

imagen de un régimen replegado sobre sí mismo y concentrado únicamente en su supervivencia, si bien es parcialmente cierta, no puede constituirse en una barrera a la hora de afrontar el estudio de la influencia que el entorno y el escenario internacional tuvo en la dinámica de la dictadura y viceversa.

Uno de los horizontes de mayor relevancia por el espacio reservado en el libro como por sus implicaciones a la hora de interpretar el franquismo, su final y la reinstauración democrática española, es el de la sociabilidad y asociacionismo. Con él se expone (entre otros) un análisis innovador basado en la movilización y la articulación de redes opositoras, y no otro, tradicional, que descansa en el pacto entre las elites políticas para el origen de la Transición. Sin caer en conclusiones mecanicistas que sostengan la desaparición del régimen como efecto pura y simplemente de la modernización económica, se llama la atención sobre la recomposición del tejido asociativo nacional que tras el colapso provocado por la victoria franquista y la consiguiente era de represión, empieza a reconstruirse en los años cincuenta y sesenta y que formó la base de una cultura cívica de oposición al régimen.

Otro aspecto de extraordinario interés recogido en esta obra, es la insistencia en aclarar la confusión, por otra parte habitual, entre Memoria e Historia y recalcar la separación que debe existir tanto para la una como para la otra. La primera es materia de la segunda pero no la segunda. La segunda ayuda a conservar la primera pero como el oficio de restaurador, perfila ciertas imperfecciones que el paso del tiempo ha ayudado a crear, a fin de mantenerla viva.

Ante una obra de esta magnitud se podría pensar que la dispersión y el desequilibrio son las notas predominantes. Afortunadamente, la labor del coordinador y su equipo han servido para evitar los males que suelen aquejar a toda recopilación, logrando un todo conjuntado y armonioso. Las relatorías son incisivas y útiles, aunando brevedad con descripción y análisis crítico. Las ponencias ilustran temáticas (asociacionismo y sociabilidad, mujer y franquismo, mercado laboral y condiciones de trabajo) interesantes y abiertas al debate que formulen agendas de investigación renovadas y modernizadoras de sus campos de investigación.

En suma, se trata de una aportación de gran valor fruto del trabajo de un grupo, el GEAS,

conocido por su dinamismo y voluntad pionera en la investigación. Un libro que no se acaba en sí mismo sino que llama a la ampliación y revisión de los conocimientos del lector y sobre todo, que lo incita a fajarse en el trabajo de campo desde unos supuestos de partida estimulantes e innovadores.

Pape, Robert A., *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*. New York, Random House, 2005, 352 pp.

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The prevailing knowledge provided by the main stream global media on 'suicide terrorism' could be described as below: 1, suicide attacks derived from the fanatical and vicious Islamic Fundamentalism; 2, trapped in a status of insane and irrational, the attackers turn themselves into murdering machines as a result of brainwashing with religious hatred and bias, i.e., they kill innocent people by suicide for religious purposes; 3, to eliminate the evil of terrorism, the only long-term strategy is to get rid of social and religious roots, i.e., to conduct an overall social and political transformation in middle east region and establish some secular, democratic and therefore peace-loving nations. These are opinions that the public have received from mass media. In fact, not only the public opinion, but also the logic of strategies that US government has adopted in the 'anti-terrorism war' is based on, or, at least justified by these assertions. But, according to the research of Professor Robert Pape from Chicago University of United states, all these perspectives are wrong.

In his book *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (2005; ISBN 1-4000-6317-5), Professor Robert A. Pape presents to readers his discovery due to his scientific research on suicide terrorism. It is based on a data he has compiled at the University of Chicago, where he directs the Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism. Totally there are 315 finished suicide terrorism campaigns around the world from 1980 to 2003 and 462 individual suicide terrorists. As a politi-

cal scientist, he combines the methodology of case, studying and statistical analysis to find out the fact, which he believes that the previous research has never revealed. In his book, he reveals the “causal logic of suicide terrorism”: at the strategic level, suicide terrorism exerts coercive power against democratic states to cease occupation of territory terrorists consider homeland, while at the social level it depends on mass support and at the individual level it is motivated by altruism (pp. 20-23). “The bottom line, then, is that suicide terrorism is mainly a response to foreign occupation” (p. 23).

First and most important, he discovers that it is the foreign occupation rather than Islamic fundamentalism that should be regarded as “the taproot of terrorist attacks”. According to his data, 95% of all 315 cases are not random attacks but part of the campaigns aiming at driving the occupiers out of the territory which is perceived as sacrosanct homelands. “The data show that there is little connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, or any one of the world’s religions”. Among all the 315 cases, more than half of them are not conducted by Muslims. Hezbollah suicide bombers in the period 1982-1986 were 71% Christian, 21% Communist/Socialist, 8% Islamist (pp. 204-207). Since 1980 to 2004, the Tamil Tiger, a Hindu and secular organization rather than any Islamic fundamentalist one that launched more suicide attacks than any other groups. Even in the case of Al-Qaeda, his theory is also applicable. “Al-Qaeda is less a transnational network of like-minded ideologues... than a cross-national military alliance of national liberation movements working together against what they see as a common imperial threat”. There has never been one Al-Qaeda suicide bomber from Iran or Sudan, two of the most extremely fundamentalist countries. On the contrary, Saudi Arabia, a secular ally of US where there are thousands of US soldiers stationing, contributed to most of Islamic attackers. Religion plays a role in suicide terrorism, but “mainly in the context of national resistance”, and in a different way from what is widely perceived: when occupiers and local residents have different religion, it’s very likely that the terrorist attacks will take place. Therefore, it is not Islam *per se* but “the dynamics of religious difference” that matters.

