

THE PRC FOREIGN POLICY TRANSITION UNDER JIANG ZEMIN (WITH A FOCUS ON SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS)

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It is a hazardous duty to write about the People's Republic China (PRC)'s current foreign policy. China's rapid rise in the world political economy has attracted more and more people from various fields to study, analyze and comment on its foreign policy. For example, *Foreign Affairs* in recent years published more articles about China than any other foreign country, such as Russia or Japan. I have learned greatly from various sources. While in no way do I mean to negate the tremendous work of others, the usual discussions appeared in Chinese, English, and Japanese languages, dissatisfy me, and some thing must be done simply because it is so important. My dissatisfaction is that most serious writings on the subject of the current PRC foreign policy, both published in scholarly magazines and printed by policy-oriented institutes, are governmental power theory and reflect corporate profit values. With a focus on democracy, human rights, and people's security, this essay attempts to review the changes of the PRC's foreign policy since the Tiananmen Incident of June 1989 until 2004 when Jiang Zemin resigned from his position as the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Military Central Committee in September.

How and why was the PRC foreign policy transformed? Does the current foreign policy transition advance people's security, social justice, political freedom, and economic equality in China and for the world? I will assess these critical inquiries from people's perspective¹, with a focus on Sino-Japanese relations. Hopefully, the perspective here will contribute to rethinking of the conventional wisdom.

1. THE BACKGROUND BEFORE THE RECENT TRANSITION

The PRC foreign policy has undergone grand transitions since the PRC's founding in 1949. The fortunate thing for the Chinese people is that the greatest transition was initiated directly by the founding fathers. During the Cold War, although the U.S. with reason considered China as a vital "card" for its own interest against the USSR, the PRC/CCP leadership nonetheless at their final life stage could rationally calculate that they had also placed China into a proper position within the "Three Worlds" division frame², or later, the "triangle world frame"³. Struggling to correct the crucial mistakes of relying on the USSR only and to break

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¹ The concept "people's perspective" is close to other terms such as "global humanism" with an emphasis on each global citizen's equal rights regardless his/her living state boundaries. I read only one American scholar with similar perspective on Asia. See Gurtov, Mel, *Pacific Asia? Prospects for Security and Cooperation in East Asia*. Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield, 2002 and my review of this book for H-Net at <<http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.cgi?path=196671029215885>>.

² Although Mao Zedong made a modest remark claiming China not the leader of the third world, with the U.S. and the USSR (the first world), Japan, Western and Eastern Europe (the second world) excluded, no other country could compete with China to lead the third world against the two superpowers. Deng Xiaoping discarded Mao's world division and began to use the "triangle frame" to emphasize China's importance and independence in international politics.

³ Although the U.S. and the USSR did not look international politics within a "triangle frame," it did not matter for the PRC leadership to use it.

through the international isolation, the CCP leadership under Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai laid a foundation of a peaceful international environment for China to survive and develop.

It is still early to make a comprehensive judgment on the PRC foreign policy under Mao and Zhou. After all, foreign policy is only one field of the PRC politics and history (of which we only begin to know gradually), and its evaluation is deeply dependent on China's domestic politics and its future. If China would eventually develop into a strong, stable as well as democratic society with a nonetheless socialist characteristic, Mao's "zili gengsheng" (*self-reliance*) policy of enforcement of Chinese people's tremendous hardship under the international Cold War context deserves appreciation and praise. Otherwise, a deteriorated PRC regime would make the Chinese people regard Mao and Zhou's foreign policy either unnecessary sacrifice (against both the U.S. imperialism and the USSR "revisionism") or a grand betrayal (such as in the case of giving up war reparations from Japan). The reality, however, is that the PRC had only limited options in foreign policy and the selection policy became a highly controversial maneuver.

The "normalization" of Sino-Japanese relations in 1972 and the establishment of Sino-American diplomatic relationship in 1979 accomplished the biggest PRC foreign policy transition from an ideology-based revolutionary policy to interest-based diplomatic relations⁴. This change also naturally paved the way to eventually normalize the PRC's relations with the USSR when Mikhail Gorbachev visited Beijing in June 1989. Internationally, in the meantime, China's foreign policy shift created victims and losers. They include the Japanese Communist Party (which waned and split among pro-USSR, pro-PRC or independence lines in the 1950s), Cuba's Revolution, Vietnam's liberation and unification war, and the Southeast Asian communist movement when China established diplomatic ties with their governments in the 1980s. The worldwide revolutionary movement (some of

them are called "Maoists") associated with military struggle strategy rationally regarded the PRC's policy change a grand betrayal. Even today, when we read direct reports from Peru, the Philippines, or Nepal's peasant struggles, we can understand more and appreciate deeper of the original meaning and significance of "Mao Zedong Thought" (Maoism) in the world history.

