Later other Europeans from north of Iberian Peninsula joined the Iberian-Mediterranean invaders and brought with them the past and present European rivalries which have continued up to date.

Even if, viewed from the contemporary perspective, the invasion may seem to have been a relatively easy effort, and to a certain degree it probably was due to various advantages the Europeans had, the Americas was for a long time occupied only partially and the indigenous peoples could in various parts continue to live their life despite the occupation of other parts. Moreover, the indigenous peoples were not just submissive but instead the Americas have had and still have many indigenous revolts and rebellions and some areas remain still outside the sphere of the occupiers. The Americas were generally and gradually incorporated into the emerging European socio-economic system, be it called European world-economy, market economy or just an emerging capitalist system, the emergence of which received a considerable or even a decisive boost from the import and re-export of silver and gold bullion and the creation of the Atlantic trade system.¹ Invasion and the new system of wealth creation² also enriched many invaders and later immigrants. Various countries such as Argentina were rich countries still in the early 20th century and the United States which emerged as the main industrial country in 1890's became the undisputable hegemonic power (at least in the west-capitalist camp) after the Europeans had destroyed themselves in the Second Eurocentric Civil War of the 20th Century (1939-1945). Though not only the white-Caucasian Europeans form the wealthy classes in the Americas, it is clearly visible that ethnicity-race still defines to a

considerable degree where an American – from Inuit's lands to Patagonia – is located in the scale of wealth-property-power-well-being.

As Immanuel Wallerstein has suggested, the 20th century was also a century of revolutionary and anti-systemic struggles³. In the beginning of the century thinkers such as Oswald Spengler and Arnold J. Toynbee had serious but varying concerns about the viability of the West and its civilization⁴, which is related to the Eurocentric and especially European order. The 20th century Eurocentric world-order did indeed face various internal and external challenges, including revolutions, intra-Eurocentric competition and wars, economic crises, internally oriented and nationalistic economic development processes of the more peripheral countries as well as the process of decolonization. Despite that the Eurocentric world-order did survive even if the locus of this system was transferred to the United States. Western countries such as the US and Britain however engaged in the counterrevolutionary struggles against these threats from the very beginning (for example the Mexican revolution of 1910 and the Russian revolution of 1917) as well as against their fellow Eurocentric competitor national socialistic Germany, which, for its part, declared to be the main opponent of the Bolshevik rule. Also Japan, the Honorary White nation, which fought the West with its own weapon (modernization), was tamed. So were also the Latin American countries thorough military coups and the regimes of national security as well as economic crises and the neoliberal political program and later with the new imperialist political program and related integral fascist policies⁵. These latter have been most visibly targeted against the Islamic world, as well as the threats emerging from within, but they affect practically the whole world.

However, the effects of the revolutionary and other anti-systemic transformative policies, though very much undone, did promote the transition toward a non-Eurocentric broad historical context. This applies also to various African countries, many of which have moved from colonial domination to foreign aid dependency and are presently targeted by the new imperialist objectives not only of the US and the European Union but also those from the more “understanding and tolerant” China. This latter can, at the same time, be seen as a part of transition toward a non-Eurocentric broad historical context. Besides that, among other

things, these very policies (neoliberal and new imperialist), though to a considerable degree, when conceived as the policies targeted against extra-Eurocentric challenges, have also performed the function of a self-made grave digger for the Eurocentric cause and world domination. In Latin America, the neoliberal policies, besides destroying the development policies and the societies of these countries, created also counter forces which have materialized as an increasing independence of these countries as a group. The new imperialist policies, for their part, at least partially, as counter weapons surpassing the failed neoliberal policies have also impacted the Latin American countries, by promoting securitization and surveillance, most visibly in México. In their most visible target area, the Islamic world, they have led to costly and credibility wrecking new imperialist wars and promoted the recruitment of anti-imperialistic forces. Also the earlier imperialists in the area have been defeated (Afghanistan as the most clear case) and I would not bet my money for the stability in Iraq even though the Obama administration has shifted its target to Afghanistan, Pakistan and the archenemy Iran.

The new imperialist policies and the related First Real World War have – against the wishes of the makers of these policies – contributed to the decline of the US and promoted the transition toward a non-Eurocentric broad historical context. Even if the countercyclical military Keynesian policies did help temporarily in fighting the US and world depression and also the speculative economic forces revived, this depression (against which the new imperialist policies were also partially targeted) have, as I have suggested, followed the W-form of the 1930's depression, as the superficial recovery ended in 2007 in the form of a world depression. In the W-form of the 1930's there was finally a recovery (in the end realized by the help the Second Eurocentric Civil War of the 20th Century). At the moment it is interesting to see whether the world economy follows the W-form up to the final recovery, or, whether there is an alteration to a form M, in the context of which there would not be recovery within the modalities of the existing socio-economic order. Be it as it may, the transition toward a non-Eurocentric broad historical context has been fomented by the new imperialist policies. Besides that, it seems to be evident that instead of continuing “globalization”, the world economy and especially its governance system

is moving towards increasing macro-regionalization. We have been frequently warned that the regionalization à la 1930's was related to the rise of totalitarianism. However, in the present situation, the contemporary macro-regionalization may be beneficial in a sense that it opens up possibilities for socio-economic policies that are macro-region specific and respect more local particularities. It has been said that the “development develops”. In a similar manner “globalism has also developed” and in the contemporary world we should be more afraid of the imposition of global totalitarianism than that of macro-regions, even though, in the human world, there are risks at all levels, including local.⁶

The First Real World War (FRWW) is related also to the First Real World Revolution (FRWR). As I have suggested in an earlier article⁷, in the context of the discussion of the revolutions and reforms in general as well as the earlier “world revolutions”, the FRWR means basically that we are facing a transition to a non-Eurocentric broad historical context, in the context of which the Eurocentric states, other entities and social forces will not be in a position in which they can dictate how the main development paths and related institutions are set in our common world. Even if the world and how it is run will most certainly change, from this it does not automatically follow that these changes would be progressive or emancipative, what ever meaning we give to these concepts. This is not related to the fact that the writer of this article is a white, Lutheran, educated, heterosexual and North European male who would be worried about the decline of Europe or more broadly Eurocentrism.

On the other hand, it is related to what I consider as a dangerous deviation of the technological development towards the control and surveillance technologies. It is also related to my view that all human beings are at least as physical entities and most likely also at the level of mental capabilities (though there are individual differences) and basic instincts quite similar, despite the cultural differences. In other words, the human beings do not necessarily change and develop rapidly enough into more humane and tolerant beings, while, at the same time, the control and surveillance technology has developed so rapidly that it would make the earlier dictators green of envy. As already suggested above, especially in the global context this could result as extremely dangerous.

However, though the prospects at the overall levels (globalism, technology and human nature) are not necessarily encouraging, this does not mean that there could not be more positive prospects at various geo-historical contexts. There have been serious “cracks in the window” in the recent globalist or semi-globalist projects, i.e. neoliberal and new imperialist political programs and also, though lesser, in the related light and hard forms of integral fascism. These latter and similar forms of human and social repression and control are partially related to the deviated technological development, which most of the people most likely do not reject even if they may know their dangerous aspects. Moreover, these are not necessarily only the property of the recently dominant white-European-Caucasian “race”, and given the general qualities of human beings and human nature (though not all negative), the transition to a non-Eurocentric broad historical context does not necessarily mean the end of integral fascism. Moreover, as thinking and responsible researchers, we must also remember that the individuals, groups and other entities promoting and constructing “alternatives” are not necessarily free from these vices and other hindrances and may end up doing same things under a new thought construct, institution, nation or other entity; as we all know, history is full of examples of revolutions that have eaten themselves, though often with the help of external pressure. However, the macro-regionalization may also open up possibilities for alternatives which are more culture and region specific and thus freer from imposed global “necessities”, which, independently whether they are “good” or “bad”, tend to be constructed basing on the socio-cultural modalities of a particular culture, area or country.⁸

Keeping this in mind and remembering that the transition to a non-Eurocentric broad historical context is not necessarily a risk-free transition, there have been, within the Eurocentric broad historical context, many transitions, transformations, revolutions and reforms (radical or not), which have changed the power structures and relations within countries and other entities and between them, improved the lot of at least some people (while weakening that of some and probably never improved that of all) and changed up to a point how things have been done. In this article three such instances are being discussed, the three long Mexico's revolutions: the struggle for

independence (1810-1821), the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920/1929/1940) and the ongoing Mexico's long revolution (1968/1988/1994→), the outcome of which is yet to be seen. All of these have taken place in the broader international/global context and all of them have had transformative consequences, not only within Mexico but also internationally/globally.

2. THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE (1810-1821)

The discovery/invasion of the Americas was related to other events of that time. The Castilian led Spanish/Iberian *reconquista* of the last remaining Moslem possessions in Granada took place in 1490-1492 just before the first voyage of Christopher Columbus in August 1492 and, besides being often carried out by second sons of the families, the invasion was probably related also to the cumulated battle energy and adrenalin of these “freedom-fighters” turning into conquistadores. Moreover, the Portuguese and Spanish voyages were inspired by the fact that the Ottoman Empire had severed the land route to the Eastern lands and the Spice Islands. Thus, those just liberated from the foreign occupation engaged in the conquest and occupation of the new foreign and other people's lands. Three hundred years later these newly occupied lands began, for their part, their struggles of liberation from the yoke of foreign occupants rule.

In relation to the revolutions, also the European peasant rebellions of for example 16th century and the revolutions of 1848 took place in various countries at roughly same time – though recently there has been discussion that in the context of “globalization” the borders are increasingly “porous”, the influences, revolutionary or no, did flow quite freely also before. In similar manner the Mexican and Latin American struggles for independence were inspired and facilitated also by the external events and influences: the independence of the British colonies in North America and the US wars against the British; the French Revolution (1789) and the Napoleonic Wars, a part of which was also the French invasion and occupation of Spain from 1808, except liberal Cádiz, in which a liberal constitution was promulgated in May 19, 1812.

Spain, a society of estates and social immobility, dominated by the nobility and clergy, had itself

entered into a situation of crisis during the second half of the 18th century and could not resolve the problems of that historical moment. In Spain, the nobility, lacking the technical abilities of increasingly complex administrative machinery, and the professional political class required by the modern society, were closely interrelated. The bourgeoisie, timidly arising from the professional political class did not challenge the landholding nobility but instead united with it which made the land reform and economic policies favouring industrialization impossible.⁹ Political power in this patrimonial state promoted group, class and dynastical interests, which resulted as a primacy of local over national interests and *caciquismo* as the form of political organization.¹⁰ In Spain, as in Latin America, the primary conflict of the 19th century was that between the liberals and conservatives and that between the Ancien Regime and modern society. This latter had culminated in the French Revolution, against whose rationalism and liberties emerged a reactionary anti-enlightenment movement, which, according to Garófano Sánchez and de Páramo Argüelles promoted a thesis of a “fundamental myth”, that there is a universal conspiracy of Evil forces against the Good and a triple conspiracy: a conspiracy of philosophers, using Reason to destroy Faith; a conspiracy of Jansenists, promoting the satanic idea of liberty in the Church itself and weakening through reforms the power of the Catholic (Roman) Monarchy; and a conspiracy of Masons which promoted the practical realization of “perverse” principles of Reason, Liberty (Freedom), and human rights. With these they seek to destroy the European civilization, by the means of liberal movements and parliamentary democracies. This reactionary mythology was a European phenomenon¹¹ and thus we see that the borders were porous not only for the revolutionary ideas but also for reactionary ones.

It should be remembered that there were two simultaneous struggles for independence: that of the Spaniards against the French occupation (1808-1814) and the Latin American (Hispano American) struggles against 300 years of Spanish occupation. As the Crowns of Castile y Portugal divided the world, or at least the new areas discovered and to be discovered, in the Treaty of Tordesillas (June 7, 1494), the Napoleonic French Empire and the Russian Empire reorganized and divided European areas and beyond in the Treaty of Tilsit of June 7, 1807, which gave Russia of Alejandro I for

example Finland and the European parts of Turkey (i.e. Ottoman Empire) and the Bourbon Monarchies of Spain and Portugal would cease to rule and the House of Bonaparte would receive both of these Crowns.¹² Spain of Carlos IV (and Manuel Godoy) and Napoleonic France signed the Treaty of Fontainebleau in October 27, 1807 in order to take over Portugal, which effectively led to the occupation of Spain. The rebellion of Aranjuez (Mars 17-19, 1808) ended the reign of Carlos IV whom was followed by Fernando and Napoleons brother José Bonaparte. The dignitaries of Spain met in Bayona and approved the Napoleonic version of Spain's reforms which led to an insurrection based on popular support around the country and resulted as new political powers the Local Juntas which integrated as thirteen Provincial Juntas. The oppositional Central Junta (September 1808-January 1810) organized a national consultation and was replaced in January 1810 by a representative Regency Council, which was given the task to summon *las Cortes* which were inaugurated in September 24, 1810, in Isla de León, Cádiz.¹³

In 1808 the Spanish political ideology was divided in three sectors: One part of enlightenment Spain, *afrancesados*, considered the Napoleonic rule as a guarantee for the modernization of Spanish institutions; Great majority of liberals whom were against the French occupation but considered *las Cortes* as a possibility to realize the reforms the enlightenment saw necessary for the regeneration of Spain; and the Spanish reactionaries whom wanted to preserve the Ancien Regime and the Napoleonic invasion helped them to launch the Spanish against the liberal reformists.¹⁴ In *las Cortes* were represented various groups of liberals, the clergy and the representatives of Spanish colonies of America, though the latter formed a just a minority: of the 183 signatories of the Constitution only 52 were Americans. According to María Teresa Berruezo the participants formed four groups: *serviles* or reactionaries, those oscillating between the liberals and *serviles (peninsulares)* but with a clearly conservative posture, the moderate liberals whom did not want revolutionary change in relation to the monarchy proper, and the progressive liberals, whom accepted the independence in a transitory form until the situation in metropolis becomes normal again. Therefore, as suggested also by Marx, the purpose was to maintain the dominion of the

American colonies – which already had began their insurrection – by granting the Spanish of Americas (Creoles, *criollos*) the same rights as those of Peninsula (*peninsulares*) had, among other reform proposals. For their part the majority of the Americans paid their attention mostly to the themes related with their colonies, though some preoccupied themselves also with the themes of general interest.¹⁵

Even if the Constitution of Cádiz was revoked by the following conservative rule in 1814, it did however inspire the Latin American independence struggles, promoted by various independence fighters such as Simón Bolívar, Francisco de Miranda and Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla, among others, as well as their consequent Constitutions. According to Levaggi, one principal source of conflict was that the Negros and Mulattos were, at least in principle, excluded from the citizenship. Other “cause of disgust” was that the text did not mention slavery, the indigenous problem and the freedom of trade. However, the Americans voted for it because through “institutionalizing the liberal revolution”, it included many of their “aspirations of ideological modernity and even of the mode of governing the provinces”. However, it was applied to a varying degree in the American provinces. For example El Río de la Plata, which was governed by the revolutionaries, did not submit to it. Moreover, it influenced the Constitutions of the later independent Hispano-American republics and, through the Portuguese Constitution of October 1, 1822, that of Brazil, too. The major difference to the Constitution of Cádiz was the adoption of republic as the form of government. An important question was that of sovereignty and its exercise and those of representation, citizenship and suffrage, as well as religion and the “generally differentiated” questions of the requirements of nationality and citizenship.¹⁶

In the case of New Spain the Constitution of Cádiz was applied in 1812-1814. After that even the Viceroy such as Venegas and Félix María Calleja, fighting insurgents led by Miguel Hidalgo and José María Morelos, were unwilling to apply it. It became a custom to evade it through clauses like “for now” and “while”. Also the military commandants resisted its application. Besides that, by continuing the subordination of America to Spain, it did not satisfy the wish of autonomy of the Creoles. It did, however, influence the revolutionary constitutive process of Mexico. Morelos had

declared that he “remit” to the Constitutive Congress of Chilpancingo, which sanctioned the first Mexican constitutional document “Decreto constitucional para la libertad de la América Mexicana”, “the Spanish Constitution and a few numbers of *El Espectador Sevillana*”. This sanctioning was a result of the declaration of independence in November 6, 1813, precursor to that of September 28, 1821. As Fernando VII was made to sworn allegiance again to the Constitution of Cádiz in 1820 (only to be renounced again in 1823 after he restored his absolute power), Agustín de Iturbide, who declared México independent through his Plan de Iguala of February 24, 1821, informed that the independent México proceed completely in line with the Spanish constitution through his imperial projection. Even after his abdication in 1823, and the adoption of republican and federal form of government, the Federal Constitution of October 4, 1824, remained “closer to Cádiz than Philadelphia”, though influenced by both.¹⁷