Second, the stereotypical image of a suicide terrorist is usually a young Muslim boy, uneducated, poor and easily influenced by evil with nothing left to lose. However in reality, according to the author, the suicide terrorist is usually educated, coming from a middle-class background with no criminal record, and perceived as successful or promising. The driving force behind the suicide is an overwhelming sense of nationalism, brought about by the humiliation created from one’s home being occupied by another country. “In general, suicide attackers are rarely socially isolated, clinically insane, or economically destitute individuals, but are most often educated, socially integrated, and highly capable people who could be expected to have a good future” (p. 200). “Many acts of suicide terrorism are a murderous form of what Durkheim calls altruistic suicide” (p. 179). As a social constructed phenomenon, the altruistic suicide behavior is respected and supported by the community that produced them.

Last but not least, although not emphasized in the text, democracy is not a good idea for anti-terrorism strategy. On the contrary, it is a relatively fragile facing the terrorist attacks. The most persuasive case is the Kurdish independent movement: in the democratized Turkey, Kurdish secessionist organization PKK launched many suicide attacks in 1990s to fight against the integrating pressure from the Turkish government, but only a few hundred miles away, the Saddam regime in Iraq treated Kurdish minority much cruel than the Turkish government, but there was no terrorist attacks in Iraq. Why the difference? Because everybody understands the fact that no matter how many hundreds of Iraqis you kill, you can never expect that the regime will change its policy; while in Turkey, attackers can well expect that the bomb and the psychological impact can influence the vote in the election campaign and finally change the policy. As democratization does not necessarily change the status of occupation and therefore change the political agenda, it is irrelevant, if not complicates, for the anti-terrorism effort.

In fact, even without the support from data statistics, these findings are very clear to any independent strategy observer because they are no more than common sense if put into the context of war history or with the well understanding of

humanity. While in directly involved countries, i.e., US and its allies, these common senses are so severely covered and biased by mass media and other opinion leaders that scholars need scientific methodology and specified database to support and clarify. The mainstream elites of these states, especially political elites need to justify and mobilize support for their invasion policy, and to demonize the rivalry explicitly and implicitly by describing their action as insane and irrational serves best for that purpose. In contemporary world politics which is believed to get beyond the jungle status, the powerful States are not only depriving the weak using their superior violence capability, which is well represented by the struggle for the power of obtaining and pricing energy resources; but also depriving the latter of the moral right of rejection and resistance with the superiority power of discourse, in which regard, the introducing and construct of the term "terrorism" is one of the fresh cases. What professor Pape correctly pointed out in his study is helpful for people to get aware of the bias and exaggeration produced by the process of demonizing propaganda, but even Pape himself is also sensitive to political correctness on this sensitive issue. He emphasized repeatedly in different occasions that he is not intended to justify terrorist attacks but to provide proper understanding. What's more, he deliberately avoids mentioning the name of President Bush in his book and keep firmly and rigidly in the boundary of scientific and academic domain, although he is touching a topic directly linked with reality politics. The cautiousness may be helpful for self-protecting, but they seem to be gradually less necessary as the political atmosphere in US is changing and the mainstream is in favor of the idea of isolationism.

The aim of social science could vary from the simplest "description" to the bravest "prescription", and it seems that the author is brave and ambitious enough to try the latter. What he prescribed for US's middle-east strategy in the last chapter is a Mearsheimer style "off-shore balancing", which means to establish local alliances and jump out of the conflicts while maintaining the capacity for rapid deployment of military forces. What will happen then? It may reduce the direct cost of cash and life in the middle-east, and may also calm down the local community and therefore minimize the possibility of

terrorist attacks on US. But inevitably, the withdraw of US troops will compromise the credibility of US power globally and especially in the region, and what we need bear in mind is the fact that the fragile balance today in middle-east is established, to a very large extent, on the commitment and credibility of US power in the region. Considering the vital importance of US national interest in the region, even if US troops leave there immediately, it's very likely that they will have to get back few years later, while facing with a more difficult, risky and unfavorable conditions, as a policy advisor to Bush has put it.

So, although the book has convincingly provided lots of data and facts about the topic, the critical question that he asks in the last chapter, 'can US find a lasting solution to suicide terrorism that does not compromise its core interest in maintaining access to one of the world's key oil-producing regions', is still not successfully answered. In fact, that question seems to me not really an academic question but a political one, the aim of discussion on which is no longer for truth but for interest, and inevitably impossible to produces any final answer.

Pérez Herranz, Fernando Miguel; Santacreu Soler, José Miguel, *Las rutas de la Humanidad. Fenomenología de las migraciones*. Simat de la Vallidigna, Edicions La Xara, 2006, 168 pp.

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En un momento en el que, a nivel estatal, proliferan desde todos los ámbitos que conforman las ciencias sociales los estudios destinados al análisis de las migraciones, especialmente al fenómeno de la inmigración en la Unión Europea y en concreto en España, el libro que nos disponemos a reseñar supone un punto de inflexión.

En este caso los profesores Pérez Herranz y Santacreu Soler amplían su objeto de estudio y reconstruyen no sólo las migraciones empíricas sino también las abstractas. A lo largo del ensayo, y como el propio subtítulo bien indica, se realiza un análisis fenomenológico, incitando al mismo tiempo al lector a dicho ejercicio. La fenomenología