However, the PRC foreign policy change under Mao and Zhou was unavoidable for any revolutionary regimes to transfer their military states to normal countries, and it is generally supported by the majority of their own people. If we compare the process of the PRC's foreign policy change with that of the USSR⁵, we can conclude that the PRC's peaceful foreign policy change greatly benefited the majority of the Chinese people. The PRC foreign policy concluded its greatest transition process from Mao Zedong's handshake with Nixon to the PRC "chief architect" Deng Xiaoping's meeting with Gorbachev in 1989. For China, Taiwan was not reunified yet, but that was not a particular worry. The U.S. has promised to gradually reduce weapons sale to Taiwan in the August 17, 1981 Sino-American Shanghai Communiqué. Time will solve this problem. Finally, China obtained the most favorite international environment since the Opium War one and half century ago. Now China's friends were all over the world, and the PRC would have a much brighter future. It seemed that the PRC foreign policy needed no more substantial change, provided, however, that the Tiananmen Incident had not happened.

2. THE TIANANMEN INCIDENT AFFECTING THE PRC'S FOREIGN POLICY TRANSITION

The 1989 Tiananmen Incident ended the Cold War in East Asia with a very characteristic beginning: the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), the main instrument of the Chinese Revolution, was mobilized to crack down the PRC's own civilian people in the heart of the PRC poli-

⁴ This was finalized as the so-called "five principles of peaceful co-existence" and evolved to the core of China's independent foreign policy. The five principles are: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.

⁵ One vital factor for Trotsky's failure is that his "Continuous Revolution" theory required the USSR people to continue the hardship for the cause of the world revolution after decade-long war turbulence. For example, it was reported that sometime in the 1920s Petrograd's Party members were forced to pay large amount of dues to support the CCP. It is understandable that the majority of the Soviet people did not support Trotsky's foreign policy.

tics. It is true that the CCP regime had politically oppressed the Chinese people since the founding of the PRC, nonetheless, Deng Xiaoping's brutality⁶ was exposed to the world media focus which challenged the legitimacy of the CCP's one-party dictatorship to rule China. This affected the process of the post-Cold War political transformation in East Asia and the world, which in turn, forced China to adjust its foreign policy to cope with the consequences following the incident. Especially in the two fields of PRC foreign policy priority, China's relations with the U.S. and Japan, the PRC foreign policy has been forced to undergo unexpected, unintended and undesired transformation in the post-Cold War frame.

Throughout its whole history, ruthlessly suppressing its dissents becomes one vital element for the Bolshevik's victory to take power which also led to the USSR's final dissolution. Although to a great degree the Stalin regime was just a continuation and extension from Lenin's harsh policy⁷, people could hardly accept the legitimacy of any suppression policy after the regime had firmly controlled the country. Under an authoritative regime, those with either true orthodoxy principles⁸ or reform orientation would be expelled from the system, and those without principle but only personal purposes could remain in or rise up to power. The death of

the USSR under its new generation leaders is unavoidable. While by no mean I intend to underestimate the severity⁹, the PRC regime is much softer than the USSR in this regard. The political freedom became much more in the 1980s since virtually all core members in the second generation of the CCP leadership, such as the top three party veterans, Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun and Peng Zhen, were victims of Mao Zedong's dictatorship¹⁰. They had learned enough lessons from their own bitter experience of inner party struggles. It seems that China is exempt from troubling issues, such as democracy and human rights, in the PRC's foreign policy¹¹.

Besides, rather than challenging the U.S. worldwide hegemony, China desperately needed America's help in developing its economy, which had been the top priority of China's "Reform and Openness" policy, and became the CCP's new legitimacy to rule China. Under such a political circumstance, human rights could hardly become an important issue of Sino-American relations¹². The U.S. government was still supporting a dictatorial regime in Taiwan and the exiled Dalai Lama in India, but without the issue of democracy and human rights in the mainland China, it was widely expected that Taiwan would eventually be reunified like South Vietnam or Hong Kong, and the Tibet

⁶ We now know that even Yang Sangkun, the then PRC President and Vice Chairman of the CCP Military Central Committee, opposed opening fire to civilian people. Li Peng, the "butcher" Prime Minister, also wrote a book recently (which was not allowed to publish) to plead innocence claiming that he was just following Deng's order.