Those born in Spain (*peninsulares* or *gachupines*) formed the dominant group in the structures of governance of New Spain. The Creoles were citizens of lower status though they often succeeded economically. The Creoles occupied the lower and middle position offices in the royal governance structure and they often lead the *cobildos* (communal council). Arising Creole aristocracy and large estates holding Creoles were in high positions outside the government structure of the capital. The Mestizos and the indigenous population and later the Mulattoes, the Zambos and numerically relatively few Negros represented the lowest layer of the society.¹⁸ Also the Catholic Church and the ecclesiastical elite were in an important position and, according to Tannenbaum, the Church produced one of the elements, on which the country based on the Mestizos, and the future “Mexican nationalism was to be built: a common race, the Mestizo; a common language, Spanish; and a common faith, Catholicism”.¹⁹ There had been conspiracies and rebellions against the *gachupines* throughout the colonial era and there were resentment against their dominating position among the Creoles. The *gachupines*, representing the concentration of political and economic power and European colonialism, were conceived as enemies against whom almost all Mexicans beyond the class and race lines were ready to fight despite their differences and the social inequality.²⁰

The independence movement of New Spain was initiated by the priest Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla who in his *Grito de Dolores* of September 16, 1810, in Guanajuato, shouted out as follows:

“Long live the Virgin of Guadalupe! Long live Fernando VII! Death to the bad government!”²¹

Their initial attempt, which had had its precursors already in 1808, however failed, and Hidalgo was executed in June 30, 1811. His and his close companions such as José de Allende's heads were kept in cages in Guanajuato until the independence which was finally obtained in 1821. After Hidalgo's death the independence movement was headed by José María Morelos y Pavón, and their struggle advanced significantly and they succeeded in encircling Ciudad de México. Though there were disputes and personal intrigues within the independence movement Morelos succeeded in summoning a Constitutional Congress to gather in Chilpancingo, Guerrero. During the congress the Spanish succeeded, however, to break the siege of the capital city and arrested and executed Morelos.²² The ideas of Hidalgo and Morelos departed significantly from those of the other insurgents for whom, beyond purely military objectives, the purpose was just a material detachment from *la Madre Patria*. For them and especially Morelos the purpose was also a social revolution “provoked by an absurd political system and shameful economic exploitation” and they had to “operate a total change in *status quo* of the Indigenous, Mestizo and Creole multitudes”.²³

According to Morelos himself:

“¡Genios de Moctezuma, Cacama, Quautimozin, Xicotécatl, y Calzontcin, celebrad, como celebrasteis el mitote en que fuisteis acometidos por la pérfida espada de Alvarado, el fausto momento en que vuestros ilustres hijos se han congregado para vengar vuestros ultrajes y desafueros y liberarse de las garras de la tiranía y francmasonismo que los iba a sorber para siempre! Al 12 de agosto de 1521 sucedió el 8 de septiembre de 1813; en aquél se apretaron las cadenas de nuestra servidumbre en México-Tenochtitlan; en éste se rompen para siempre en el venturoso pueblo de Chilpancingo”.²⁴

At the same time when the so called Congreso de Anahuac began, September 14, 1813, Morelos presented his “Sentiments of the Nation”, 23 points to guide the work of the constitutive Congress, a few of which are shown below:

“1° Que la América es libre e independiente de España, y de toda otra nación, gobierno o monarquía, y que así se sancione dando al mundo las razones.

2° Que la religión católica sea la única sin tolerancia de otra [...]

12° Que como la buena ley es superior a todo hombre, las que dicte nuestro congreso deben ser tales, que obliguen a constancia y patriotismo, moderen la opulencia y la indigencia, y tal suerte se aumente el jornal del pobre, que mejore sus costumbres, alejando la ignorancia, la rapiña y el hurto.

13° Que las leyes generales comprendan a todos, sin excepción de cuerpos privilegiados; y que éstos sólo lo sean en cuanto al uso de su ministerio [...]

15° Que la esclavitud se proscriba para siempre y lo mismo la distinción de castas, quedando todos iguales, y solo distinguirá a un americano de otro el vicio y la virtud [...]

23° Que igualmente se solemnice el día 16 de septiembre todos los años, como el día aniversario en que se levanto la voz de la independencia y nuestra santa Libertad comenzó, pues en ese día fue en que se desplegaron los labios de la Nación para reclamar sus derechos con espada en mano para ser oída; recordando siempre el mérito del grande héroe, el señor Dn. Miguel Hidalgo y su compañero Dn. Ignacio Allende”.²⁵

By reviving the names of the Aztec Kings and the tradition of resistance they broke in Chilpancingo symbolically and temporarily also practically the chains enslaving the indigenous peoples for nearly 300 years. The political program of Morelos can be conceived as a precursor of the 1910 revolution; he wanted an independent country with popular sovereignty, demanded the abolition of great land holding, slavery and state monopolies and devised a constitution based on universal suffrage.²⁶ The wars of independence of México (1810-1821) were anti-colonial and this long revolution succeeded in gaining independence but they did not in the end succeeded in producing a social

revolution as devised by Hidalgo and Morelos. None of the social classes succeeded in gaining and maintaining dominance over the rebelling masses. The fundamental social problems separating the social groups and classes remained unresolved and this had politically destabilising consequences until the era of Porfirio Díaz beginning in 1876.²⁷ The new constitution adopted in New Spain guaranteed the rights of the indigenous population and their land holding rights which threatened the Creole dominance in the countryside. Their loyalty to Spain faded and they searched among them a man who could guarantee their position, *hacendado* Agustín de Iturbide. He was able to unite the elites with the help of a more conservative Plan of Iguala and offer an anti-colonial struggle producing independence as an alternative to the social revolution directed against the elites. In August 24, 1821 Viceroy Juan O'Donojú, who did not have mandate to do that, and de Iturbide signed the Treaties of Córdoba, which practically ended the wars of independence and, at the same time, opened way through the backdoor to de Iturbide's emerging position as an Emperor. De Iturbide's army entered triumphantly to Ciudad de México on September 27, 1821 and in the next day he formed a provisional government which announced Mexico's Declaration of Independence in September 28, 1821.²⁸

This declaration was very different from that of Chilpancingo and, as Sayeg Helú suggest, points at de Iturbide's egoism, as the Declaration states that:

“Los heroicos esfuerzos de sus hijos han sido coronados, y está consumada la empresa eternamente memorable, que un genio superior a toda admiración y elogio, amor y gloria de su patria, principió en Iguala, prosiguió y llevó a cabo, arrollando obstáculos casi insuperables.”²⁹

3. MEXICAN REVOLUTION (1910-1920/1929/1940)

In similar manner as the post-colonial African countries of the 20th century, the Latin American newly independent countries faced internal power struggles, social instability, insufficiency of capital, civil wars and foreign interventions. This was the case of Mexico, too. The Spaniards made an attempt to regain Mexico already in 1828 and the French had imperial ambitions from 1830's until 1860's, when they succeeded

in imposing shortly the second Mexican empire headed by the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian, the reign of whom ended through the defeat of French troops and his later execution in Querétaro in June 19, 1867. This intervention (*Intervención tripartita*) was initially a joint venture of France, Great Britain and Spain and was also related to President Benito Juárez's decision in 1861 to postpone the payment of Mexico's national debt – a task which in recent decades has been delegated to the International Monetary Fund.

These interventions did not, however, result as a territorial loss to Mexico. The encounters with the United States, for their part, did have such results and were partially related to the European wars and affairs. After the Seven Years War France lost territories in North America to Great Britain and Louisiana to Spain and in the Treaty of Paris of 1783 France obtained the Florida's and, based on the secret Treaty of San Ildefonso, Spain had to cede Louisiana to France, which, Napoleon Bonaparte, for his part, sold to the United States in 1804. Napoleons troops invaded Spain in 1808 and the United States invaded Western Florida in 1810 and annexed it on 1812. The borders of Louisiana were not clearly defined which caused later problems to Mexico. As the US-Americans conceived Louisiana as a part of Texas, the change of possession and this interpretation paved way for the colonization and independence of Texas, which was annexed to the United States in 1845. Also the Adams-Onís Treaty of 1819 which diminished Mexico's territory and defined the borders between The United States and Mexico laid bases for the expansive policies of the US, in the context of which Mexico's territory was grabbed in forceful ways and through other pressure.³⁰

In the context of the US-México war of 1846-1848 and the consequent Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, México lost more than half of its territory. The US continental expansion was related to the Manifest Destiny doctrine of John O'Sullivan, according to which the US had a providential destiny to the continental expansion, experiment of liberty and federated self government. He also assumed that Mexico would become an integral part of the US in the future but not then, because “the entire Mexican vote would be substantially below our national average both in purity and intelligence”. There could, however, be no talk of any “political union” because the “the degraded Mexican-

Spanish” could not receive the “virtues of the Anglo-Saxon race”. That was related to that “while the Americans had shown ‘democratic energy and enterprise’ in ‘driving back the Indians, or annihilating them as a race’”, the Spanish conquerors of Mexico had shown no such spirit of mission’. O’Sullivan supported the pacific penetration through commerce, as the means of moral education emanating from commerce, which would have a result, that “the whole continent is destined one day to subscribe to the Constitution of the United States”. Also Friedrich Engels and probably also Karl Marx were of the opinion that it would be an advance to Mexico to be “placed under the tutelage of the United States”. Later the US territorial expansion was continued through purchases such as “Compra de Gadsden” and the related Treaty of Mesilla of 1853, in which Mexico lost the area of Mesilla and which gave the US the right to operate in the strategically important Isthmus of Tehuantepec.³¹ During the reign of Porfirio Díaz from 1876 until 1911 there was no direct US intervention. However, the peaceful US economic penetration continued, even though Díaz did also promote Mexico’s national economic interests.