⁷ See, for example, *Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics, Conversations with Felix Chuev*. Chicago, Ivan R. Dee, 1993, 107. "Who was more severe, Lenin or Stalin?" "Lenin, of course. He was severe. In some cases he was harsher than Stalin. Read his messages to Dzerzhinsky. He often resorted to extreme measures when necessary. He ordered the suppression of the Tambov uprising, that everything be burned to the ground. I was present at the discussion. He would not have tolerated any opposition, even had it appeared. I recall how he reproached Stalin for his softness and liberalism. 'What kind of a dictatorship do we have? We have a milk-and-honey power, and not a dictatorship!'" However, there is a distinction (or disillusionment): Lenin destroyed "enemies" but Stalin executed "comrades," so Lenin is not regarded harsh towards its own people.

⁸ A typical case is the diehard Maoist Deng Liqun, a former politburo and CCP's propaganda chief. He is prohibited from speaking out criticizing Jiang Zemin's so-call "Three Representatives Theory".

⁹ I myself was deprived my PRC passport for my dissident opinion even before the Tiananmen Incident.

¹⁰ Mao himself was a loser of the inner party struggle before he finally established himself in the famous Zunyi Meeting during the Long March in 1935, and he was much softer than Lenin and Stalin. Except the few senior CCP leaders who directly challenged Mao's power at his late age, almost all victims survived so they had a second or third chance to come back to power again. Assassination or execution in party line struggles is strictly prohibited inside the CCP.

¹¹ These issues had hindered USSR-American relations. Besides, unlike the USSR, the PRC does not have a Jewish problem with the U.S.

¹² There were political prisons in Chinese jails or labor camps, and human rights advocates such as Amnesty International did not forget them. However, as long as China would not make explicit public mistakes, human rights would not become an issue relevant to America's "national interest" against China.

problem was merely a question of how long the current Dalai Lama would physically live in this world. The mainstream American politics and media would have no interest to contain or “engage” China without much material for agitating the general public.

However, the Tiananmen Incident showed the world how brutal, ruthless, and unpopular the CCP regime was, and how weak the PRC foundation was. It created public enemies all over the world. Human rights became a hot issue of Sino-American relations, and virtually all other important disputes (security, trade, IPR, and so on) were linked to the PRC’s democracy and human rights condition because China has been judged standing at the wrong side of history. The CCP leadership was denounced in the world. With the legitimacy under crisis, the PRC foreign policy was caught.

Although good people all over the world wished to improve Sino-American relations by removing this headache element of Tiananmen Incident, the PRC foreign policy could not make this happen simply because the new PRC regime under Jiang Zemin would lose legitimacy if they admitted wrong doing. Instead of correcting the mistake, the Jiang regime made compromises in almost every other field at the cost of sacrificing Chinese people’s interest for the purpose to maintain their power. “(Power) stability is all”. With the results of the Chinese Revolution at their disposal, the Jiang regime put China for sale¹³.

The Jiang regime was indeed fortunate enough. In the first years soon after the Tiananmen Incident, the USSR was still there; and as long as it existed, the USSR was the number one enemy of the U.S. Even after the dissolution of the USSR, the U.S. needed several years to consolidate its Cold War victory in Europe, following the unification of Germany and the enlargement of the NATO to Eastern Europe. The U.S. could not mobilize its might to contain China. Coincidentally, Iraq’s Saddam Hussein helped China shaking off the Western sanctions completely and extricating China from international isolation since the Tiananmen Incident¹⁴. For the goal to maintain the regime’s power, to cast off the shadow of economic sanctions, and to avoid a similar fate of the USSR, the PRC foreign policy was transformed. The PRC foreign policy became a tool to serve its regime and their clients, domestically and internationally¹⁵.

Internationally, Beijing has been in most cases staying with the U.S. at the UN Security Council over controversial cases. Except in the situations relevant to Taiwan, the PRC disappeared from international politics arena in a turbulent time when the people in weak and poor countries desperately need a voice for people’s security, peace, social justice and economical development. The world needs the People’s Republic but the PRC is not accountable any more. Let’s take the Iraq case and the UN function in this regard. Never before has the U.S. officially claimed or approve the right to launch a preemptive strike; never before has the

¹³ The most explicit case is the WTO deal with the U.S., in which not only China’s economic interest but also the PRC political sovereignty, including its Constitution, were placed subordinate to a treaty with an foreign organization. If readers are not familiar with the complicated contents, they can understand the essence of the deal from the process. This is not a “win/win” game, as claimed by both sides. This is not even a negotiation. The U.S. delegation was headed by the cannot-make-decision Trade Representative while her boss, the U.S. President, was far away from his White House office. She came to Beijing in November 1999 only for the final signature to subjugate China. There was no place to negotiate for the U.S. conditions, and they had prepared to leave for the U.S. on the third day. This reminds us the U.S. diplomacy during the Rambouillet “negotiation” in the same year, just before the U.S.-led NATO’s bombing campaign against Yugoslavia (and also China’s Embassy there).

¹⁴ In 1990, in the run-up to the planned Desert Storm military action, the U.S. bribed poor countries with cheap Saudi oil, and dangled new arms packages before governments such as Ethiopia and Colombia, whose access to U.S. military support had been cut because of wars and human rights violations. The U.S. also threatened and punished virtually every country on the Security Council to force them to vote to authorize the U.S. war. And, certainly, as one of the Security Council’s five veto-capable permanent members, China’s veto would make the U.S. military action impossible. The U.S. diplomats went to China and asked “name your price” to avert a veto and fulfilled Beijing’s wish list for post-Tiananmen Incident diplomatic rehabilitation.

¹⁵ It can be argued that this is always true under any regime. However, it was not so distinctive of the difference and conflict between the government and the people under Mao. Today, we can easily identify that foreign capitalists, officials or scholars are VIP guests of the PRC consulates while ordinary PRC citizens are bitterly treated.

U.S. openly threatened to unilaterally invade another country in the name of enforcing UN resolutions even if the UN explicitly disavowed such a military attack. The option of a clear “no” position, rejecting the U.S. consensus, standing publicly against such a catastrophic war, and trying to prevent the war or at least distinguishing its own country from such global folly, does not appear on the PRC’s agenda, when yet exactly that position is urgently required. While France and Russia threatened to veto the U.S. (and its junior partner the UK) new resolution to bargain for a bigger share, the PRC keeps silence publicly. As one of the five permanent Council members, the PRC cannot prevent the U.S. from violating the UN Charter, which prohibits the use of force unless all non-military possible options have been exhausted. Peace-loving people all over the world have reason to believe that they are betrayed by the PRC. Should the Tiananmen Incident not happened fourteen years ago so the PRC regime did not fear to be linked with the same problems of Iraq (dictatorship, human rights violation, and so on), would not China act differently? Would the world be safer today?

3. THE PRC’S JAPAN POLICY FAILURE AFTER THE TIANANMEN INCIDENT

With the victory confirmed in Europe after years of the USSR dissolution, the U.S. turned eyes to East Asia, the world dynamic economic growth center. Now the Jiang regime had consolidated their power base and the PRC restored its relatively normal relations with the world. In 1995, the Clinton Administration had to unlink the annual renew condition of China’s most-favorite-nation (MFN) status from China’s human rights condition. The Taiwan problem had become the “core

issue”¹⁶ in Sino-American relations. To use the Taiwan card to “engage” (contain) China, the Clinton Administration turned to the almost forgotten “oxygen”¹⁷: the U.S.-Japan military alliance.

Japan is still the second largest world economy, and is the dominant economy and financial center in Asia. Since the first Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), Japan has been China’s first (1894-1945), third (1945-1991), or second (1991-) important foreign country in the world to influence (and in some degree, to determine) China’s survival or development. In 2001, Japan also became China’s first trade partner, and China became Japan’s second trade partner, with the trade between them amounted \$90 billion. In 2003, that amount is \$130 billion. A right and appropriate Japan policy is vital for China’s development. However, since Japan’s rising to world power was the same process of China’s declining to the edge of bankruptcy¹⁸, some observers see Sino-Japanese interactive as a “zero-sum” game. They see China’s emergence as a political, economic and even a financial powerhouse in the region inevitably exacerbates Japan’s economic troubles (such as deflation and hollowing industries). Along with the economic ties being enlarged, the political relations between China and Japan have become tenser after the end of the Cold War, and the PRC’s Japan policy has reached its limitation under current circumstance.

The 2004 Asian Cup soccer tournament, which was held in China, developed into a political “Chinese nationalism vs. Japan” game all over China. In the final China vs. Japan championship on August 7 in Beijing, the Chinese government mobilized 47 thousand police forces to protect the Japanese team and their cheering watchers¹⁹. Why the Sino-Japanese political relations deteriorated so pessimistically even though there exists no vital

¹⁶ In fact, from the view of China, it has always been the most important issue between China and the U.S. since the foundation of the PRC. However, it was not the priority issue for more than two decades in the late Cold War period.

¹⁷ This was coined by Joseph Nye, Clinton’s Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and a point man on Asia policy. He said when the Defense Department announced a floor of 100,000 troops in East Asia: “While we are indeed stressing the increased importance of multilateral institutions, it’s not at the cost of our primary attention to reinforcing the traditional security alliances we have in the region”. *Washington Post*, 28 February 1995.

¹⁸ Besides the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, if you have a chance to visit rural Japanese villages, you will easily find memorials devoted to every Japan-engaged war. The Japanese policy was through “koyohei” (strong army) to “fukoku” (wealthy state), and Japan’s advanced nationwide education system, which was established mainly through war gains, became the base for the Japanese miracle decades later without a army (officially, Japan’s peaceful constitution prohibits Japan having military forces).