As an at least nominally politically independent country, though an object of militarily interventions, Mexico had problems in promoting its economic independence. Independent Mexico firmed in 1825 its first commercial treaty with Great Britain, the leading economic power of that time. Along with other treaties, projects and finance Mexico was incorporated into the sphere of influence of Britain. Mexico’s political and economic instability, the lack of national unity, and the foreign invasions decreased the possibilities of economic development. In 1800 the US GNP was twofold to that of Mexico and in 1845 already 13 to 1.³² During the early decades after the independence Mexico indebted constantly externally and, as it was mentioned, its foreign debt was related to the *Intervención Tripartita*. External indebtedness continued also during the *Porfiriato*; at that time, however, foreign loans were not spent in arms but instead to railway construction. In 1890’s Mexico had to devalue its currency by 50 percent and to reconstruct its foreign debt. Mexico negotiated through *Banco Nacional de México* with 10 most important banks and most important lender countries Germany, Great Britain, the United States and France.³³ At that phase of the previous intensive liberal economic globalization and imperialism,

and in Mexico’s case, peaceful economic penetration, though supported by the population control forces of Díaz such as the *Rurales* Guards, the foreign investments were diversified, even if the US position was steadily improving.

In the times of the beginning of Mexican Revolution foreign capital dominated the modernizing sectors of México’s economy. According to the data of 1910-1911 the weight of the US-Americans in the main economic sectors was 44 percent, whereas that of the British was 24 %, the Mexicans 24 %, and the French 13 %. Of the total capital of the 170 largest companies, 77 percent was in foreign hands: in oil industry 100 %, mining 98,2 %, in export orienting large corporate agriculture 95,7 %, electricity 87 %, industry 84,3 %. In mining and metallurgy the US-Americans had 81 percent and in the mentioned agro-exports 66,7 %. In oil industry the British share was 60,8 percent. The French led in industry with 53,2 percent and in banking sector 45,7 % through three largest banks (*Banco Nacional de México*, *Banco Central Mexicano* and *Banco de Londres y México*).³⁴

Behind Mexico’s economic growth were the large landholding system, the export oriented *hacienda* system, and the foreign investments, which were targeted for example to railway construction, oil industry and steel and cement industry. Of the latter the Englishmen founded Cruz Azul and Tolteca, still operational today³⁵. Also the national capital accumulation was possible and at that time the bases were laid for the Monterrey group, which became the main private industry and financial capital group of Mexico. Modernization and industrialization concentrated mainly in the northern states of Mexico. In the foreign eyes Mexico became to be seen as a modernizing country, with foreign capital friendly administration and in which significant internal disputes are history. In oil industry, which was in foreign hands, there was competition between the Englishman Weetman Pearson, developing industry through *El Aguila*, Mexican Petroleum Company owned by the US-American Edward L. Doheny and the earlier monopoly holding Pierce Oil Company, owned by New Jersey Standard Oil. The oil companies have been important in Mexico’s history. The revolutionary leader Francisco I. Madero belonged to a family belonging to the Monterrey group and his revolutionary Maderist movement was supported by Rockefellers Standard Oil

because Díaz had favoured Weetman Pearson in granting oil concessions.³⁶

Mexico's landholding was extremely unequal. This inequality was promoted already by President Benito Juárez's liberal reforms which led to the dismantling of Church's and Indian communities' collectively owned land and the destruction of Indian villages, which fomented the *hacienda* system, as well as through Díaz's laws of 1883 and 1894 which gave the mapping companies (*compañías deslindadoras*) land holding rights which were typically passed on to foreign companies. By the end of Díaz's term the 17 largest mapping companies owned 38 million hectares and their activity was called a new conquest. In 1910 foreign companies owned just in Baja California an area of land larger than Ireland. One percent of the population owned 97 percent of country's territory and the 96 percent majority had to be satisfied with 2 percent of land. Oligarchy was small; in 1910 there were 834 *hacendados* and in Chihuahua Terrazas family hold a territory size of Costa Rica. This agrarian oligarchy composed of *hacendados* dominated the economic, political and social life of Mexico.³⁷

Another power holder was the *Científicos*-administration, the purpose of which was to modernize and make more "scientific" the administration of Mexico – in similar ways as the neoporfirian "neoliberal" administrations of especially post-1910 Mexico. The *Científicos*-administration promoted laissez-faire economic liberalism, though not strictly orthodox and with a tint of economic nationalism, under an authoritarian rule, which is considered more centralized than the colonial system, and which was conceived as necessary for political stability, which was necessary for material progress. It was conceived as an opposite to the earlier years of "chaos and idealism". Even if the middle class expanded the group of well-being people, the living conditions of the majority, wage-labour workers and especially small farmers, agricultural workers and "wage-debt slaves", worsened dramatically.³⁸ Also the middle class was unsatisfied because the authoritarian oligarchy of Díaz had produced a social closure, in which large foreign companies and agrarian oligarchy held all the position in which the decisions were made and thus prevented the social mobility.³⁹ For his part, Porfirio Díaz thought – possibly echoing O'Sullivan's views – that the Mexicans are not ready for democracy, especially the Indians, half

of the population, who are accustomed to follow authorities "instead of thinking by themselves"⁴⁰. He wanted to remain in power in order to give the people time to surpass its ignorance and revolutionary passions, to grow up to take advantage of responsibility and freedom and to change their presidents without revolutions and wars. In a 1908 interview made by James Creelman for the Pearson's Magazine, Díaz said that this time has finally come and announced his intention to give up power in the end of his term.⁴¹

Among many things, Díaz's announcement has been seen as a significant incentive for the revolution. Also his preferences in granting oil concessions and his negative for renewing the rights of the refilling station and shooting practicing to the US Navy in Magdalena Beach in Baja California – the granting of which in 1907-1910 aroused anger and anti-US nationalistic reactions in Mexico – in 1910 had their impact. The unequal social situation aroused anger among various social groups as did the role of the foreign capital and the problematic relations between the administration, national capital and foreign capital as well as the abuse of power by the ruling groups. Moreover, the US economic crisis of 1907 damaged Mexico's economic development and its mining exports. Also the low productivity of agriculture in 1908-1910, at least partially related to bad weather conditions, may have had its impact. All these reasons, however, created an "explosive social situation".⁴²

The Mexican Revolution of 1910, besides being country's second long revolution, was the first great revolution of 20th century, a reaction to the then prevailing intensive phase of Eurocentric globalization and expansion. It was a social revolution, the consequences of which were felt during the rest of 20th century. It was primarily a nationalistic and agrarian revolution even if it contained elements of a socialistic, bourgeois and anti-authoritarian anarchistic revolution. The Russian Bolshevistic revolution of 1917 was a "socialistic" revolution against the imperial government. Germany's revolution of 1918-1919 and the early 1920's did not produce a lasting socialist revolution but was instead a stepping stone for the totalitarian and expansive-nationalistic right which arose to power through the elections of 1933. All of these were counter-reactions to the liberal economic and imperialistic globalization of 19th and early 20th

century. China's revolution of 1949 produced a competitive model for the leftist revolutions and was an agrarian-socialistic and anti-colonial revolution which should be seen as a precursor to the later wave of anti-colonialism and decolonization, rather than as a direct continuation to the earlier revolutions against the liberal economic and imperialistic globalization. Another great anti-colonial revolution was the independence struggle of India which was based on pacific resistance.⁴³

According to José Revueltas, seen from the internal development of México and *el mexicano*, the 1910 revolution was a sort of an endpoint to the disintegration produced by colonization. The colonization had produced a new kind of economic and property relations system and it broke the earlier indigenous division into different nationalities. As a new class division emerged a division to the European conquistadors and the indigenous people, a gradual genetic unification of which produced mestization, which formed the germ of the developing national being, *el mexicano*. The independence process was initiated by Hidalgo in 1810. Its initial purpose was to produce a social revolution, which would include the Indians, and a nationalistic revolution of *mestizo-mexicano* against the European power elite. It was however reduced to an anti-national and reactionary power struggle between the European population groups, which preserved the power position of the Creoles, but did not liberate the Mexican nationality. From the 1850's the revolution of Ayutla, liberal reforms and the overthrow of the Second Empire ended definitively with the power position of the hereditary Spanish classes. At the same time the liberal reforms undermined the indigenous communal ownership and the ruling class composed mainly of the Creoles crushed ruthlessly the indigenous rebellions (the Mayas of Yucatán, the Huichols and the Nayaritas of the Occidental Sierras) which could have promoted the national unification of Mexico. During the liberal era emerged an anti-national power group and the economic imperialism represented by foreign capital penetrated the country forcefully. In 1910 began an anti-imperialistic revolution and a revolution against the feudal landholding relations, which opened possibilities for the ascension of *el mexicano* developed during 400 years of mestization, and for the emergence of national unity, on which the future development of Mexico could be built.⁴⁴