¹⁹ *Asahi Shinbum*, 9 August 2004.

interest conflict between the two countries? Besides the Chinese political situations as mentioned above, we also need to notice the structural change of the Japanese politics after the Tiananmen Incident.

Japan fully utilized the international context to achieve its national goal of economic growth since the end of the Second World War. In the post-war democratic system, the pro-USA ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) knew what Japan should do and what Japan could not do. The so-called LDP conservative mainstream (*hoshu honryu*), from the former Prime Minister Yoshida soon after the war to the former Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi in 1993, stick with the so-called “Yoshida Doctrine” restricting Japan from rearmament. Although the Japanese government was caught by the America-seeded “Northern Territories” problem and could not make a peace treaty with the USSR or Russia until today²⁰, it successfully utilized America’s fear of Japan’s political neutrality potential to force the U.S. to provide capital, technology and market for Japan’s economic growth. Tanaka Kakuei even went to China and established diplomatic relations with China without America’s approval²¹.

In the Cold War period, virtually all Japanese opposition parties, including the second largest opposition party Komei Party (translated in English as Clean Government Party), were socialistic oriented. It is not an exaggeration to say that without the opposition Japan would probably become similar dictatorial regimes as South Korea, South Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia. And the progressive pro-PRC opposition also played an indispensable role for Japan’s national interest. China “enjoyed” popular support or sympathy from almost

all Japanese, even inside the LDP. When Zhou Enlai stated that the PRC would not deal with a Japanese government under Sato, Sato’s cabinet collapsed and was replaced by Tanaka who stated his willingness to go Beijing. Thus it is easy to understand how deeply the entire Japanese society was shocked by the Tiananmen Incident in 1989 and how the incident would affect the Japanese political structure. The opposition parties either collapsed (the Socialist Party), turned round to the ruling party (Komei Party), shifted to nationalistic line (the Japanese Communist Party)²², or simply disappeared without any reason to exist (the Democratic Socialist Party and the Social Democratic Alliance).

The Socialist Party (JSP) was the largest opposition party and the only party in Japan to keep an official friendship with the CCP based on their similar socialistic ideology. In 1959 the JSP Central Committee Chairman Asanuma declared in Beijing that the American Imperialism was the common enemy of the Japanese and Chinese peoples. Such close ties with the CCP (hence the PRC government) greatly enforced its bargain power within Japanese politics. For example, in the 1980s, the JSP provided information of Japanese Education Ministry’s textbook censorship to the PRC and requested the PRC to respond. After the PRC criticized Japan’s denial of its past war atrocities²³, the JSP could raise this issue in Japan’s Diet to blame the ruling LDP. The Japanese government hated the JSP’s “betrayal,” and the Japanese embassy in Beijing was always busy to collect JSP delegation’s information in China, but the LDP could not curse more the JSP because they themselves were more corrupt under the U.S. (some times direct) control²⁴. The

²⁰ For this Russo-Japanese territory dispute, see (in Japanese) Yoshikazu, Takahashi, “Against Japan’s imperialist territory request, strengthen internationalism”. *Kakehashi Weekly*, 8 June 1998; (in Chinese) Zhao, Jing, “The so-called Northern Territories problem”. *October Review*, 4 (1998).

²¹ He was eventually punished, though. The U.S. declassified a Senate hearing indicating Tanaka took 500 million yen bribes from Lockheed for the Japanese government to purchase Lockheed airplanes. Humiliated and convicted guilty, Tanaka was forced to hand over LDP’s largest faction to Takeshita and leave the Japanese politics. Not coincidentally, his daughter was also fired from her popular Japanese Foreign Minister position by Prime Minister Koizumi in April 2002, partly because of her pro-Beijing remarks and critical remarks of the newly elected U.S. President Bush.

²² The small but strong Japanese Communist Party was once declared by the CCP as one of its four enemies in Japan, along with the American Imperialists. For the transformation of the Japanese Communist Party after the Tiananmen Incident, see Zhao, Jing, “The Japanese Communist Party and the June 4th Incident of 1989”. *Sino-Japanese Studies*, XII-1 (1999), 25-32.

²³ For example, Japan’s invasion of China was described as “shinshutsu (advance) to China”.