The revolutionaries had varying reasons and objectives. Some supported radical anarchism of Flores Magón, some liberalism of Francisco Madero and others the conservatism represented by Bernardo Reyes. Some fought against the large landholding and *los hacendados*, some mainly against local *cacique*-leaders, and many primarily against foreign capital and the capitalists. Even if there were various reasons and objectives, the revolutionaries were united in seeing Díaz administration behind the problems and that its overthrow would improve the situation.⁴⁵ The revolution began in November 20, 1910, when Francisco Madero, who had lost [or "lost"?] to Díaz in the presidential elections, called the Mexican to take arms and rise to rebellion – or, in November 18, when a constitutionalist and thus maderist Aquiles Serdán began an armed but defeated rebellion in Puebla. With these events began the military phase of the Mexican Revolution, which ended with the assassination of the constitutional president Venustiano Carranza in May 21, 1920. The most significant event for the success of the revolution and the resignation of Díaz in 25 May, 1911, was the conquest of Ciudad Juárez by the troops of Pascual Orozco, who acted against the order of Madero. When Madero became the president, Díaz proclaimed that Madero has unleashed the tiger and now we see whether he can control it. It was not going to be easy. In November 1911 Emiliano Zapata from the state of Morelos had presented his Plan of Ayala and because Madero was unable and unwilling to implement it, Zapata's troops turned against Madero's government. So did also the Northern troops of Pascual Orozco, unsatisfied earlier Maderists, the Porfirists led by Felix Díaz and Bernardo Reyes, conceived as a Porfirist and a conservative, in the North.⁴⁶

In this article it is not possible to go through all the military and other events of the revolution. Instead the main phases and consequences of this long revolution – which, depending on the interpretation lasted until 1920 (the end of its military phase), 1929 (its institutionalization) or 1940 (the end of Cárdenas presidency) – are presented:

1) In the first phase of the revolution, Francisco Madero becomes a democratic and constitutional President (democratic phase) and after his and Vice President José María Pino Suárez's murder-assassination, the power was held by an authoritarian Victoriano Huerta. The

United States of President William Taft and Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson, which was concerned about the future stability of Mexico and the US economic interests, organized a coup against Madero, which led to their arrest and murder and rose to power the military dictatorship of Huerta. Taft's more "liberal" follower, President Woodrow Wilson condemned Lane Wilson's activities and did not approve Huerta's dictatorship. Therefore, he ordered an US military intervention to Veracruz which led to Huerta's resignation.⁴⁷ Later Woodrow Wilson regretted his intervention to Mexico's Revolution and became a supporter of the peaceful resolution of conflicts and national self-determination. By the 1930's the US ends [temporarily] its imperialism and interventions in the Caribbean and Central America. Especially during the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt the US promotes the Good Neighbour policies (external "good will") as well as the New Deal policies (internal reforms).

2) In the second phase, a constitutional President Venustiano Carranza rises to power and a progressive Constitution (1917) and Carranza's foreign policy doctrine (1919) are being enacted. Emiliano Zapata is assassinated in 1919. The second phase and the military phase of the revolution end with the assassination of Carranza in 1920. Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution forbade the foreigners to own natural resources of the soil which opened way for the expropriation/nationalization of the foreign land assets and the oil companies lost their absolute ownership to oil deposits. It also forbade large land holding (*latifundios*) which opened way to the redistribution of land and to the revitalization of the indigenous communal land holding model *Ejido* and to the liberalization of *peones*, the land-debt slaves. The Carranza doctrine did not approve the supremacy of foreigners in relation to the Mexicans and it demanded that all states should be equal in relation to the international law. It disapproved the interpretation of the Monroe doctrine which gave the US the right to intervene in the internal affairs of the Latin American countries. It promoted solidarity, based on non-intervention, between the Latin American countries. The purpose was to obtain control of the natural resources of these countries and the industrialization as the way of strengthening independence.⁴⁸

3) In the third phase the revolution was consolidated internally; the regional strong and

often military leaders, *caudillos*, were eliminated, the revolutionary leader Francisco "Pancho" Villa was murdered in 1923 and the *Cristero* Rebellion was suppressed in 1926-1929. The revolution was moderated externally (for example in relation to foreign oil companies) during the eras of Álvaro Obregón (later assassinated) and Plutarco Elías Calles (later "voluntary" exile, which has been the tradition of the ex-Presidents of Mexico). Calles turned revolution to the right (and for example co-operated with the US in its anti-communist objectives) and during his *Maximato* began the institutionalization of the revolution through a revolutionary party, which changed its name two times and was later known as the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (PRI).⁴⁹

4) The objectives of the revolution were realized in significant ways during the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas del Río, known as the last revolutionary president (1934-1940). He promoted the interests of the workers, *campesinos* and indigenous people and had good personal relations of mutual respect with Franklin D. Roosevelt. This, along with the US depression and the increasingly tense international situation as well as the Good Neighbour and the New Deal policies, helped Cárdenas to promote the nationalization of the foreign oil companies (which had advanced their aims during the 1920's but which as large corporations had conflicting interests with Roosevelt who did not like such companies and had to promote his New Deal policies in the US) in 1938 and who promoted the redistribution of land more than any other Mexican president. During the Second Eurocentric Civil War of the 20th Century, after his presidency, he was nominated as the Secretary of Defence in 1942, because, besides his revolutionary credentials, he was known to be an antifascist as well as strong in defending the sovereignty of Mexico in relation to the US, which was expected to gain him both the US and Mexican citizen's support.⁵⁰

4. THE THIRD AND ONGOING LONG MEXICAN REVOLUTION (1968-/1988-/1994-)⁵¹

Mexico adopted from the 1920's an inward oriented economic strategy which put emphasis on the development of its national economy. This transition was followed also by other Latin American countries and also more generally there was a turn from "globalism" toward more

national strategies; in the Soviet Union, in national socialistic Germany, in social democratic Scandinavia as well as in the New Deal United States, among others. Mexico's economic growth was approximately 6 percent from 1930's until 1976. In Mexico the economic development was based on import substituting industrialization and agriculture and both public and private companies had a possibility to develop, though the emphasis with this respect varied at different times. At the same time, through its institutionalization and steadily after the end of Lázaro Cárdenas term, the Mexican political system, though in principle a multi-party system, developed towards de facto one party system dominated by the Revolutionary Party, even though there was an alternative represented by the *Partido Acción Nacional* (PAN) formed in 1938, which had its base in the religious and traditionalist groups, some close to sinarquism, sometimes considered "American version of fascism", and which was considered as a minor populist alternative to the dominant party. The dominant party, as a party to unite the country after the revolution, represented many social sectors; the workers, *campesinos*, middle classes (popular sectors) and in the beginning also the armed forces. It had also many side or assisting parties representing certain groups and to support the main party. The election system became increasingly corrupted and election fraud was commonplace. Later the PRI led system was considered as a perfect dictatorship; at the times when the US and its allies in Latin American countries imposed military dictatorships, it was considered that Mexico does not need one due to PRI's dominant position.

Especially from the 1950's there emerged cracks in the window of apparent harmony when many social groups and most famously the railway workers union began their struggle and their communist (or supposedly communist) leaders were jailed. In general, the independent unions were not tolerated. Also the middle class sectors emerged as a problem and medical doctors were striking in the 1960's. With these and many other antecedents in 1968, in line with more general international tendency as well as at the times of Mexico's Summer Olympics, there emerged a strong student (and professor) movement, which was brutally suppressed by the *granaderos* and army. Parts of this movement radicalized and turned into urban and countryside terrorism. The PRI-system tried to buy social stability within the moderate middle

class groups, while the radical groups were brutally persecuted in this *Guerra sucia, á la Mexicana*. The repression against the student movement can be considered as one possible starting point of Mexico's third long revolution. It wrecked PRI's intellectual hegemony – conceived in Gramscian terms – and legitimacy in the minds of many Mexicans, though not all.

The PRI dominated system was, however, still strong and the party remained in power until 2000. In 1970's, even the organizations of national capital wanted to be included in PRI's corporative representation system. The events of 1968 and early 1970's are in interesting – and partially still unclear – ways connected to the US of especially Nixon-Kissinger duo, Chile as a possible "new Cuba" and Mexico's Echeverría administrations involvement in these events. The US economic crisis and the problems of the Bretton Woods system and world economy impacted also Mexico, the inward oriented development model of which had began to show its weaknesses in the late 1960's. The public spending to buy social peace, the economic crises (like that of 1976), increasing foreign indebtedness, the US and local capitalist's anti-Echeverría campaign and the growth illusion based on new oil discoveries deepened Mexico's indebtedness, which exploded in 1982 in the form of the debt crisis, which was related also to the fall of international oil prices and the US economic manoeuvres.

The debt crisis deepened Mexico's submission to the IMF's increasingly "neoliberal" structural adjustment policies which had began in 1976 and forced Mexico to abandon its earlier development strategy in 1985, though there had been movement away from it and adjustments to it already before. One response to the social and political problems had been the series of political reforms, which had, however, started in minor ways already before. The 1978 reform opened some possibilities to the opposition parties but to a considerable degree, it remained superficial. Other crises such as the 1985 earthquake of Ciudad de México promoted the "birth" of the civil society and pro-democracy activity, one result of which was that Lázaro Cárdenas's son Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas resigned from the PRI and was a popular and opposition uniting candidate in presidential elections of 1988. He won the elections but PRI's candidate Carlos Salinas de Gortari (representing neoliberal "social liberalism" and more correctly, *neoporfirismo*) was imposed as a

president through a massive electoral fraud and political manoeuvres. These elections of 1988 can be considered as one possible starting point of Mexico's third long revolution and which I have underlined as the main starting point.

Cárdenas and others formed the *Partido de la Revolución Democrática* (PRD), as a representative of the centre-left and civil society. The PAN made a deal (*pacto*) with the PRI, accepting PRI's electoral fraud – despite its earlier strong opposition to it – for its increasing electoral possibilities. The PRI had also come very close to PAN's economic policies and – at least in reality – though not necessarily as an written document, the PRI, which knew that one day its rule will end, preferred PAN and not PRD as its successor in state power. On economic front, though poverty had increased dramatically from the 1980's, Mexico's economy grew rapidly during the early years of Salinas's term (1988-1994). This and his violent anti-crime and anti-corruption attack (devised to hide his fraud) – and more silently but very murderously against the opposition – increased his popular support. During his term the “neoliberal” restructuration deepened and Mexico joined the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In the beginning of 1994, when the NAFTA-period officially began, the Neozapatists, the *Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional* (EZLN) began its (short) armed rebellion against the illegitimate rule of Salinas, NAFTA and neoliberal policies and for the indigenous peoples and democracy. The Neozapatista Rebellion can be considered as one possible starting point of Mexico's third long revolution.

In the end of same year Mexico entered into a new devastating economic and financial crisis, the peso or tequila crisis, which delegitimized the “neoliberal” policies and hit now also middle classes, among others. The EZLN Rebellion had strong impact within Mexican and international civil society and it is one component of this long revolution, which has had important global/international consequences. Mexico entered into an era of high level political murders. At the same time, the new political reforms began to have an effect and also PRD could win elections and Cárdenas was elected as the Mayor of Ciudad de México (or, more precisely *Jefe de Gobierno del Distrito Federal*) in 1997 and was expected to have good chances in the presidential elections of 2000. In these latter federal and presidential elections the PRI

lost the remnants of its majority in Mexico's Congress. In these elections, which were relatively clean at the federal level, Vicente Fox Quesada, a relatively outsider to the earlier PAN circles, won the presidential elections and became the first non-PRI president since 1929. There were many hopes – though on the left there was strong criticism – in relation to his presidency. However, the strong PRI presence in country's bureaucracy, Fox's ability to wreck his relations even with his own political circles, as well as the US turn to new imperialism and hard form integral fascism undermined his intentions, for example in relation to the state reform, migration and human rights. Fox can be considered *neomaderista*, a democratic but weak president.

After Cárdenas, Andrés Manuel López Obrador became the Mayor of Ciudad de México, and due to his successful and popular policies, he was expected to be a winning candidate in the 2006 presidential election. However, the Fox administration entered into a campaign to take away his rights to be a candidate (*desafuero*) and when he won this battle, they did all they could to delegitimize him and his campaign. Also certain business circles in Mexico and abroad, especially in the US and Spain, and the political circles related to the Bush administration and Spain's Partido Popular (PP), supported in many and partially illegitimate ways the PAN candidate Felipe Calderón Hinojosa. Also generally hated ex-president Carlos Salinas joined the Fox camp, his earlier political enemy. Without the possibility to go into details here, it is possible to say that López Obrador won the elections and was nominated as the legitimate president of Mexico in November 20, 2006, the commemorative day of the beginning of the Mexican Revolution of 1910. However, in a fraudulent electoral and post-electoral process with many problematic and also illegitimate twists, Calderón was finally and just barely placed formally on the presidential seat, in the militarized Congress with also its environment sealed by the army, and flown there by a helicopter – hardly an entry of an honest, respected and democratic politician.

Thus, in this phase of Mexico's third long revolution, there is a legitimate president López Obrador, promoting his policies of state reform, among other things, through a new Convención Nacional Democrática (CND) and Mexico's legitimate government. On the other hand, there

is an illegitimate leader of government Calderón, who can be considered as an authoritarian *neohuertista*. There is also the *Asamblea Popular de los Pueblos de Oaxaca* (APPO), the rebellion of which was brutally repressed in 2006, with the help of army and concentration camps like those in Guantánamo. There have also been other kinds of civil society and opposition (party political and other outside the *clase política*) activity and together they can promote the restoration of democracy as well as the state and political system reform and the change in the socio-economic policies. However, Calderón started, like Carlos Salinas before him, a violent and militaristic war against the drug cartels – in connection with the US Plan México – and in its shadow against the opposition in order to hide his and his supporter's electoral fraud. This is not to claim that there is not drug traffic and cartel related problem in México. There are indications, that, like many other high level Mexican politicians and other actors before him and now, that also Calderón was connected to drug money during his electoral campaign. I have estimated that Calderón's illegitimate government will not last until the end of its term in 2012, which happens to be, the same year when the world as we know it ends, according to the Maya calendar.

CONCLUSIONS

The struggle for independence of México began in 1810 in a situation in which the leading colonial powers were in a state of war with each others. The state of war supported the emancipation of Latin America from the yoke of colonial power, in the same way as the Second Eurocentric Civil War of the 20th Century (1939-1945) and the First Real World War which began in 2001, which have strengthened the position of the poorer countries and supported the transformative objectives. For its part, México's Revolution of 1910 preceded the First Eurocentric Civil War of the 20th Century (1914-1918) even if both the revolution and the war were related to the tensions and antagonisms of the phase of intensive globalization which began in the 19th century. However, this long revolution continued throughout the war and the US of President Woodrow Wilson, which intervened militarily in the México's revolution, regretted and repented this later, which helped to turn the US global policies towards the acceptance of the peaceful resolution of conflicts and national self-determination (which was also partially a response to Lenin's

competing proposal on national self-determination)⁵²

In general, it has been quite typical that foreign powers or some other entities such as corporations support revolutions or revolutionaries for their strategic, ideological or economic reasons. As already mentioned, Madero was supported by the US oil money and Lenin was supported by the Germans hoping to benefit from his anti-war position. After all, also Karl Marx was supported in many ways by a wealthy industrialist, Friedrich Engels. The world we live in and its human relation is a relatively complex mix, and besides revolutions, also coups and counterrevolutions have had such connections. As ones terrorist is others freedom fighter, ones revolution is others coup or counterrevolution.

All Mexico's long revolutions have been connected to the changes taking place in the external world. The first one was related to the US independence process and the French revolution as well as the related European wars in Europe, Americas and elsewhere. The second was related to the intensive phase of globalization and imperialism, the First Eurocentric Civil war of the 20th Century (partially also an inter-imperialist war, but very European one) and the end of the golden age of capitalist civilization and progress, among other things. And the third one is related to the renewed phase of new liberal economic and new imperialist globalization, the crises of world(-)economy and the First Real World War. The first and second took place in the context of the continuity of the prevailing world order, that is, the Eurocentric broad historical context, whereas the third one is related to the discontinuity of that world order and thus, to the transition to the non-Eurocentric broad historical context, which can also be conceived as a First Real World Revolution⁵³.