²⁴ See, for example, Johnson, Chalmers, “The 1955 system and the American connection: a bibliographic introduction”; Schlei, Norbert A., “Japan’s ‘M-Fund’ memorandum, 7 January 1991”; Schaller, Michael, “America’s favorite war criminal: Kishi Nobusuke and the transformation of U.S.-Japan relations”. Also see Kaplan, David, “U.S. propaganda efforts in postwar Japan”. *Japan Policy Research Institute Working paper*, 11 (July 1995) and *Critique*, February 1997.

very existence of the JSP, a powerful political ally of the PRC in the Japanese politics, was a grateful blessing to the PRC's Japan policy. On the other hand, the JSP's dramatic collapse due to the Tiananmen Incident verifies how deeply the JSP depended on China and the international Cold War context. Its successor Social Democratic Party now has only six seats in the House of Representative and five seats in the House of Councillors, even lacking the power to introduce a bill to the Japanese Congress.

Compared with the JSP, Komei's political turning round was much easier and natural, since it did not have a clear political principle. Komei silently dropped off all "socialist" wordings from its charters, pamphlets, meetings, and advertisements. Komei and its grassroots election body Soka Gakkai's paramount leader Ikeda Taisaku went to Beijing to meet Li Peng soon after the Tiananmen Incident. He obtained another handshake photo with one "world leader"²⁵. Komei also abandoned its peace and constitution-protection lines. Since the LDP usually could not control both the House of Representative and the House of Councillors²⁶, Komei's stance sometimes could determine Japan's important policies. In 1991, Komei's agreement made it possible for the LDP Prime Minister Kaifu to send the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) minesweepers to Gulf even though the war had ended. In 1992, Komei helped the LDP pass Japan's PKO (peace keeping organizations) bill, which legally authorizes sending the SDF abroad,

under the flag of the UN (at the time being). In July 1999, Komei formally decided to share power with its life-long enemy the LDP and Ozawa Ichiro's Liberal Party. During the meeting between the heads of Komei and the LDP, Prime Minister Obuchi especially mentioned Komei's role in establishing Japan's "normalization" relationship with China²⁷. However, this time, Komei's contribution to the Japanese national interest would no longer benefit China any more.

The Japanese government collaborated with the Chinese government to persecute Chinese people in Japan during and after the Tiananmen Incident²⁸. It could not, nor has the willing to use the "democracy and human rights" card against China. Backed by Japanese people's attitude change toward China²⁹ and the Japanese politics "regime shift" since the Tiananmen Incident, the Japanese government for the first time sent a clear "No!" signal to China in 1995 by freezing a small fraction of that year's ODA (Japan's governmental Official Development Aid). More and more Japanese people are "educated" by rightist media (such as Sankei, Yomiuri) to connect their attitude change to the ODA issue³⁰. Japan used the pretext of China's two nuclear tests that year, emphasizing its unique experience as the world's only nuclear victim. China was annoyed. The PRC Ambassador rebuked: "Japan should first leave the nuclear umbrella under the world's solo superpower before criticizing China for developing its moderate nuclear capacity". China's Vice Premier Qian Qichen told

²⁵ Ikeda's life-long goal is Nobel Peace Prize. Increasing Ikeda's handshake pictures with "world leaders" becomes one important accomplishment of Komei-Soka Gakkai's worldwide diplomatic activities.

²⁶ The House of Representatives were elected from middle (and later small) election districts, so the LDP usually could obtain more than half of seats with less than one third popular votes. The House of Councillors were elected rationally from popular votes, so the LDP usually could not become majority. Important bills/acts should be passed in both houses to become laws. When there is a conflict to form a cabinet, the House of Representatives is superior.

²⁷ Since the JSP was China's public ally in Japan during the whole period of Cold War, Zhou Enlai knew that the LDP would not make a deal with China through the JSP. Instead, he had to utilize Komei, whose Central Committee Chairman Takeiri had personal connection with Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei, at the final stage to negotiate the core conditions (Taiwan status and war reparations).

²⁸ Zhao, Jing, "The Betrayal of Democracy: Tiananmen's Shadow over Japan". *Historia Actual On-Line*, 4 (spring 2004) [article on-line] Available from Internet at: <<http://www.hapress.com/haol.php?a=n04a02>>.

²⁹ *Yomiuri Daily* has a series of survey of Japanese people's attitude toward China since 1988. In the first time survey, 76% answered to trust China, while 14.2% answered not to trust China. In 2002 (August 24th and 25th), 37% answered to trust China, while 55% answered not to trust China (*Yomiuri*, 11 September 2002.) Notice that the rightist *Yomiuri* does not have a good relationship with China, so the above numbers may not be accurate. But the Japanese people's attitude change toward China is clear and sharp.

³⁰ *Ibid.* *Yomiuri* (11 September 2002) survey shows 43% Japanese wanted to reduce ODA, 13% wanted to stop ODA to China.