In all cases, the Mexico's long revolutions have had and are having significant external/global consequences. The independence struggle, which did not produce a social revolution, was however an anti-colonial or anti-imperialist revolution which changed the external relations of the emerging independent country. It also promoted the decline of Spanish international power position. Mexico's second long revolution of 1910, besides its internal transformative consequences, promoted or even created the trend of transition from globalism

towards the policies of internal, national economic development, not only in Latin America, but also globally. Moreover, it caused a transformation in the global policies of the emerging great power the US towards the acceptance of peaceful resolution of conflicts and national self determination as well as a temporal end to its imperialist policies. Mexico's ongoing long revolution, for its part, has inspired transformative policies inside Mexico and externally, again, not only in Latin America but also contributed to the broader process of the transition towards non-Eurocentric broad historical context. Even if the US launched in 2001 its new imperialist policies against various kinds of transformative activities around the world, Mexico's new long revolution is again impacting the global policies of the US, now a declining superpower. It is also possible that the re-emerging New Deal policies will eventually take place, not only in the national context, but also in the context of the emerging North American political community. However, in relation to the latter, Barack Obama has yet to prove that he can emerge as a new Franklin D. Roosevelt.

NOTES

¹ On the commercial and monetary impacts of especially silver, see Cipolla, Carlo M., *La odisea de la plata española. Conquistadores, piratas y mercaderes*. Barcelona, Crítica, 1999.

² Independently whether it remained a dual economy or whether it was a unified though a differentiated system.

³ Wallerstein, Immanuel, *The Modern World System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century*. New York, Academic Press, 1974.

⁴ See e.g. von Wright, Georg Henrik, *Ihminen kulttuurin murroksessa*. Helsinki, Otava, 1995, 82-164.

⁵ On these political programs and policies, see Minkkinen, Petri, *El fascismo integral globalizante*. Helsinki, KAKTUS, 2010.

⁶ See Minkkinen, Petri, *El fascismo integral...*, op. cit., 75-78. In this work it is also suggested that from the point of view of an individual human being a macro-region is a safer form of governance, given the fact that, if there is a forcing necessity, it is easier to escape from a macro-regional dictatorship to another macro-regional entity than from a global dictatorship.

⁷ Petri Minkkinen, "Wars, Revolutions and the First Real World Revolution", *Historia Actual Online*, Núm 19 (Primavera, 2009), 7-27. Available from internet at: <http://historia-actual.org/Publicaciones/index.php/haol/article/view/295/283>.

⁸ One possible alternative regional community could be the North American political community (see e.g. Minkkinen, Petri, "Toward a Political Community in North America", *Revista de Historia Actual*, 3(2005): 11-26.

⁹ This can be compared to the English case, in which the coexistence and fusion of the bourgeoisie and the landed classes was not a hindrance to industrialization, quite the contrary.

¹⁰ Garófano Sánchez, Rafael y Juan Ramón de Páramo Argüelles, *La Constitución Gaditana de 1812*, Cádiz, Diputación de Cádiz, 1987 (Segunda Edición, corregida y aumentada), 17-18.

¹¹ Garófano Sánchez y de Páramo Argüelles, *La Constitución Gaditana...*, op. cit., 18-19. Quotations in the source.

¹² Cf. Marx, Karl, *La España revolucionaria*, Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 2009 (Edición a cargo de Jorge del Palacio), 42-43. While we know that the indigenous populations of America lost their territories and liberty through the Iberian conquest, it is interesting that, according to Marx (37) also the Spanish liberty was lost through it due to clatter of arms, rivers of gold and the gloomy glimmer of auto da fé's.

¹³ Garófano Sánchez y de Páramo Argüelles, *La Constitución Gaditana...*, op. cit., 22-24; see also Marx, Karl, *La España*, op. cit.

¹⁴ Garófano Sánchez y de Páramo Argüelles, *La Constitución Gaditana...*, op. cit., 20-21.

¹⁵ Levaggi, Abelardo, "Constitución de 1812: Presencia latinoamericana", in Juan Ma Terradillos Basoco (coordinador), *La Constitución de 1812: Reflexiones jurídicas en la víspera del Bicentenario*. Cádiz, Diputación de Cádiz, Servicio de Publicaciones, Colección Bicentenario, 2006, 61-63; Marx, Karl, *La España*, op. cit., 89-90. According to Marx (90-97) the Constitution of 1812 had been criticized [at least at that time] of being just an imitation of the French Constitution of 1791 without noting the Spanish historical traditions. Marx denies that and suggests that many of its central themes are derived from the ancient Spanish *fueros*, the ancient Constitution of Castile and the ways of the other Crowns/provinces as well as the ancient municipal system. However, these were read in the light of the French Revolution and the demands of modern society.

¹⁶ Levaggi, Abelardo, "Constitución de 1812...", op. cit., 64-72.

¹⁷ Cf. Levaggi, Abelardo, "Constitución de 1812...", op. cit., 69-75; Marx, Karl, *La España*, op. cit., 122.

¹⁸ Meyer, Michael and William L. Sherman, *The Course of Mexican History*. New York, Oxford University Press, 1979, 208-219 (*). The sources marked with an asterisk (*) are cited in Minkkinen, Petri, *Meksikon 1900-luku – Vallankumouksellisen maan politiikka, talous ja ulkopoliitiikka*. Helsinki: KAKTUS, 2009.

¹⁹ Tannenbaum, Frank, *Mexico: The Struggle for Peace and Bread*. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1950, 50 (*).

²⁰ Cockcroft, James D., *Mexico: Class Formation, Capital Accumulation, and the State*. New York, Monthly Review, 1983, 57 (*).

²¹ "¡Viva la Virgen de Guadalupe! ¡Viva Fernando VII! ¡Muera el mal gobierno!", cited in López Reyes, Amalia y José Manuel Lozano Fuentes, *Historia General de México*. México, Compañía Editorial Continental, 1986, 188. The exact text of the Grito is unknown and there are many variations and interpretations as the one presented by Meyer, Michael and William L. Sherman, *The Course of...*, op. cit., 287-288 as follows: "My children: a new dispensation comes to us today. Will you receive it? Will you free yourselves? Will you recover the lands stolen three hundred years ago from your forefathers by the hated Spaniards? We must act at once.... Will you not defend your religion and your rights as true patriots? Long live our Lady of Guadalupe! Death to bad government! Death to gachupines!". A shortened version is cited in Minkkinen, Petri, *Meksikon 1900-luku...*, op. cit., 28.

²² López Reyes, Amalia y José Manuel Lozano Fuentes, *Historia General de...*, op. cit., 193 (*); Meyer, Michael and William L. Sherman, *The Course of...*, op. cit., 291-293 (*); Sayeg Helú, Jorge, *El constitucionalismo social mexicano. La integración constitucional de México (1808-1988)*. México, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1996, (Primera reimpression), 108-109.

²³ Sayeg Helú, Jorge, *El constitucionalismo social...*, op. cit., 95.

²⁴ Cited in Sayeg Helú, Jorge, *El constitucionalismo social...*, op. cit., 107.

²⁵ Cited in Sayeg Helú, Jorge, *El constitucionalismo social...*, op. cit., 101-105.

²⁶ Meyer, Michael and William L. Sherman, *The Course of...*, op. cit., 292 (*); Tannenbaum, Frank, *Mexico: The Struggle...*, op. cit., 39 (*).

²⁷ Cockcroft, James D., *Mexico: Class Formation...*, op. cit., 59 (*); Meyer, Michael and William L. Sherman, *The Course of...*, op. cit., 297 (*); Revueltas, José, *México: Democracia Bárbara – Posibilidades y Limitaciones del Mexicano*. México, Editorial Posada, 1975 (Segunda Edición), 141-144 (*); Minkkinen, Petri, *Meksikon 1900-luku...*, op. cit., 29.

²⁸ Cf. López Reyes, Amalia y José Manuel Lozano Fuentes, *Historia General de...*, op. cit., 211 (*); Cockcroft, James D., *Mexico: Class Formation...*, op. cit., 60 (*); Revueltas, José, *México: Democracia Bárbara...*, op. cit., 141-144 (*); Tannenbaum, Frank, *Mexico: The Struggle...*, op. cit., 41 (*); Bustos Rodríguez, Manuel, *Cádiz en el sistema atlántico. La Ciudad, sus comerciantes y la actividad mercantil (1650-1830)*. Cádiz, UCA/Sílex, 2005, 514 (*); Sayeg Helú, Jorge, *El constitucionalismo social...*, op. cit., 137.

²⁹ Sayeg Helú, Jorge, *El constitucionalismo social...*, op. cit., 139.

³⁰ See Zoraida Vázquez, Josefina y Lorenzo Meyer, *México Frente a Estados Unidos (Un ensayo histórico, 1776-1993)*, México, Fondo de Cultura

Económica, 1994 (Tercera Edición, corregida y aumentada), 18-22 (*).