Japan's Foreign Minister Kawaguchi: "It is understandable for Japan to reduce the ODA. However, we cannot accept the pretext of China's military expansion"³¹. Some Chinese media asked: "If Japan can use the small amount of ODA as a diplomatic tool against China, why our government cannot use the huge amount of war reparations?"

In fact, the Chinese government has changed its policy on the war reparations issue, from suppressing its own people to tolerating, encouraging, and supporting the Chinese victims seeking for reparations from both the Japanese government and Japanese companies³². This is a positive change, because the Chinese government can no longer monopolize the PRC's Japan policy. The Chinese official line now becomes: "Although the Chinese government gave up the 120 billion USD of state-to-state reparations, however, under no circumstance the Chinese government gave up the 180 billion USD of individual reparation requests"³³. Neither the Japanese government nor the Japanese people are prepared to face to this "already settled" reparations issue between China and Japan³⁴. The Sino-Japanese friendship, based on the bitter experience of the worst war between the two peoples, was buried by their governments due to China and Japan's domestic politics. Using the pretence of

anti-terrorism, which has nothing to do with Japan's security at all, the Japanese government is rushing to prepare a series of subsequent war-related acts and to sanction the "national flag" Hinomaru and "national anthem" Kimigayo with the goal to revise its peaceful constitution and to rearm Japan³⁵.

A historical event occurred in one site always brings about significant responses in global settings. Deng Xiaoping's crushing of the democracy movement in Beijing helped and encouraged the regimes in other countries, especially in Japan, to utilize this incident to pursue their own reactionary policies. The ending of Cold War in East Asia on June 4, 1989 sent the Japanese ruling class a misleading signal that they could mislead Japan from an economic giant to a global political power. In more than one decade, the destruction of the opposition has undermined Japan's relatively democratic system³⁶ and relatively independent foreign policy. A Japanese professor observed of the Japan-United States relationship in "a situation that can only be described as 'extreme abnormality' has become the norm"³⁷. With Japan's deepening domestic conflicts among different classes, the stagnate economy, and the corrupt politics, the Japanese ruling class has less and less options, except nationalistic militarism³⁸. In fact, even though the Japanese

³¹ *Mainichi Daily*, 10 September 2002.

³² Unlike many other democratic activists for domestic political reform who were persecuted or harassed by the Chinese government, Bao Ge, a famous democratic activist on this reparations issue, enjoyed his wide connections with various governmental officials supporting him before he came to the U.S.

³³ Xianyong, Wang, "How did we give up the Sino-Japanese war reparations". *Dangshi wenhui* (The CCP History Collection), July 2002.

³⁴ For a thorough survey on this issue, see Yan-Jun, Yin, *Chunichi Senso Baisho Mondai—Chogoku kokuminseifu no senji/sengo tainichiseisaku wo chushin ni* (Sino-Japanese War Reparations). Japan, Ochanomizu Shobo, 1996. See Jing Zhao's review of the book for H-Japan, April 1997: <<http://www2.h-net.msu.edu/reviews/showrev.cgi?path=2385874357020>>.

³⁵ The Japanese constitution chapter II "Renunciation of war" has only one article: "Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized".

³⁶ The single district election "reform" has artificially made up Japan's two-party system, thus makes constitution revision much easier.

³⁷ In "Toward an Independent Japanese Relationship with the United States", Ito Narihiko observed: the US Deputy Secretary of State Armitage, who ordered the Koizumi Cabinet to "show the flag" and get "boots on the ground", recently stated in an interview that "Article 9 of the Constitution interferes in the Japanese-American Alliance" (*Bungei Shunju*, March 2004). In discussions with LDP Secretary General Abe Shinzo, Armitage also declared that "the Japanese-American Alliance is going after North Korea" (*Bungei Shunju*, July 2004). Ito's article appeared in *Gunshuku* (*Arms Control*), August 2004, was translated for *Japan Focus* by Vanessa B Ward at <<http://japanfocus.org/175.html>>.

³⁸ *Yomiuri* (11 September 2002) survey shows total to 70% Japanese from different aspects consider China's military strength a future threat to Japan's security. The rightist *Yomiuri* does not have a good relationship with China, so the above number may not be so accurate, but the figure is still astonishing.

government has not publicly abandoned its “three non-nuclear principles”, when will Japan declare nuclear is a problem of time under current international political environment. Should another Tiananmen Incident occur again, the majority of Japanese people would be easily agitated to rearm Japan³⁹.

The consequence of the reactionary Japanese politics in turn reacts on Chinese politics and shadows forth concerned Sino-Japanese relations. Unlike the Sino-American relations which can be rehabilitated as long as the U.S. holds its “One China” policy⁴⁰, the Sino-Japanese political relations have deteriorated irreversibly, even though from Chinese people’s perspective we have given up war reparations request. Without a political ally inside the Japanese politics, and most significantly, without a democratic mechanism inside China, the PRC’s Japan policy under Jiang Zemin was left very narrow space to maneuver; it failed bitterly.