³¹ Stephanson, Anders, *Manifest Destiny. American Expansion and the Empire of Right*. New York, Hill and Young, 2000, 38-47; Zoraida Vázquez, Josefina y Lorenzo Meyer, *México Frente a...*, op. cit., 76-79; see also Marx, Karl, *La España*, op. cit., 10-14 (Introducción by Jorge del Palacio), in which it is mentioned that this sentence is from one of Marx's article to New York Daily Tribune, many of which were written by Engels and signed by Marx.

³² See Meyer, Michael and William L. Sherman, *The Course of...*, op. cit., 304-305 (*); Meyer, Lorenzo, "The United States and Mexico. The Historical Structure of Their Conflict", *Journal of International Affairs*, 1990, 43(2), 251-252 (*); Ceceña, José Luis, *México en la órbita imperial. Las empresas transnacionales*. México, Ediciones El Caballito, 1991 (Vigésima segunda edición), 37-39 (*); Tannenbaum, Frank, *Mexico: The Struggle...*, op. cit., 211 (*); Minkkinen, Petri, "Ylikansallinen talouspolitiikka ja Meksikon identiteettikriisi", *Kosmopolis*, 1995, 25(3), 19-35 (*).

³³ See Bazant, Jan, *Historia de la deuda externa de México 1823-1946*. México, El Colegio de México, 1983, 119-177 (*); Garner, Paul, *Porfirio Díaz*. Harlow/London, Longman, 2001, 169 (*).

³⁴ Ceceña, José Luis, *México en la órbita...*, op. cit., capítulo II (*); See also Gil, Carlos B., *Hope and Frustration: Interviews with Leaders of Mexico's Political Opposition*. Wilmington, Scholarly Resources Inc., 1992, 7-8 (*); Lajous, Roberta, *México y el Mundo. Historia de sus Relaciones Exteriores. Tomo VI*. México, Senado de la República, 1990, 134-141 (*).

³⁵ The first is now a cooperative and the latter is a part of CEMEX.

³⁶ See, López Reyes, Amalia y José Manuel Lozano Fuentes, *Historia General de...*, op. cit., 277 (*); Meyer, Michael and William L. Sherman, *The Course of...*, op. cit., 442-452 (*); Lajous, Roberta, *México y el Mundo...*, op. cit., 138 (*); Camp, Roderic A., *Los empresarios y la política en México: Una visión contemporánea*. Primera reimpression. México, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1995, 233-239 (*); Gill, Mario, *Nuestros buenos vecinos*. Mexico, Editorial Azteca S.A., 1959 (Cuarta edición ampliada), 162 (*); Bazant, Jan, *Historia de la deuda...*, op. cit., 119 & 176 (*).

³⁷ Stavenhagen, Rodolfo, "Aspectos Sociales de la Estructura Agraria en México", in Rodolfo Stavenhagen et. al., *Neolatifundismo y explotación de Emiliano Zapata a Anderson Clayton & Co*. México, Nuestro Tiempo, 1968, 13 (*); Tannenbaum, Frank, *Mexico: The Struggle...*, op. cit., 39 (*).

³⁸ See Meyer, Michael and William L. Sherman, *The Course of...*, op. cit., 454 (*); Cockcroft, James D., *Mexico: Class Formation...*, op. cit., 86-87 (*); González, Luis "El liberalismo triunfante", in *Historia General de México*, Tomo II. México, El Colegio de México/El Centro de Estudios Históricos, 1981 (Tercera edición), 1005-1015 (*); Weiner,

Richard, "Battle for Survival: Porfirian Views of the International Marketplace", *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 2000(32), especially 645-648 (*); Topik, Steven C., "When Mexico Had the Blues: A Transatlantic Tale of Bonds, Bankers, and Nationalists, 1862-1910", *American Historical Review*, June 2000, 736 (*).

³⁹ See Meyer, Michael and William L. Sherman, *The Course of...*, op. cit., 500-501 (*); Zoraida Vázquez, Josefina y Lorenzo Meyer, *México Frente a...*, op. cit., 114-115 (*).

⁴⁰ On the other hand, as suggested by B. Traven (Hallitus, Helsinki, Love Kirjat, 1981, 201-202)(*), the Indians tried to keep themselves apart from the modalities of the mainstream (the European, the Mestizo) population; they did not want to mess with the Mexican political customs and they did not want that the Mexicans mess with their own customs and try to change them violently.

⁴¹ Cámara de Diputados, *Los Presidentes de México ante la Nación, 1821-1984, VI: Documentos de 1821 a 1984*. México, Cámara de Diputados, 1985, 499-525 (*).

⁴² See Lajous, Roberta, *México y el Mundo...*, op. cit., 75-79 & 156-157 (*); Bulnes, Francisco, *El verdadero Díaz y la Revolución*. México, Editorial del Valle de México, 1920, 287 (*); Gil, Carlos B., *Hope and Frustration...*, op. cit., 9 (*); Bazant, Jan, *Historia de la deuda...*, op. cit., 177 (*); Ulloa, Berta, *México y el Mundo. Historia de sus Relaciones Exteriores. Tomo V: La Lucha Revolucionaria*. México: Senado de la República, 1991, 16 (*).

⁴³ Minkkinen, Petri, *Meksikon 1900-luku...* op. cit., 50.

⁴⁴ Revueltas, José, *México: Democracia Bárbara...*, op. cit., 129-155 (*). The genetic unification produced, more precisely, according to Revueltas (139), a threefold class and population structure: the Spanish (*peninsulares* and Creoles), the Mexicans (Mestizos and Spanish speaking Indians) and the "pure" Indians whom did not adopt Spanish language and maintained their division into different nationalities.

⁴⁵ See Meyer, Michael and William L. Sherman, *The Course of...*, op. cit., 500-501 (*); Zoraida Vázquez, Josefina y Lorenzo Meyer, *México Frente a...*, op. cit., 114-115 (*).

⁴⁶ See López Reyes, Amalia y José Manuel Lozano Fuentes, *Historia General de...*, op. cit., 302-303 (*); Zoraida Vázquez, Josefina y Lorenzo Meyer, *México Frente a...*, op. cit., 119-129 (*); Meyer, Michael and William L. Sherman, *The Course of...*, op. cit., 498-505 & 508-519 (*).

⁴⁷ See Meyer, Michael and William L. Sherman, *The Course of...*, op. cit., 521 (*); Gill, Mario, *Nuestros buenos vecinos...*, 521 (*); Zoraida Vázquez, Josefina y Lorenzo Meyer, *México Frente a...*, op. cit., 143 (*); Minkkinen, Petri, *Meksikon 1900-luku...*, op. cit., 53-54 & 378.

⁴⁸ Zoraida Vázquez, Josefina y Lorenzo Meyer, *México Frente a...*, op. cit., 141 & 146 (*); Martínez

Morales, Rafael I., *Constitución política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos (Comentada)*. México, Oxford University Press, 2000, Artículo 27, 30-39 (*); Tannenbaum, Frank, *Mexico: The Struggle...*, op. cit., 146 (*); Meyer, Michael and William L. Sherman, *The Course of...*, op. cit., 544 (*); Minkkinen, Petri, *Meksikon 1900-luku...*, op. cit., 57-59 & 378.

⁴⁹ Minkkinen, Petri, *Meksikon 1900-luku...*, op. cit., 378.

⁵⁰ See and compare Torres, Blanca (1991) *México y el Mundo. Historia de sus Relaciones Exteriores. Tomo VII: De la guerra al mundo bipolar*. México, Senado de la República, 1991, 20-35 (*); FRUS, *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Paper 1939. The American Republics, Volume V*. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957, 25. Available from internet at: <http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/> (*); Cárdenas, Lázaro, *Obras, I-Apuntes 1941/1956, Tomo II*. México: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México – Dirección General de Publicaciones, 1973, 64-65, 77 & 186 (*); Zoraida Vázquez, Josefina y Lorenzo Meyer, *México Frente a...*, op. cit., 182-191 (*); Gómez-Quiñones, Juan, *Política chicana. Realidad y promesa 1940-1990*. México, Siglo XXI, 2004, 53 (*); Minkkinen, Petri, *Meksikon 1900-luku...*, op. cit., 113-114 & 378.

⁵¹ This section is based principally on Minkkinen, Petri, *Meksikon 1900-luku...* op. cit., "Liite 5: Meksikon pitkät vallankumoukset", 378-379, and other information of that book.

⁵² Cf. Minkkinen, Petri, *Meksikon 1900-luku...*, op. cit., 29, footnote 36; on Wilson's change of mind, see Tannenbaum, Frank, *Mexico: The Struggle...*, op. cit., 249-253.

⁵³ On this, see Petri Minkkinen, "Wars, Revolutions and ...", op. cit.