Originally, the Taiwan problem was China’s domestic unification process from a prolonged civil war⁴¹. However, the international reality, added by the PRC domestic problems and foreign policy mistakes, transformed the development and changing aspects of the Taiwan question into a PRC-U.S.-Japan tripartite interplay. After the Tiananmen Incident, the U.S. pushed Japan to “redefine” the U.S.-Japanese Security frame to transform it from an “exclusively defense-oriented” (*senshu boe*) regime to a globally offensive military alliance so Japan would be able to participate global actions

with the U.S. forces. In 1996 the U.S. and Japan signed the Clinton-Hashimoto Declaration and began to revise the 1978 “Defense Guidelines”. In 1999 Japan’s Diet passed three new Defense Guidelines acts to ensure that Japan would mobilize its national resources to support any U.S.-initiated military actions in “area surrounding Japan”⁴². Once a remote nightmare⁴³, Japan’s eventual military alliance with the U.S. against China over Taiwan, i.e., a de facto triangle alliance of Washington-Tokyo-Taipei to contain China, is gradually coming into emerging. East Asian people’s security and prosperity is under threat from the U.S.-Japanese hegemonic military alliance, the PRC non-democratic one-party political system, and Taiwan’s irresponsible independent attempts.

CONCLUSION: TOWARD PEOPLE’S SECURITY IN EAST ASIA

We are living in a sole super-power era, and the super-power is much more powerful in military, economic, political, technological, and cultural influence than any empire throughout history. Since the U.S. President announced that any country that is not “with us” is “against us”, no country, even China, dares to risk standing defiant of U.S. demands. However, on the other hand, as the anti-war presidential candidate Howard Dean pointed out: “America’s war in Iraq is also the beginning of the end of the American Empire”. Especially in East Asia area, China is playing a more and more

³⁹ Since the September 17, 2002 summit between Koizumi and Kim, with North Korea having accepted Japan’s conditions, the possibility of Japan’s utilizing the North Korea card to develop nuclear weapons is low. Militarily, there is no need for Japan to participate a U.S.-South Korea action to subjugate North Korea. Rather, Japan’s involvement would make such a military action difficult.

⁴⁰ Human rights issue is not vital to both sides, and the Taiwan problem is not so vital to the U.S. interest as it to China. That is the reason the U.S. maintains an “ambiguity strategy” policy on Taiwan. Since the Bush Administration has created so many enemies in the world, there is a high possibility that the Bush Administration will compromise on the Taiwan issue to exchange for the PRC concessions on other vital American interests in the world.

⁴¹ We can trace this perspective from the anti-imperialism Chinese Revolution for people’s liberation or people’s rights to peaceful life without foreign intervention. The question is how long the PRC foreign policy could hold this view.

⁴² Inside the ruling LDP, only the Kato faction did not belong to the so-called Taiwan Gang. Kato went to Beijing to explain that 90% Japanese regard “area surrounding Japan” as North Korea, but the Cabinet Secretary-Chief Kajiyama corrected Kato stating “area surrounding Japan” includes Taiwan. In April 2002, Kato was forced to resign for tax deviance, even though that is just a common practice by almost all Japanese politicians. He dissolved his LDP faction and lost his hope to become the Prime Minister.

⁴³ For example, Asai Motofumi, a former MOFA China Section Chief, now an international politics professor at Meijigakuin University, is a famous critic of Japan’s current foreign policy. He argues that, from the minimum moral standard, Japan should not to be involved into a Taiwan conflict under any circumstance. After all, who caused the Taiwan problem from the beginning?

important role⁴⁴, and Jiang Zemin's stepping down from the Chinese politics provides a chance for the new PRC leadership to clear out Tiananmen's shadow over the PRC foreign policy. The PRC foreign policy is still undergoing transformation. Among so many powers/forces/actors in this area, only China's democratization will not only force the new PRC leadership in Zhongnanhai to achieve a peaceful reform for social justice and political free-

dom, but also re-transform the PRC foreign policy toward people's security and economic prosperity. Never before in the modern history, the Chinese people have a greater role to determine their own fate. Never before in the modern history, the Chinese people will make a greater contribution to East Asia and the world's permanent security, peace and prosperity.

⁴⁴ For example, before September 11, 2001, some Americans indicated that not only Seoul, but also Pyongyang and Beijing should accept the idea of a U.S. military presence in Korea even after the unification (Goldstein, Avery, "U.S. policies toward Asia". *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, 17 April 2001). However, the Bush Administration now has to rely on China to deal with North Korea.